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PREPARATIONS FOR THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE
PART III

Soviet Union Political Affairs

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CONTENTS

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READERS SUBMIT PROPOSALS

19th Party Conference: Readers Debate Need To Return to Stalinist Discipline [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 20 May 88]	1
Reader Wants More Information on Central Committee Members [Yuri Burtin; MOSCOW NEWS, 22-29 May 88]	2
Non-Party Member Submits Proposals [MOSCOW NEWS No 21, 29 May-5 Jun 88 p 2]	3

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

Supreme Court Chairman Interviewed on Judicial Reforms [V.I. Terebilov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 17, 27 Apr 88]	4
Legal Regulation of Social Bodies Viewed [IZVESTIYA 17 May]	9
Sociologists Study Makeup of Bureaucracy, Ways to Combat It [L. Ponomarev, V. Shinkarenko; IZVESTIYA, 18, 19 May 88]	13
Discussion of 'New Youth Policy' Sought [IZVESTIYA 20 May]	19
Youth Official Discusses Challenges to Komsomol [V. Lukov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 21 May 88]	22
Kryuchkov Discusses Preconference Debate [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 22]	25

LETTERS ON CONFERENCE THESES

PRAVDA Readers Respond to CPSU CC Theses [PRAVDA 28 May 88]	29
Reader Advocates 'Cleansing' Party [PRAVDA 30 May]	31
PRAVDA Readers Discuss CPSU CC Theses [PRAVDA, 30 May 88]	32
Readers' Letters View CPSU Conference Theses [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 31 May]	33
Conference Delegate Opposes Third Elective Term [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 31 May]	34
Idea of Party Monitoring Body Welcomed [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 1 Jun]	35
PRAVDA Readers Discuss Economic Reforms, Cadres [PRAVDA, 1 Jun 88]	36
Party Officials Surveyed on Reaction to Conference Theses [A. Maleyev, M. Amirov; Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 1 Jun 88]	38
Party Veteran Urges More Open Leadership Debate [PRAVDA 2 Jun]	41
Public Criticism Must Extend to General Secretary [IZVESTIYA 2 Jun]	42
Leaders' Functions Differentiation Urged [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 2 Jun]	42
Readers' Letters Comment on Conference Theses [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 2 Jun]	43
PRAVDA Reader Views Conference Theses, Party Role [PRAVDA 2 Jun]	44
Letter Opposes Limit on Term of Office [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 2 Jun]	45
Creation of Official 'Opposition Center' Urged [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 2 Jun]	46
'Extraordinary' CPSU Congress Proposed [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 2 Jun]	46
Reinterpretation of Democratic Centralism Urged [PRAVDA 3 Jun]	46
PRAVDA Reader on Points Arising From Theses [PRAVDA 3 Jun]	47
Reader Seeks Conference Assault on Privileges [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 23]	47
Theses Lack Clarity on Defense Parity [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Jun]	48
Tenure Limit Should Count Party, Soviet Work [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Jun]	48
Two-Term Limit on Party Officers Unnecessary [PRAVDA 6 Jun]	48
Mailbag on Party Conference Theses Sampled [PRAVDA 11 Jun]	49
Program Explores Public Opinion of Theses	49

DISCUSSION OF THESES

Scientist Opposes Party Control of Science	51
'One-Man Leadership' of Obkoms Deplored [PRAVDA 28 May]	51
IZVESTIYA Editorial Views Party Conference Theses [IZVESTIYA 29 May]	52
PRAVDA Editorial Examines Party Conference Theses [PRAVDA 29 May]	54
Role of State Orders System Discussed [Valovoy in PRAVDA 30 May]	55
CPSU Role in Society Needs Legal Definition [PRAVDA 31 May]	59
Lawyer Argues Against Parliamentarianism [IZVESTIYA 31 May]	59
Scholar Urges Reform in Legal Sphere [IZVESTIYA 1 Jun]	63
Glasnost in Party Documents Urged [Rusakov in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 2 Jun]	66
Academics Criticize Conference Theses [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 4 Jun]	67
National Equality Problems Viewed [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 4 Jun]	72
Sociologist Zaslavskaya Interviewed on Theses [IZVESTIYA 4 Jun]	75
Control by Labor Collectives' Councils Urged [TRUD 5 Jun]	79
Editor Pledges To Defend Komsomol at Conference [Seleznev in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 5 Jun]	81
Economist Responds to Party Conference Theses	81
Conference Must Pave Way for Congress [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 9 Jun]	82
Theses Solve Main Problems in Party Mechanism	84
Ways To Enhance Supreme Soviet Role Suggested [PRAVDA 13 Jun]	85
Zagladin Discusses Changes in Foreign Policy [PRAVDA 13 Jun]	88
Economic Institute Official Interviewed on Theses	92
Burlatskiy Views Parliamentarian System [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 15 Jun]	93

Election of Conference Delegates

'Backstage Games' Over Delegates Deplored [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 25 May]	97
Outdated Election Procedures Criticized [Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY 25,26 May]	97
Delegate Nomination Directives Being Ignored [Kamenev in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 26 May]	98
SOVETSKAYA KULTURA Readers Voice Concerns on Delegates [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 26 May 88]	100
Election of Sakhalin Conference Delegates Denounced as Fraud [B. Sukhinin; Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 26 May 88]	101
Chelyabinsk Obkom Election Procedures Scored [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 1 Jun]	102
Course of Conference Delegate Elections Viewed [PRAVDA 1 Jun]	104
Selection of Yaroslavl Area Delegate Criticized [PRAVDA 2 Jun]	105
'View' Examines Elections to Party Conference	106
Moscow Gorkom Plenum Elects Conference Delegates [PRAVDA 4 Jun]	108
Readers View Delegate Election Procedure [IZVESTIYA 11 Jun]	110
Official Sums Up Delegate Elections [PRAVDA 13 Jun]	112
Official Discusses Improving Soviet Electoral System	114
Moscow TV Views Delegate Elections, Conference Tasks	115
Moscow Delegates to Party Conference Viewed [Prokhorov]	117

19th Party Conference: Readers Debate Need To Return to Stalinist Discipline

18000393 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 May 88 p 2

[Letters to Editors. First paragraph is source introduction.]

[Text] These two letters arrived, as they say, unsolicited. We placed them together only for one reason: both quote the saying about the carrot and the stick. We checked with V. Dahl. He affirms that the horse must be driven not with the stick but with the carrot. Clearly affirmation that a good horse needs the stick is a transformation of the Russian saying dating from Stalinist times.

Even a Good Horse Needs the Stick, by A. Sisin, CPSU member since 1960, war and labor veteran, Kharyuskiy Rayon.

It is unbelievably difficult for me to watch the television and read in the newspapers what is being said about Stalin. I cannot judge on a state-wide scale, but I can imagine for an instant a decent family in which after the death of the father they begin to defame him in the last words, they accuse him of all the deadly sins, and the now existing mistakes and shortcomings. And they clearly forget the most important thing—under the Father there was order and people worked. Did they live poorly? On the other hand all were equal according to humane justice. As soon as it was possible, prices were reduced for the good of all the people. And no one could eat to his fill, as people lose their sense of measure and with this their reason.

Now look what is going on around us. Each person tries to take for himself from society a thicker and juicier piece of the pie. They bring it from the plant, they carry it from the kolkhoz farm, they talk long-distance with a relative while at work, they drive an official car to the dacha and take a business trip to a resort. For all such things, Iosif Vissarionovich beat and punished. Unmercifully! And now they hand down a pro forma sentence and you get on with it, you steal from the state for your apartments considering the already acquired experience, in a more refined and skilled manner. Someone is hired and you say to him: "You must do such and such." But what do I get for this? And how hard it is for the leaders to work! Before you went to the appropriate institution, you were given paper, you were called by the phone and everything was clear. You rolled up your sleeves and worked very carefully. You were appointed to a position and then everything and everyone were in your hands, you decided, you gave orders and you were responsible for what was entrusted to you. Now, what do you think: a superior is to be elected! I feel that no matter how we twist and turn with humanity, with glasnost and democracy, we will still reach the point that we will accept a strong Stalinist law about discipline on the job and in social life. And in our country we must do this as quickly as possible. I would like to direct such a proposal to the

19th Party Conference. It is essential to know and never forget the harsh truth of life, its prosaic side and this, in my view, is in the simple peasant saying that even a good horse needs a stick.

We Need No Stick, By S. Filin, section head of the Vazalemma Sovkhoz

For many years it was considered quite all right that if you did a good job in your main profession you were also an outstanding communist. In truth, for a recommendation it was also essential to be politically mature, morally restrained and ideologically steadfast. But why be cunning, since this often simply meant that the individual was not remarkable in any way. And to make a totally clean breast of it, often people themselves wrote recommendations for themselves following a standard pattern and format. In principle, you wrote what you needed.

I was the secretary of a Komsomol organization and then the chief engineer at a sovkhoz, I have been in the party for some time and feel that our main question is who today is to be in the party? Outstanding production workers, good specialists, experience-wise veterans and young people making their career? If you go to a meeting, you can see that some are profoundly indifferent as to what is being discussed, they would rather get down to voting and then go home. But others are good at tearing everything and everyone to bits, still others take a wait and see attitude, but the following are on the offensive: too bad we don't have Stalin to take care of you. In an instant, there is order, a good law has been carried out and everyone has been forced to get to work. I feel that at present we must give serious concern to the purity of the party ranks, or as Lenin put it: it is better to have fewer but better ones. And there should be just one specific notion as the criterion of a communist and that is: what are you fighting for, what new and advanced are you affirming in life. A fighter, a champion or a prompt dues payer? And, incidentally, as often follows in any bureaucratic organization, various commissions often pay primary importance to the latter and as for the former, as a rule, it is not even discussed. To be an active party fighter is written into the Charter. Almost no one is required to do this, as certainly at times a few who had decided on open criticism got it back, as they say, in full measure. In my opinion, it is this idea which must be made primary and its old significance must be returned to it. For this reason I would propose that at the party conference they resolve the question of the party activists without in any manner linking this title to official position. All those who had lost the quality of a party fighter, after appropriate certification in the primary party organization, would be transferred to its aktiv with the same party card, with the right of a consultative vote, but without the payment of party dues. I feel that if this in no way actually told on the professional promotion of a person and on his career, few would make claim to the title of fighter. For a person this title at times comes at a

high cost, besides many people have no particular need for it. Incidentally, this would nullify any so-called social statistics and would free many party bureaucrats from the work invented by them.

A horse can be led not by the stick but by the carrot. And we were all convinced of the wisdom of this old Russian saying, having organized cost accounting in our department. Now each worker is the master of his job and is completely interested in the end results of his work. Only in this manner can one combine a personal interest and a state interest.

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Reader Wants More Information on Central Committee Members

18120079 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 20, 22-29 May 88 p 13

[Article by Yuri Burtin]

[Text] During the years of stagnation, any criticism of "certain flaws," no matter how pointed it was, even any constructive approaches in the press, always contained something morally ambiguous. Why? Because proposals to correct and improve the economic or socio-political systems inevitably smacked of complacency and officialdom, self-deception or fraud so long as they focused on isolated aspects rather than the system as a whole. By raising the question of the need for revolutionary transformations in society, perestroika (though only making its first steps, and facing serious obstacles) has radically changed the situation. Any kind of criticism (if it is honest) concerning any social problem is permissible; any constructive approach is permissible. In fact, criticism without constructive suggestions isn't interesting any more.

Thus I'd like to express some specific ideas regarding our leading political institution—the Party.

Some people maintain that the only way to guarantee democracy is to have a multi-Party system. This conclusion would be indisputable if we had exhausted all the possibilities for democratization under a one-Party system. We have not. If we are serious about democratization, then the first thing is to evaluate the democracy of all components of the Party's current organizational structure and procedures. My concern here is the procedure for forming the highest Party bodies: the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Auditing Commission.

The CPSU Central Committee is the country's brain. Virtually the highest authority, it takes decisions that are binding for all and guides all aspects of society's life. As the regular reports in PRAVDA attest, the activities of the Central Committee do not affect Party members alone. They affect everyone equally—Communists and non-Party people. But who are these 400 or so people

elected by the Party Congress to the highest echelon of the Party and state leadership? Most are known to us by name only and only after the Congress is over. The published list provides only last names plus first and middle initials. To find out who's who requires major research. Why? The press publishes not only the names but short biographies of each member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Those biographies are then compiled in a single volume for each convocation. The absence of any comparable information about the Central Committee is especially striking when you consider that there are 3 to 4 times as many deputies to the Supreme Soviet as there are Members and Alternate Members of the Central Committee: a Member has several times the political influence of a deputy.

Though the Party Rules do not envisage this, new Members of the Central Committee have traditionally been elected at a closed session of the Congress. Why? Is it of no consequence to the people and the Party who is elected—by whom and why—to serve for five years on the Central Committee, the Central Committee which will elect Members of the Politbureau and the Sekretariat (including the General Secretary) of the CPSU Central Committee? Is it less important for us to know what was said at the Congress about each candidate than, say, what was said in the various speeches of welcome?

All this, including how the votes are distributed, is important. Why is such an important procedure (for the Party and all society) still beyond the bounds of glasnost and, thus, democratic control from below? In the past, when too much of our life was veiled in secrecy, that way of doing things allowed the top Party and state leadership to reproduce itself and keep a grip on the key posts. Nine out of ten people were promoted to the Central Committee based on the principle that if you were a USSR Minister, a First Secretary of a regional committee, or a CO of a military district, election to the Central Committee or at least the Central Auditing Commission (and simultaneously to the USSR Supreme Soviet—see IZVESTIA, No 120, April 1988) was practically automatic.

Is this principle or procedure—which made Central Committee membership something like an honorary addendum to an official post—democratic? Does the Central Committee, as a collegium of top officials invested with all authority, correspond with the task of democratizing our social system? I think the answer is obvious: both principle and procedure are part of what we are trying to overcome today.

I would suggest the following proposals for discussion at the 19th Party Conference:

1. Elect the highest Party bodies at the open session of the Congress.

2. In addition to the names of those elected to the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, list at least where and in what capacity each new Member and Alternate Member works.

3. Elect the highest Party bodies as well as the lesser Party committees according to personal merit, not official posts.

I believe all this might substantially enhance the Party's prestige and dynamism as well as the stability of the Party leadership.

/9604

Non-Party Member Submits Proposals

[Letter from Natalya Morozova under the rubric "Letters to the Editor": "Though I'm Not a Party Member"]

[Text] I have a proposal: to introduce a clause into the Rules of the CPSU making it obligatory for a person being admitted into the Party to first receive recommendations from a meeting of the work collective, along with the usual recommendations.

If an offence has been committed by a non-Party member, it is discussed by the whole collective, but if the offender is a member of the Party, he is dealt with at a closed Party meeting, or even at a meeting of the Party bureau, as if they don't want to tell non-Party people the whole truth about the guilty Communist.

We non-Party people are also hurt by the advantage CPSU members enjoy in obtaining information. Why are some Party documents, even those which are of relevance for the whole of society, read only at closed Party meetings?

I think that the very concept of "closed" meetings has long been outdated. Today it is simply a social anachronism.

Now about privileges. A non-Party member is put on trial in accordance with the law, a CPSU member is sometimes punished first "along the Party line", often with no further steps taken.

Sometimes, when criminal proceedings are instituted against a member of the CPSU, he is expelled from the Party, even before court hearings. So the person sitting in the dock is no longer a Party member. I think this is incorrect, as it violates the presumption of innocence concept. Expulsion from the Party before court hearings means that the Party bodies already consider the person guilty, but what if he was only a victim of slander? Would he be reinstated? Yes, but the whole thing is still very humiliating.

The top Party leadership has been doing much to overcome the problems piled up over decades, and we want to do everything to help the Party in this formidable undertaking. After all we non-Party people are also to blame in many respects. Haven't many of us, through our habit of revering the higher-ups, through our readiness to declare any word uttered from on high as gospel, contributed to this atmosphere of servility, to this false image of infallibility?

But the paradox is—how can we try and help in practical terms? I, let's say, disagree with certain statements by some Politbureau members, including the General Secretary. How can I convey this? By writing a letter? By voicing my views in the press? But no editor will accept this kind of material from me.

Perhaps it would be advisable to adopt some document or law guaranteeing the mass media freedom of criticism regardless of whether the target is a Politbureau member or anyone else. It is quite possible that, at first, such criticisms will be too timid or, on the contrary, too loud. That's all right, in the final analysis we shall find a way of dealing with exaggerations and extreme views. But with reservations and all these limitations we shall never extricate ourselves from the morass.

Natalya Morozova

(Moscow)

Supreme Court Chairman Interviewed on Judicial Reforms

18000386a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 27 Apr 88 p 11

Interview with V.I. Terebilov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer Aleksandr Borin: "What We Expect from the Reform of the Courts"; date and place not specified]

[Text]

The Pyramid

[A. Borin] Vladimir Ivanovich, I would like to start our conversation with the so-called judicial errors. Unfortunately, this is a question not of isolated cases but of a quite widespread phenomenon. A person is arrested and spends years behind barbed wire, and then it is discovered that the person is guilty of nothing. Moreover, this is permitted not just by the investigatory organs but also by the courts, whose entire role amounts to rubber-stamping the charge brought against the individual. Of course, the easiest thing would be to explain this by the poor skills of the lawyers. But perhaps the causes are much deeper and more serious and lie in defects in the judicial system itself? Will the judicial reform for which preparations are now being made in the country eliminate them?

[V. Terebilov] The causes of which you speak did not come into existence today or even yesterday. I think that in large degree they are the result of the metamorphosis that took place in our judicial system in the early Thirties. If we imagine the entire judicial system as a kind of unique pyramid, then in a normal situation the apex of that pyramid should be the court whose word is decisive and final. In the early Thirties, however, this pyramid was stood on its head and priority was given to the centralized and unmonitored pre-trial investigation. The main obligation of the court when hearing criminal cases was not an impartial and independent consideration of the charges made against the individual but merely deciding the scale of the punishment. Acquittal or submitting a case for a new investigation was considered an extraordinary event. A conviction was made in 99 percent of all criminal cases. It is primarily from this that not only the numerous errors of which you spoke stemmed, but also instances of direct arbitrary rule and crimes against the administration of justice. Since 1953 the situation has been largely corrected, but underestimation of the court and of judicial control are alive to this day. So that, to put it briefly, I would formulate the cardinal restructuring of the judicial system that is now beginning as follows: the "pyramid" must be returned to its normal position.

[A. Borin] But obviously the unnatural position of the "pyramid" pursued a certain end, did it not? Is it not in principle much easier to dictate to the organs conducting the pre-trial investigation than to the court, because they are, so to speak, more amenable and controllable?

[V. Terebilov] As a rule the courts consider cases openly and publicly, and therefore it is, of course, more difficult to influence them than the institutions in which everything is decided behind closed doors. Concentrating the pre-trial investigation and virtual judicial power in the same hands meant untying one's own hands... However, even with all the publicity of the court proceedings, pressure on the judicial organs is a phenomenon, unfortunately, not only of yesterday but even to some extent, of today. Look here. The USSR Constitution states that the courts are independent and subject only to the law. It seems to me, however, that this correct provision of the USSR Constitution should necessarily be augmented with an instruction on the actual guarantee of that independence. Well, for example, it would be useful to establish that judges be appointed for longer periods than at present, and perhaps also for life. It would be very important for the USSR Constitution to make reference to the fact that the independence of the courts is guaranteed by a special law that provides penalties for lack of respect toward the courts and for attempts to apply pressure to them.

[A. Borin] To be honest, I cannot imagine how such a law would work. For pressure is applied to the courts most often not in public but in secret and in private. A telephone call, a confidential conversation in an important office, an opinion from "a high place" passed on to a judge... Can this kind of extrajudicial act be cut short judicially?

[V. Terebilov] There is some truth in your reasoning. But you are obviously underestimating the very fact of the existence of such a law, if, of course, it were to be passed. In and of itself its very existence would force many people to hesitate about how they behave toward the courts. It is one thing to foist one's opinion on a judge by talking with him or by making a telephone call, in disregard of general principles, but quite another to commit an act for which specific liability has been established.

[A. Borin] Criminal liability?

[V. Terebilov] Yes, even criminal.

[A. Borin] And you are suggesting that some court will institute a criminal case, for example, against a raykom secretary? Is this realistic?

[V. Terebilov] Not now, perhaps, but it should become realistic as the result of perestroika. I am suggesting that further democratization in the life of our society must also affect the party apparatus. The party must play its leading role not using directive-command methods, not

"by telephone," but through those communists who occupy various posts in the economy and in the state apparatus. And, of course, the courts. These people must put into practice the party line and the party approach. And the party duty of the judge is strictly to observe the law.

[A. Borin] But what if you have the law on one side of the scales and a directive, a command, "a device" from a local party leader on the other? And the judge understands very well: "First and foremost, dear comrade, you are a communist."

[V. Terebilov] Whoever permits himself something like this is a very bad communist.

[A. Borin] Yes, of course. But does it not seem to you, Vladimir Ivanovich, that it is a much easier thing for the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court than for a rank-and-file local judge to be guided by this in practice?

[V. Terebilov] Undoubtedly. This is why I remind you so persistently of the need for real guarantees of judicial independence as a main condition for perestroika in the judiciary. Today, it is also sometimes not very difficult for the official party or soviet leader to achieve the recall of a bothersome, "unruly" judge. There are many examples of this. And so the problem is to protect the judge from the arbitrary rule of the local leader. How can this be done in a practical way? There are various ways. But now I am talking about just one of them. I think that the USSR Supreme Court and the supreme courts in the union republics could set up competent expert councils (or committees of appeal). If complaints are made against a judge or if his competence is called into question and a recall move is made, then it should not be the local leadership, which is sometimes prejudiced and has an interest in this, that decides whether or not the complaints are justified, but an objective and competent council.

[A. Borin] As I understand it, in addition to the independence of judges there is also the issue of immunity. I read recently in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA about how militia and procuracy workers took their revenge on bothersome judges. And this is the regrettable thing: today a judge can be influenced, virtually blackmailed without violating the letter of the law. Permission from the republic supreme soviet presidium is required only for laying charges against a judge but his home can be searched and he can be called in for interrogation and confronted by witnesses without any kind of permission.

[V. Terebilov] That part of the law was badly formulated and it requires amendment. It does happen that some pre-trial investigators and procurators take advantage of this, and this is quite improper. It seems to me that it is necessary to lay down a special procedure that today, unfortunately, is not provided for by the law, namely, dismissal from office. If the appeals council of which we have already spoken is convinced that the complaints

made against a judge are correct then the judge should be officially dismissed from office. And only then would it be possible to interrogate the dismissed judge, lay charges against him and so forth. But while the judge is in office he should enjoy immunity.

[A. Borin] And how should this dismissal procedure be implemented? Behind closed doors or openly and publicly?

[V. Terebilov] Publicly, I think, but its specific form, of course, must be well considered. It is important that all democratic principles be strictly observed here.

[A. Borin] And perhaps the time has also come to think well not only about the procedure for dismissing a judge from office but also about his appointment to office? Is not the system for selecting judges, at least in its present form, outdated? For to be honest, it is not so much democracy as a semblance of democracy, a pro forma, perfunctory measure. Would it not be more sensible to appoint a people's judge by, say, resolution of the republic supreme soviet presidium?

[V. Terebilov] This is probably advisable. But if this suggestion is acted upon they will say: "A conservative who is against democratic secret vote."

[A. Borin] I do not think that they will say this; we have already suffered enough from democracy for show, which has very often been used as a screen behind which direct command methods flourished.

"Nevertheless I Would Let Him Go Free..."

[A. Borin] Imagine that specific guarantees of judicial immunity had been introduced into the USSR Constitution and that a law had been passed providing for penalties for lack of respect toward the courts. Would the bias toward conviction in the activity of the courts about which the newspapers today write so often disappear?

[V. Terebilov] You want to ask only whether it is external causes that sometimes force a judge in a complicated situation to prefer a conviction to an acquittal. No, not that alone. Much depends on the experience of the judge and his competence, moral qualities, sense of principle, firmness of character... It is common knowledge, for example, that any kind of doubt should be interpreted in favor of the accused. Openly, of course, no one disputes this. But the judge does sometimes think to himself: "Ah, let him go, old darling, and then he will kill someone else or steal something else, and then they will say to me: 'But you could have prevented a new crime.'" Or this: the evidence in a particular case may, of course, be not quite enough but everyone can see that the person is a potential criminal and that leaving him free is still dangerous because there might be a tragedy... How should the judge decide? how to make his choice? What is more humane:

to follow the letter of law and let the person go free or to persuade yourself that perhaps in the interests of society the letter of the law can be disregarded?

[A. Borin] And how would you act as a judge?

[V. Terebilov] I would let him go free. And then I would wait to see if you wrote an article saying that in a formal way I had acted correctly but that the result of this "correctness" was the perpetration of a new crime.

[A. Borin] I shall not write that because I know all too well what it costs people and society when the rights of the individual are violated "just a little" supposedly in their own interests.

[V. Terebilov] Of course, it is easy for me to reason thus from the height of my own life's experience and my judicial position. But stand in the shoes of a junior judge who is just starting out. How can he sustain this blow every time he faces that choice?

[A. Borin] And remember what Herzen said: "It is far better that the clever thief go unpunished than that every honest man tremble like a thief in his own room."

[V. Terebilov] Yes, and I totally share that view. But if tomorrow the clever thief who has been set free by a judge because of insufficient evidence robs your apartment, what do you say then? This is the profession of judge, and oh! what a difficult one...

[A. Borin] Nevertheless, if there is doubt you would still interpret the law in favor of the accused and let the person go free?

[V. Terebilov] Yes, I would still let him go free. It is still better to have two guilty parties escape punishment than to sentence one innocent man wrongly.

[A. Borin] Vladimir Ivanovich, it seems to me that the following circumstance also hampers the normal work of the courts. A judge knows that if he makes an acquittal or returns the case for further investigation then the pre-trial investigator dealing with the case cannot expect an easy life. His failure in his work is noted and they will poke into every corner, in short, an Extraordinary Event! As a result relations between the procuracy and the court will become strained and there will be disputes and reprisals. Is this right? Of course, if the pre-trial investigator has grossly violated the law, or falsified the facts, or juggled with and distorted the facts, then this cannot be tolerated. But a different kind of situation may arise: the pre-trial investigator honestly thinks that a person is guilty and tries to prove it, but after the court has investigated the material it does not agree with the reasoning. Must every case be made into a tragedy, an extraordinary event, and the pre-trial investigator be reproached and abused?

[V. Terebilov] I think that this unhealthy attitude toward acquittal was shaped precisely at the time when the investigation was everything and all that remained for the court to do was rubber-stamp its decision. And now, when the courts have started to move beyond the confines of modest role assigned to them, some pre-trial investigators and personnel of the procurator's office are regarding this as little short of a real insult. I think, however, that it is quite possible and proper to have cases in which the pre-trial investigator in a complicated situation passes the case on for examination by the court, while the court, after weighing things up and investigating them, decides that it does not share with the evaluation and conclusions of the investigation. There is, of course, no tragedy in this. It is the natural process of the administration of justice.

[A. Borin] And what is your attitude toward trial by jury?

[V. Terebilov] I think that in our times it will not be of much use.

[A. Borin] Why?

[V. Terebilov] Life has become more complicated, and crimes are more complicated, and the activity of the courts is more complicated. And when deciding the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence the judge must in sum be an honest man. He must also possess a broad range of knowledge and have rich experience of life and the law. A juror is not trained for this work. Incidentally, the practice of law abroad has also made significant changes in the traditional jury system. The judge most often does not remain in the courtroom but instead goes out with the jurors into the room where they deliberate. He does not vote with them but advises them and provides the necessary explanations; many cases are dealt with by a judge alone. In other words, our institution of people's assessors is better than the jury system. But we do realize that our institution is weak, if not bad.

[A. Borin] You have suggested, have you not, that the number of people's assessors be increased?

[V. Terebilov] Well, when considering particularly difficult cases it would be possible to have, say, four instead of two people's assessors. But not because we do not trust the judges but simply based on the fact that the more people you have and the more experience of life that is brought to bear, so to speak, the better. It will also help the judge to overcome his doubt or hesitation...

[A. Borin] And what changes would you suggest in the work of the appeals and supervisory systems? For it is here that the main barrier against judicial error is to be found.

[V. Terebilov] I think that the main barrier against judicial error should be placed in the court of original jurisdiction. A multitude of appellate levels is no panacea. However, I think it would be useful to give the

supervisory courts greater rights than at present. Now, in order to correct a more or less serious error we must send the case back to the court of original jurisdiction. And then the entire procedure must be repeated all over again, time goes by, and people remain in custody... I think that in the interests of justice and in people's interest it is necessary to give the supervisory court the right if necessary to correct errors made by lower courts.

[A. Borin] And if necessary recall those involved in the case to court?

[V. Terebilov] Yes, if necessary also call those participating in the case who are required by the court.

Remaining Free before the Trial

[A. Borin] Unfortunately, the practice of holding a person in custody for months, and sometimes years, before his trial is quite widespread. Is this a normal situation?

[V. Terebilov] It is not only abnormal but also illegal. This is just one of the birthmarks remaining from the evil memory of past years. Deprivation of freedom before the trial is permissible only in cases in which a person may be concealing a crime or may commit another crime, or in a special situation that requires special, extraordinary steps to be taken. As a rule, however, a person should remain at liberty. And how do some pre-trial investigators act? They first arrest the person and only then begin the investigation. They make the task easier for themselves in disregard of fundamental legal principles written into the USSR Constitution.

[A. Borin] Perhaps legal control could break this this shameful practice?

[V. Terebilov] It is the USSR Procuracy that is primarily called upon to break this shameful practice, and I am convinced that ultimately it will. Legal control? Yes, some scholars and journalists suggest that the court itself should give approval for arrest before trial. The thrust of this reasoning is perhaps correct. But I would perhaps prefer another procedure: one way to stop this could be approval by the procurator, in cases that so require it, but, for example, after 6 months, if it becomes necessary to hold someone in custody for longer, the investigation should be turned over to the court, and the court should immediately resolve the matter.

[A. Borin] But still extend the time without limit?

[V. Terebilov] Of course not. Another 2 or 3 months.

[A. Borin] And then? The case is passed to the court, the court starts to study it, and probably not immediately, for it is common knowledge that the load on the courts is great, and the person remains in prison as before? Because formally the time periods are not being violated

and the arrested person is now not on the procurator's list but the court list; but what is the difference to the person arrested? Prison is still prison.

[V. Terebilov] There is a 2-month period during which time the courts are obliged to examine the cases brought before them. But you are right, these time periods are sometimes not observed. Demand that the courts always and in all circumstances deal with cases within 2 months? And will there not be harmful haste in the complicated cases, and even more judicial errors? One highly placed jurist in Ireland told me that under Irish law he may invoke as follows: "I shall consider the case in 6 months. I must think about it, and read the law and the special literature."

[A. Borin] Does this mean there is no solution? The arrested person must wait in a prison cell until his judge is "ready"?

[V. Terebilov] This is the solution: confine ourselves to the time established by law and—the main thing—place people under arrest less before the trial. And, incidentally, if as we have already said, the court hands down a decision about whether or not the period of initial arrest can be extended, then there will be fewer arrested people numbered on the court list.

[A. Borin] Oh! I fear, Vladimir Ivanovich, that the courts will be too diffident in exercising this right. I say this because I see how modestly and unwillingly judges alter preventive restriction when they direct cases for further investigation. What happens is that as a rule they do not alter it at all.

[V. Terebilov] And have you considered why this happens?

[A. Borin] Is it that they do not want to upset relations with the procuracy?

[V. Terebilov] This is also my assumption. But if you say this to judges, then many of them respond as follows: "What, then, are you accusing us of cowardice? But on what grounds?" And in fact, the courts are very often directly deprived on any opportunity to alter preventive restriction. A person is accused of five murders. Two of them are unproven and further investigation is necessary. So now how do you deal with it? Are you going to set a murderer at liberty? Or a defendant is accused of stealing R100,000. A second expert opinion is required. In expectation that he will be acquitted? And what if he goes into hiding? All the same, it would probably be useful when returning a case for further investigation for the court to determine a specific period in which the accused can still be held in custody.

[A. Borin] Is there any chance that this kind of procedure will be adopted?

[V.Terebilov] I fear that our two votes will not be sufficient. Some pre-trial investigators will probably give it a hostile reception. And I can understand them: the main burden of the struggle against crime right there where it happens is placed on their shoulders.

[A. Borin] But not by violating constitutional principles?

[V.Terebilov] No, not that way.

[A. Borin] Now I would like to talk a little about punishment for criminal acts. Here too, many problems have accrued that require a solution.

[V.Terebilov] Undoubtedly. But I think that this subject is large enough and complicated enough to require a special conversation. I shall therefore restrict myself to some brief comments. First, it seems to me that it would be advisable for the new criminal laws to make provision only for the upper limit of punishment while the lower limits should be at the discretion of the court. Then the courts would be able to impose sentences giving more consideration to the personality of the convicted individual and the circumstances of the case. I also suggest that the court should determine the conditions of punishment for the convicted person only for the first 6 months or a year. Subsequently special commissions could operate at the place of confinement, made up of representatives of the local soviet, administration, and procurator's office, and physicians and psychologists and so forth. Proceeding from specific data they—the commissions—should also make decisions on whether or not the convicted person should remain under the conditions of imprisonment imposed or whether it would be advisable to give him some kind of privileges or a greater degree of freedom. And finally, the conditions where the punishment is being served must be more varied and differentiated. Some people understand only harshness and drastic measures, while others, on the contrary, are crushed by excessive harshness. Individualization of punishment is one of the main approaches in re-education of the convicted person. I want to emphasize that over the past 2 or 3 years the courts have used imprisonment almost 50 percent less. This is the right trend. The only thing is that we must track this carefully to insure that it does not engender a flare-up of recidivist crime.

Constitutional Oversight

[A. Borin] Up to now our conversation has been about solving the problems that one way or another have accrued in judicial practice. However, perestroika in the legal system is obviously also expanding the very sphere of judicial activity. Suggestions have already appeared in the press that the courts should be afforded the right of constitutional oversight. How do you regard this and what in your opinion should this kind of oversight be?

[V.Terebilov] I suggest that in a socialist state that accepts the rule of law it would be useful to give the courts certain functions of constitutional oversight. Well, for example, suppose that when considering a specific case the court finds that a person is guilty essentially not of a violation of the law but a violation of some enforceable enactment (a ministry order, instruction or provision) that in and of itself is illegal because it is at variance with the USSR Constitution or other fundamental legislation. The court acquits that person but it cannot declare the enactment illegal, that is, eliminate the ~~main~~ cause of such cases. Today it does not have that right. I would suggest that it is necessary to give this right to the USSR Supreme Court and the supreme courts of the union and autonomous republics and kray and oblast courts.

[A. Borin] But cannot the procurator today protest an illegal enactment?

[V.Terebilov] Yes he can. But what if the ministry or department does not agree with the procurator's protest? The law offers no clear-cut answer to this question. True, the procurator was recently given the right to halt the operation of certain illegal enactments. But what next? The measure is half-and-half and inadequate. I suggest that when an enactment is deemed to be unlawful the procurator should go to the court, and if the representation is found to be justified, a resolution be passed recognizing that the enactment is contrary to the law.

[A. Borin] Only the procurator can go to the court?

[V.Terebilov] No. This right would be given to the all-union and republic organs of power and management, and to ministries and departments and major public organizations like the AUCCTU, the Committee of Soviet Women, the Union of Writers and so forth.

[A. Borin] And what of the upper level of enforceable enactments against which appeals can be made? Suppose an unlawful decree were to be adopted by the USSR government itself. Can you consider this theoretically?

[V.Terebilov] I have been considering this theoretically for a long time. And in practical terms today, in the age of perestroika, this is what I think: if we have a government that accepts the rule of law then probably the USSR Supreme Court can and must be given the right in certain circumstances to evaluate the legality of government decrees also.

[A. Borin] Suppose a dispute arose between union republics. Could the USSR Supreme Court consider the case?

[V.Terebilov] I think yes. If it were of a legal rather than a political character.

[A. Borin] Vladimir Ivanovich, a law was recently passed on appealing illegal acts by officials through the court. It seems to me that this law went through in a truncated

form. Most administrative decisions are made by collegial organs, and here already the citizen is deprived of the right to appeal to the court. Is this correct?

[V. Terebilov] I am a judge and should therefore uphold the law and not criticize it. But if you talk about possible improvements in that law then I suggest that it would be possible to extend the court's jurisdiction with a right also to consider cases concerning irregularities in certain collegial decisions.

[A. Borin] We have always said, and we still do, that under the conditions of a socialist society the theory of "division of power"—legislative, executive and judicial—is unacceptable. But how can socialist democracy ignore the best democratic institutions established by humankind over the centuries?

[V. Terebilov] This issue really does exist and I think that it should be worked on and resolved. It seems to me that we cannot blindly transfer into our lives the attributes of a bourgeois society. The USSR Constitution clearly states that the CPSU is the leading and directing force in Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system. So we can talk about structure: the legislative, executive and judicial organs carry out their own strictly defined, specific functions without replacing one another, and the party exercises political coordination of all these forms of power. Let me put it another way: political tasks are common for the whole of society and it is the party that works them out. However, each of the "powers" resolves them within the limits and the framework of its own competence. And if the country's highest judicial organ has adopted a decision appropriate to its competence then it is final and neither the legislative nor the executive powers can revoke it. This position would be in line with the principles of a state accepting the rule of law and, consequently, the development of socialist democracy. And in general I would also consider it necessary to state the following: more socialism means more legal guarantees protecting socialism and providing guarantees for the life activity of all forms of socialist democracy.

[A. Borin] There is still another series of burning and topical issues. For example, the trials of the Thirties through the Fifties, certain matters relating to our own times, the first results of perestroika in legal work and so forth. I hope that I may have the opportunity to pose those questions for you.

[V. Terebilov] Well, willingly. If the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editorial office will offer us some of its precious space we may continue our dialogue. Notwithstanding, I think that these problems will also be a subject of discussion at the 19th party conference.

Legal Regulation of Social Bodies Viewed
PM2005115588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 May 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Own observer Yu. Feofanov interview with lawyer N. Belyayeva, staffer at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, under the rubric "The 19th Party Conference: The Tasks of Restructuring": "After the Long Ban"—place, date of interview not given; boldface as published]

[Text] [Feofanov] It is obvious that democracy does not mean total license and we will not be arguing about this. We should probably also accept the fact that any serious matter must have a legal basis. Until quite recently any informal association evoked first of all suspicion, which was immediately followed by a ban, just to be on the safe side. Now the authorities are afraid to touch any association so as not to get into the newspapers for restricting democracy and glasnost. All this makes you think that what is needed is a law regulating social activity. However, I immediately have misgivings as to whether a law in this sphere would not be tantamount to a ban or to the kind of "permission" which instantaneously curbs or kills initiative. However, rumors are circulating that such a draft law is in preparation. Tell me, is it really necessary to have a law regulating social activity if we want this activity to remain social?

[Belyayeva] It is a great pity that up to now legislative projects are not publicized. Despite the fact that it is quite obvious that the reasons for and expediency of the adoption of a new law, its tasks, and main thrust are a question of state legal policy which directly affects the citizens' interests. A discussion in a wide, nonprofessional circle at the predraft stage would greatly contribute to the democratic nature of lawmaking. It is not difficult to conclude that all the distortions in our legal system—which is still very "patchy", with clearly excessive regulation of minor issues still coexisting with unresolved general issues—are a consequence of the fact that plans for legislation are drawn up behind closed doors. In actual fact it is for society itself to decide which spheres of state and social life are to be regulated by law and to what extent, and which spheres are to be regulated by the standards of morality and social traditions.

But let us return to your question. I am convinced that only a radical legal reform will consolidate and guarantee the results of restructuring. After all, restructuring today is unthinkable without a galvanization of social forces, without identifying and utilizing the creative potential of direct democracy. Independently-run initiative associations have colossal creative potential but virtually no channels for expressing and translating it into reality.

Even the existing social organizations with an entirely "official" status cannot carry out their functions efficiently without the appropriate legal safeguards. For instance, the statutes of the Union of RSFSR Theater Workers contain a provision concerning the suspension

of incompetent management decisions. The provision is correct and is based on the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, on the constitutional right to participate in management of social and state affairs. However, the Ministry of Culture does not regard the statutes of a creative union as legally binding.

In your misgivings about the expediency of the adoption of such a law I recognize the familiar objections of a certain section of lawyers that legislation about the "informals" will produce nothing apart from their "formalization." A profound misconception! It is based on the old notions that a law is always restrictive. However, it can also play another role. It can create legal levers enabling society to influence the adoption of administrative decisions.

Furthermore, I would not be in a hurry to claim that today the authorities "are afraid to touch" any independent association. They do "touch" them, and how! And they dispatch letters to the activists' places of work with the recommendation that "measures be adopted." Therefore the question of legal guarantees is topical as never before also from the viewpoint of the initiators' social protection. Take the demands of the Novosibirsk ecological squads, or the Leningrad "Delta" association, the proposals of the Chelyabinsk "Peace and Youth" groups, or the initiators of the construction of the MZHK (youth housing complexes) in the Baykal-Amur railroad zone. What legal guarantees do the initiators have? None at all.

[Feofanov] You have entirely convinced me that such a law is necessary. Since you took part in elaborating the draft, could you tell us what, in particular, will the law regulate? Or let me put it more precisely: How do you define "social organization" as a legal concept? Take for instance the notorious "rockers." They do nothing but ride around on motorbikes. If they are guilty of breaching public order, administrative or criminal measures are applied to them. And if they do no more than ride around on motorbikes, what is there to be regulated by an act of law? On the other hand there is a social organization such as the Komsomol. In my view it is overorganized. It has its statutes, traditions, a powerful apparatus, a solid material base, its own publishing houses, holiday homes, and so forth. What more can a law regulate in the activity of the Komsomol? I deliberately chose two organizations which are poles apart in terms of their scale and social significance. What parameters would you have to have in order to legislate for two organizations which are as dissimilar as that?

[Belyayeva] Let me begin with the draft. Such a draft has indeed been elaborated by the USSR Ministry of Justice with the participation of representatives of our Institute, the All-Union Soviet Legislation Research Institute, the AUCCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee; taking part in its elaboration were staffers of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Office, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The law was to have the title "Law on

Voluntary Societies, Public Initiative Organs, and Independent Voluntary Associations." The title itself indicates that the draft covers three completely different types of associations. However neither the concept nor the standard distinguishing features of these associations were defined in the articles of the draft. Naturally, this attracted criticism from scientists. It was pointed out that voluntary societies' crucial political rights such as the right of legislative initiative, nomination of candidate deputies, and special sections on material, economic, and publishing activities had been omitted. The exceptionally complex procedure for obtaining permission to set up an organization gave rise to objections. Incidentally, even sector ministries were entitled to grant such permissions. The draft had already been agreed and was ready for consideration at the highest level. Resolute protests from the public—from the "informals" to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace—halted its progress. The Commission of Public Initiatives at the RSFSR Institute of Culture is now preparing a discussion of this draft.

[Feofanov] You are constantly mentioning organizations whose names I hear for the first time.

[Belyayeva] Unfortunately, information about the activities of initiative associations is not freely available in our country. And what there is, is largely negative.

[Feofanov] However, let us return to social organizations as a legal concept.

[Belyayeva] To date there is neither a full legal definition of this concept nor a precise description of the standard distinguishing features of such organizations, although the term is used in legislation quite freely. This was also omitted in the draft law. Meanwhile a social organization is only one type of a vast number of social associations ranging from house and street committees which are social initiative organs; through comrades' courts and voluntary people's squads which are labor collective organs and skateboard or Italian opera clubs which are interest associations; to the Committee for the Survival and Development of Mankind which has the status of a public movement organ. All these organizations differ from one another in their aims, scale, method of formation, and role in the life of society. However, they do not have a precise legal status. Legal practice distinguishes between the individual characteristics of their rights and obligations, reflecting them in labor and civil legislation, enforceable enactments on soviets and trade unions, and legally binding acts and departmental rules. Yet, strictly speaking, only organizations which have a membership are regarded as social organizations in our country. Traditionally, they are confined to five types of organization: trade unions, the Komsomol, cooperatives, creative unions, and voluntary societies.

[Feofanov] Precisely what significance does this have? In practical terms at least?

[Belyayeva] The point is that today other movements are springing up which are no less important but, because they do not fit in with the traditional description, they are deprived of legal support. This is curbing people's initiative. I will venture to propose three distinguishing features defining a social organization, which I consider the most important. First, it must have a sufficiently broad social base and reflect the interests of a specific social group; second, it must raise tasks of importance for the development of society as a whole and participate with its resources in the implementation of these tasks; it must have a clearly defined membership and statutes which determine the aims and forms of its work and include a clear procedure for monitoring its leadership from "below." These criteria will make it possible, on the one hand, to involve all the active creative forces—be they social initiative centers or funds, territorial interclub associations, MZHK, or professional, new technology introduction, production, or consumer associations—in the democratic process. And on the other hand, to cut off claims to "universal democracy" of groups and grouplets which do not represent anyone apart from their 10-15 members who are eager to have their voices heard for the sole purpose of "raising problems" without contributing anything to their solution. So let the "rockers" ride their motorbikes as long as they do not keep a whole rayon awake, let them call themselves what they want, without official registration.

The Komsomol on the other hand, despite its position as the "ruling party" in the youth movement, lays claim to state support, favors an expansion of its rights, and wants them to be guaranteed by law. For instance, it wants committee members to be relieved only with the sanction of the superior Komsomol organ. In short, every organization "wants" the law to guarantee its recognition and prestige and the authoritativeness of its decisions, but it should "receive" only according to its actual social role and the importance and value of the programs it advances.

[Feofanov] Cooperatives, for instance, are social organizations, and so are creative unions. Currently various kinds of funds are being set up. There are associations of believers, and various religious sects, apart from those which are expressly banned, do exist. All these associations differ greatly in terms of their social base, aims, structure, and composition. However, they all want legal recognition. But does registration with the Soviet of People's Deputies provide this recognition?

[Belyayeva] The statutes of creative unions, for instance, are not subject to registration—they are simply approved at congresses; the question of the establishment of religious associations is decided by the USSR Council of Ministers Council of Religious Affairs; cooperatives will be established in accordance with the new law, and all-union funds will be established with the agreement of central organs.

Only in the establishment of voluntary societies is registration with the local soviet a decisive factor, providing the basis for their acquisition of the rights of a legal entity as specified in the regulations on their establishment and activity approved by the VTSIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] back in 1932. However, these societies at local level are never regarded as anything but branches of the central or all-union societies. Local soviets are authorized to create independent voluntary societies without the superior level component. Their rights, in any case, are guaranteed. But what about youth housing complexes, creative production initiative and artistic creativity centers, experimental and new technology introduction and experimental and design associations which fulfill a very important and socially useful function but are unthinkable without extensive economic activity? They have to "adapt" to existing legislation which hampers their development and does not provide any legal basis for their independent activity if the status of a cooperative is not appropriate for them.

And there are other complications. Who, for instance, should register the Karelian ASSR Union of Creative Unions established on the initiative of the republic section of the RSFSR Union of Theater Workers? What rights should it be granted?

In short, social practice is confronting both theoreticians and party officials with new tasks which must be resolved without delay if we are to avoid being overtaken by developments.

[Feofanov] Since the number of independent formations has sharply increased of late, they have started demanding the implementation of all kinds of rights inscribed in the Constitution. Let's be frank: Much that is enshrined in the Fundamental Law has been in a state of dormancy. For instance, the right to assembly and demonstrations. There was a tacit agreement that the right to demonstrations was entirely exhausted by May Day and 7 November. And the right to assembly, by trade union, Komsomol, party, kolkhoz, and a few other meetings. The public is already dissatisfied with this situation. Now a new question arises. Demonstrations and meetings are held for a specific purpose: for propaganda purposes, to educate people, to protest about something. Some of them may evoke objections. Society's morality, excessively puritanical though it may sometimes be, has to be taken into account because it is accepted by society. The law regulates only the most general and essential relations. It seems to me that no matter how detailed it is, it cannot take account of all moral precepts. The rule "what is not forbidden is allowed" is, thank goodness, gradually becoming part of life. However, when it comes to the subject of debate, don't you think that this in principle golden rule is somewhat risky?

[Belyayeva] Public morality must, of course, be taken into account. However, what is "public morality?" "Let's make sure that nothing gets out" is also part of it.

Furthermore by public morality we frequently understand traditional morality and sometimes even conservative sentiments. Understandably, everything has to have a limit. But what are we afraid of? Provocative gatherings in front of foreign missions, specially orchestrated to produce "international reverberations?" But is that really what counts? A broadly-based and well organized mass demonstration reflecting genuine initiative is one of the key democratic forms of people's power, it can be an extraordinarily effective method of countering bureaucracy when other means prove impotent. Who is risking what here? Who is trying to intimidate public opinion with the dangers of "excessive democracy?" In Moscow, Riga, Novosibirsk, Leningrad, and other cities, temporary rules are already in operation about the holding of street marches, rallies, and demonstrations. Rules which crudely flout the Constitution which makes no provision for having to obtain permission in advance. Here, in actual fact a standard regulation is tantamount to a ban, as you said earlier.

[Feofanov] But perhaps the authorities need to know of the intention to hold a demonstration, if only to maintain order?

[Belyayeva] Notification of a march is one thing, but having to obtain permission is something quite different. In the first case it is exercising a right, in the second it is begging favors. Incidentally, demonstrations are also a method of resolving social problems, or at least of exposing them. The authorities would do well to show patience and historical wisdom instead of turning against the first, and probably not always successful, experiments.

[Feofanov] A question currently being posed acutely concerns, first, developing the working people's useful and healthy initiative, and second, enhancing the role and influence of the soviets. Naturally, the soviets as guarantors of the law will have to protect the rights of the social organizations and at the same time cut short their unlawful actions. How do you see the question of social organizations' representation in the soviets? Here focus on electoral laws and the right to put forward candidates will be inevitable. During the past elections to local soviets we received complaints, for instance, from a VOOPK [All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments] branch—they were not allowed to nominate their candidate deputy. I believe that this was not fair; after all, VOOPK is a solid, useful organization. But you will agree, "solid" is not a legal concept. It would be good if the interests of various strata of the population were represented in the soviets as broadly as possible. However, it is an organ of power and not a forum representing a broad spectrum of diverse formations. Although personally I favor the broadest possible representation.

[Belyayeva] The question of social organizations' representation in the soviets has been resolved at legislative level long ago. Both the USSR Constitution and the laws

on the soviets state that trade unions, the Komsomol, cooperatives, and other social organizations have the right to nominate candidate deputies. That refers to all who enjoy the status of a social organization. The law makes no provision for exceptions.

And so, incidentally, we have come back to the question of which associations can be categorized as social organizations. VOOPK is a republic-level voluntary society. Although these societies form part of the traditional "group of five," they have been subject to unjustified discrimination in practice; theoreticians, too, have tried to prove that while the DOSAAF or the Znaniye Society are political system entities, the Choir or Philatelic Societies are not.

The long dispute around whether voluntary societies are fully-fledged social organizations or not has been resolved by the new edition of the CPSU Program which clearly names all the five types of social organization, including all voluntary societies, as channels for the implementation of party policy.

The political cooperation established between some local soviets and initiative groups also constitutes a new political practice. The deputies' groups operating on residential developments are also the public, but public invested with power. Who, if not they, is to find a common language with the independent associations, open the doors of soviets to initiative, and thus to obtain the population's real backing and support. It seems to me that I could go even further and say: Why should we not put our heads together and work out how the soviet as an organ of power could at the same time be a "forum representing the broad spectrum" of representatives of all social formations? But that is a topic for a separate discussion.

[Feofanov] Why a separate discussion? I do not want to drag out our conversation, but I believe that the question of the status of both social organizations and the "informals," the practical cooperation between official social organizations and nontraditional ones, and the mutual relations of both with the organs of state power are not merely legal questions. What the new formations need above all is social recognition. In the shape of the party's blessing, I would say.

[Belyayeva] I have had many dealings with members of the new formations. And believe me, this is precisely what they are expecting from the 19th all-union party conference. This, of course, does not resolve the question of their legal status.

[Feofanov] Somehow I cannot imagine how such a "purely social" law could be adopted without a nationwide discussion. Yet it was only by accident, at a meeting of the Discussion Club which operates under the aegis of the Committee for the Defense of Peace, that I heard

from you that a draft of such a law already exists, that it has passed through the various stages and had all but been adopted. How can such a law be adopted behind closed doors!...

Sociologists Study Makeup of Bureaucracy, Ways to Combat It

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[Article by L. Ponomarev, doctor of historical sciences; and V. Shinkarenko, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[18 May 88, p 3]

[Text] We cannot but respond to R. Sagdeyev's article "Where We Have Lost the Tempo" (IZVESTIYA, No 119, 1988). The academician is absolutely right when he links stagnation in our science with the omnipotence of bureaucratism. But has there not been stagnation in other spheres of social life for the same reason? Bureaucratic averaging and leveling have crippled not only science. They also preclude the possibility of real creativity in economics, politics, and culture. Bureaucracy everywhere is trying to become self-sufficing and therein lies the greatest danger to our entire society. This is the principal danger that stalks perestroika which has begun in our country.

Beyond a doubt, the masses are aware of this danger. It is not by chance that public attention today is focused on the struggle against bureaucratism, formalism and other negative phenomena. This is indicated by 54.7 percent of the workers and 48.3 percent of the managers among the 11,000 people who were polled twice—in 1986 and 1988—by sociologists of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. The poll was conducted in 15 regions of the nation. Materials in 1100 oblast, city, rayon, and factory newspapers were analyzed and thousands of documents and oral statements were studied. Thus the conclusion seems to us to be beyond question.

But bureaucratism may possibly be the most difficult of all the problems that must be overcome in the course of perestroika. Indeed, Soviet power has been fighting it more than 70 years. The fight has not ceased in a single stage of the nation's development. What has been the result? Bureaucratism, that most malicious enemy of socialism, has nevertheless penetrated every pore of our society.

Bureaucratism has, in addition to everything else, prepared for us a very serious obstacle that is occasionally personified by very highly placed persons who have become one with the criminal world. It can be said that we have our own home-grown mafia. It is very powerful. It has vast material and human resources. It has the most extensive connections both inside the nation and abroad.

In Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and Moldavia entire strata of organized crime have been discovered operating under the cover of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Jurists emphasize the unusually sharp, even desperate character of the struggle against crime fostered by the bureaucrats. They note that as a rule there are three "fronts" in operation here. The first combines the local forces; the second—the forces from Center; and the third—the very "fathers of law and order": the militia, the procuracy, and the courts apply the brakes to the work here. More than half of the jurists polled today do not acquit defendants even though they are obligated to do so under the law. In a word, there is need for a cardinal judicial and legal reform. But...

Let us look at things realistically. But what if the bureaucracy hinders or forestalls this? And what if it moreover—it is within its power to do so—makes economic disorders even worse? What then? Evidently, if something similar happens, there may be the very change in the mass consciousness that the bureaucracy is counting on. Specifically: the masses themselves ask for a firm hand without going into details. This is a well-known path. This is how bureaucrats have chopped away at democracy since the times of Ancient Greece.

What is the basis for such a conclusion other than jurists' assumptions? First of all, the level of laxity and disorderliness that we have "attained?" Comparative analysis of the results of research conducted by sociologists at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee in 1986 and 1988 shows that this is noted by workers, collective farmers, and managers. For example, references to mismanagement rose from 82 to 92 percent.

Of course it should be considered that the mass consciousness does not always keep track of perestroika activity, especially under the conditions of expanding glasnost when the public's attention is sometimes focused more on shortcomings than attainments. However bureaucratic pressure and the wave of negligence are also obvious to the naked eye.

Is this not evidenced by Chernobyl? By ship and airplane accidents, by railroad and mine accidents? Under glasnost, they are not concealed and this is as it should be. The Soviet people must know about everything that is going on in the nation. However the bureaucracy is also prepared to use glasnost itself against perestroika, to shift the responsibility for its crimes to glasnost. A classical example taken from the newspapers: for a long time now, in no one capital construction has been interested in quality projects. Institutes are primarily concerned with seeing to it that projects are completed on schedule. Ministries are ready to accept the most worthless work as long as it has been included in the plan. Contract construction organizations are still more tractable. They are not even averse to bad design documentation. Once they have received the funding, it

permits them to postpone deadlines later on. As a result, the state sustains enormous losses—up to 15 billion rubles! And no one is to blame.

Such is the first column of bureaucratism—it is the most active and the most dangerous. This column is prepared to commit any crime for the sake of self-preservation. It will stop at nothing.

Today, our society must once again learn vigilance. This is very difficult work. It demands maximum principle and legality of the Soviet people. At the same time, it demands maximum caution, tact, and trust.

The second column of bureaucratism is more massive. It includes practically all officials who directly participate in the management of production, state, and public affairs but who do not derive any direct personal advantage as a result. They are for the most part honest people who act within the framework of contradictory instructions. But some of them are also idlers who shirk serious work. They are people who shun responsibility. Individually, almost all of them are decent people. But in their aggregate they are an enormous incrustation on society's body.

Let us take the economy. It is no secret that the management sphere employs approximately 18 million persons. Of this number, 2.5 million belong to the apparatus of management organs; approximately 15 million are management personnel of associations, enterprises, and organizations. That is, there is a manager for every six or seven people. The maintenance of this entire enormous apparatus costs us 40 billion rubles a year. And this at a time when the annual increase in national income is half of this figure.

And how does this golden apparatus work?

Frankly speaking, its work is thoroughly bad. If we evaluate it according to the end result, we must admit that stagnation is above all the result of bad management.

What if we judge on the basis of the actions of individuals? Then, we must note formalism, incompetence, indifference, and a lack of performance discipline. All this is bureaucratism in action.

Recently (in 1988), sociologists at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee carried out a study of four union ministries: finance, grain products, chemical industry, reclamation and water resources. What were the findings? More than 41 percent of their personnel were indifferent and totally uninterested in their jobs.

The party's demands for restructuring the style and methods of management are not being met at the ministries. Paper-shuffling flourishes as before. The number of pointless, unnecessary meetings is being slowly

reduced. These facts were noted by 43.7 percent of the respondents at the Ministry of Finance; 69.5 percent at the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources; 80.4 percent at the Ministry of Grain Products; and 92.4 percent at the Ministry of the Chemical Industry. A considerable number (from 26.1 to 35.8 percent) noted losses of time when a third or even a half of the working day was wasted.

Only half of the respondents in the surveyed ministries believed that their superiors were qualified to lead their subdivisions. A still smaller number—39 percent, i. e., only one-third, believed that their immediate superiors (department or sector chief) were capable of creating a healthy creative atmosphere in the collective and of leading the collective to the realization of the objective.

Studies showed that three out of the four ministries had become a lifelong sanctuary for random people with no commitment to the effort. As a rule, the only people working in their specialty are those in the USSR Ministry of Finance. One-third of the respondents in the other ministries are not specialists in the given sector.

Where did these people come from? Who are they? What are they doing in such high positions of management? What is the benefit from them? Analysis showed that they for the most part are people under the age of 30. They comprise 31.8 percent of the surveyed ministries. In the sociologists' opinion, they obtained their jobs through pull and nepotism. This is one of the principal ways in which the bureaucratic system is infused with new blood. Even though the newcomers are young, they usually show no promise. They either soon become disenchanted with their work or else show no interest in it from the very beginning. They do not know how to manage nor do they wish to manage. One-third of the ministry employees candidly admit that their jobs do not correspond to their interests in life. They would like to transfer to other jobs. But they are unavailable and so they are forced to manage the sector. They manage in the hope that something better will turn up. What is better? Fate rarely smiles on people of this ilk. They will more likely have to toil until retirement. Unless, of course, the sector falls apart before then.

The discrepancy between the jobs and personal plans of these ministry youth is the highest—four times higher than among other categories. It is not by chance that approximately 75 percent of those dissatisfied with their work are young people.

Dissatisfaction among youth is usually of an abstract nature. This is not surprising for people who do not know either production or management, who have no desire to get to the heart of their job, and who look condescendingly at the sector that feeds them. They consider it bad form to talk shop away from work.

These outwardly educated young specialists, who relate to the sector as a lamentable burden that takes away 8 hours of their personal life every day, as yet play only an auxiliary role in the mechanism for the bureaucratic management of the sector. But this is bureaucratism's main reserve from which it will draw its strength for the next 30 or more years unless decisive measures are taken today.

Bureaucratic youth are considerably more conservative than the older generation. They are hostile to any innovation that requires their mental exertions. Among the Komsomol members polled there was not a single one who could say that in his personal work there was the beginning of any kind of perestroika associated with the necessity of increasing his contribution to the common cause. These lazy young people are a poor hope for the nation.

However even the activity that is shown by the older generation of bureaucrats today cannot satisfy society. The next wave of paper directed against paperwork does not evoke any particular enthusiasm. And as regards the effort, progress is still insignificant.

In many ministries, departments and institutions that are trying to achieve perestroika from above, the further bureaucratization of the work is carried out under the name of democratization. There are plans for democratization, its expansion, and intensification, for monitoring their execution, etc. In sum, everything is as it was before—only the words are different.

The muses of bureaucratism never trouble themselves in vain. Once they have sung, check your pockets!

The third column of bureaucratism includes all of us. Perestroika has most clearly revealed this sad truth to us. Strange as it may be, neither social scientists nor publicists were the first to call attention to this circumstance. It was discovered by satirists. "I want to live in a fine apartment. I want there to be no lines. I want not to be jostled on the bus so that my buttons come off. I want to have the full assortment of all the goods I desire. The only thing I do not want is to do anything for this." Here it is, the code of dependency! Secretly or openly it is today espoused by tens of millions of people not involved in management. Mass consumerism, mass passivity, mass formalism are blazing the trail for bureaucratism into tomorrow.

According to the estimate of the working people themselves, approximately 60 percent of the members of work collectives occupy a passive position in life. Almost 82 percent of the 13,200 workers, collective farmers, and employees polled by the sociologists indicated that they had encountered unconscientious attitudes toward work and obligations; 67.6 percent had witnessed the attempt to take more than was given to society; 66.6 percent had encountered hypocrisy and sanctimony; 50 percent—

slander and calumny. One-fifth of the respondents indicated the actual existence of injustice toward people in the collective; two-thirds called attention to indifference, grovelling, and subservience, to "pull" and connections with the necessary people.

Does not all of this blaze the trail for bureaucratism? It does and how!

In order to be a thorough bureaucrat it is probably not necessary to occupy any position whatsoever. One does not need to have an office or telephones. One does not need to have instructions or papers of any kind. All one has to do is to arrange one's life in such a way as to live at the expense of others. But others must see that they will be in for it without you. You must train yourself to think within a limited range. And not a step to the side.

Is the schoolteacher who tries to keep his class in fear not a bureaucrat? What about the bus driver who slams the door in a passenger's face? Or a checkroom attendant who refuses to accept a coat? Or a producer who forces the viewer to watch his boring films? Or a father who persuades his son with his belt? Or the son who believes that his father must feed him until he reaches old age?

Such is everyday bureaucratism. It is all-embracing and omnipresent. It has lived in each of us since time immemorial. And if you now, while reading this article, catch the author in a formal contradiction, you can freely consider this thought to be a tribute to everyday bureaucratism.

Judge for yourselves. We cite the answers of economic managers to the question: "Do you hope to earn more if you do more in your work?" An affirmative response was given by 22 percent; a negative response by 35 percent; and 43 percent declared that they were not entirely certain. Is it any wonder that workers are lost in doubt as to whether to work harder or not?

Given such a mood, can one hope for an early breakthrough? They do not cherish such a hope. Thus, four-fifths of all workers and collective farmers polled stated that they worked in brigades. This is close to the figures of USSR Goskomstat. However only eight percent of them made a positive evaluation of the way khozraschet is being introduced in collectives at the lower level. An eloquent indicator!

Everyday bureaucratism grows out of the formalism of everyday life. And this occurs on the roadside of everyday consciousness. The point is that any form of consciousness is inherently divorced from reality, in other words, involves all manner of fantasy. But if artistic fantasy is found in works of art and scientific fantasy is found in forecasts, designs, plans, etc., everyday fantasy has two paths. One is real, practical reforms. The other is

myth-making, dreamy inactivity, and building castles in the air. On this other path, everyday formalism, followed by bureaucrats, flourishes on the disparity between thoughts and actions.

Do you remember old Khotabych? Such a dear, kind, responsive sorcerer. Possessing fabulous power over the forces of nature, he fashioned a telephone from the finest marble. And what was the result? The form of the apparatus was flawless. Good enough to show at an exhibit! But as regards content, the oldster failed utterly. Time, energy, and materials were expended in vain. In vain did he pull a precious hair from his miraculous beard. The marble apparatus remained silent.

Every Soviet schoolchild knows this sad story.

Any Young Pioneer, if he reflected on this fact, could explain everything without difficulty. He would understand that Khotabych did not create this fake on purpose. The old man wanted to do good but he stumbled on the steps of knowledge. After all, a knowledgeable person, including such a one as the sorcerer, comes to understand the essence of surrounding things in no other way than through their external form. The understanding of form is the very first step on the path of knowledge. But for some it is also the very last. The Khotabych syndrome is a mass, extremely stable phenomenon.

How many of us are sincerely and unselfishly dedicated to form? Being sacredly convinced that we have brilliantly completed the learning process, we act accordingly. Thus do we act in all spheres of society's life. This is how we act at work and at home, among our own people and when we go visiting. And in the international arena as well.

But then came bad luck. With the passage of time, such actions of ours become increasingly dangerous to those around us and consequently to us as well. At one time we killed a fly on our friend's forehead. Naturally we hit the accursed fly with all our might, with our entire five-clawed hand. Or, more likely, with a cobblestone. Now, however, the times have changed. The scientific-technological revolution has given us new, hitherto unheard of possibilities. Today we have in our hands the atom, the laser, genes...What will happen?

Clearly we cannot live this way any longer.

There can be no two ways of thinking about this. The elimination of bureaucracy is a pressing historical task. This is a task of the critical, perestroyka period. The 27th CPSU Congress noted that the party must declare decisive and merciless war on bureaucracy. Vladimir Ilich Lenin considered it especially important to fight bureaucracy at critical moments when there is a demand for maximum efficiency, speed and energy. Today bureaucracy is a serious obstacle on the road to

solving our main problem: the acceleration of the socio-economic development of the nation and the radical restructuring of the economic mechanism associated therewith.

V. I. Lenin was the first to see the enormous danger posed by bureaucracy and he therefore taught us to fight against it with all our might and especially with the force of law.

[19 May 88 p 3]

[Text] We must get rid of bureaucracy not only through administrative intervention, the replacement of worthless officials, and the abolition of useless services. All this must be done, of course, without fail. But this is far from enough! The main thing that must be done in the course of socialist construction is to gradually create a new mechanism—a self-management mechanism of the people that will replace the bureaucratic management mechanism.

However the replacement must be made not on the run, not all at once, not through decrees, but gradually so as to allow the new social mechanism to gain the necessary strength and stability. V. I. Lenin did not recognize cavalry charges against bureaucracy. Addressing the All-Russian Miners' Conference, he emphasized: "If someone comes to you and tells you: 'we will put an end to bureaucracy,' this is demagoguery. This is nonsense. We will have to spend long years fighting bureaucracy and anyone who thinks otherwise is a charlatan and a demagogue because hundreds of measures are required to overcome bureaucracy."

Lenin proposed the following as urgent measures. The simplification of the state apparatus, leaving only those links the state absolutely cannot do without. That is, leaving only the vitally essential institutions. And then gradually improving the apparatus on the basis of real, practical needs. All this was to be done under the supervision, the active, and the ever broader participation of the working people. As white collar workers were released, they could be transferred to productive labor, to other spheres of social activity. Bureaucracy will disappear when "there is total participation of the working people themselves in government."

But instead of reducing we have multiplied the number of civil servants. The bureaucrats, upon gaining power, naturally saw no necessity whatsoever for self-government. Self-government was considered to be something belonging to the distant future.

Lenin's conception of socialism is being reborn today. The idea of the self-government of the people occupies a central place.

The massive reduction of the bureaucratic apparatus is taking place in the course of the democratization and restructuring of all spheres of public life. A reduction of

the bureaucratic apparatus by 40-50 percent in the near future is planned in the RSFSR alone. One hundred fifteen ministries, departments, and administrations of autonomous republics and more than 800 kray and oblast organs of state and economic management are being abolished. In general, the administrative apparatus of the Russian Federation will be reduced by 263,000 persons which will make it possible to save 576 million rubles a year. A similar picture is also seen in other union republics. However in order that the struggle against bureaucracy be more successful, we must have a very clear picture of the enemy's face.

In bygone days, the general picture of the bureaucrat was that of an average statistical depersonalized civil servant who performed his duties perfunctorily and indifferently. This was a very primitive external portrait, more of a caricature than real even though as research described in the preceding issue in four ministries shows, this type also exists.

Time has shown—specifically in the course of 3 years of perestroika—that the content and roots of bureaucratic activity are deep. Today's bureaucrat is not merely a statistical unit but personifies if not a certain idea, at least a certain conception of life.

The party's policy of broad democratization of the work of the state system, of all society; its policy of developing self-government is also essentially a global offensive against bureaucracy. But the specific methods of this struggle cannot be set down all at once with ink and paper. They evolve in the course of perestroika on the basis of the in-depth analysis of practical experience. And here virtually the greatest importance is acquired the knowledge of the entire complex of those factors which over the 70 preceding years have constantly supported bureaucracy, have developed and strengthened it until it became a million-headed monster bristling with millions of poisonous feathers.

The intricate intertwining of roots and bureaucracy under the conditions of perestroika makes it capable of almost instantaneous mimicry. In the course of perestroika, it is constantly modernizing its arsenal of ideas. It holds forth in the newspapers, on television and radio actively and without restraint. In so doing it masks its true nature.

Here we should call attention to the ideological omnivorousness of the bureaucrat, to his refined psychological adaptability.

Why are our economic innovations not producing the necessary results? State acceptance is barely squeaking through with enormous effort. Cooperatives are not succeeding in developing. The family contract is not getting on its feet properly. The initial application of the state order is not justifying the hopes placed in it. Why

not? Evidently because these matters were immediately embraced by bureaucracy which was given the opportunity to present itself as an active champion of the innovations.

And now, after having proclaimed himself to be an innovator, a democrat, and a most active participant in perestroika at all crossroads, the bureaucrat at the same time calmly smothers perestroika by reducing its ideas and methods to absurdity. Here economic bureaucracy is combined with social and political demagoguery, with ideological distortion directed against the very idea of perestroika. But all this is done so subtly, so skillfully, so deftly, that there is hardly any basis for finding fault.

Under these conditions, we must not be seduced by partial successes. The struggle against the proliferation of paperwork or ostentation, against stagnation or inertia in itself, in isolation from the restructuring of the management apparatus that would draw its healthy part into the new economic mechanism—such a struggle is doomed from the outset. The orientation toward the end result of production rather than toward a bureaucrat higher up can be effective only if the fate of the person making the choice depends more on the actual result expressed in concrete, tangible form than on the disposition of the higher ups.

Of course the most important thing is to take away the economic stilts that enables the bureaucrat to rise above reality. This is clearly not an easy thing to do. The imperfection of the system of indicators and instructions and the differences in departmental interests shows itself here with full force when one bureaucrat willy-nilly supports another just because their personal interests are identical. They also identically contradict the public interest.

Radical restructuring of economic management draws all the working people into the management of the national economy thereby depriving the bureaucrat of his previous administrative and economic privileges. This occurs as a result of the restructuring of the activity of the central, republic and local organs of management. The planning system, the financial and credit system, pricing, and material-technical supply are restructured. Thus the ways of waging resolute struggle against bureaucracy have been defined quite clearly. But the struggle will be difficult if we consider the fact that restructuring in the attitude toward bureaucracy is dragged out by the bureaucrats themselves. This is how the great majority of the working people think.

According to the data of sociologists at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, perestroika in the party organs is considered to be a success by only 11.4 percent of the working people; in soviet organs—8.4 percent; in health care organs—8.1 percent;

in trade unions—6.4 percent; among economic managers—5.4 percent; and in the Komsomol—4.2 percent. They are staunch optimists. At any rate, they have no doubt.

V. I. Lenin's lessons in the struggle against bureaucratism are already producing a substantial result today. Glasnost, the principles of self-government, the universal democratization of society, appointment by election—the party has adopted all these things in the course of perestroika and is actively using them in practice.

But we must go farther. We must identify both the strong and weak points of bureaucratism. After all, it is not by chance that bureaucratism endures in every country from century to century regardless of its system. There is something in it that enables it to exist in our country as well—comfortably—for 7 decades. What is it? We must find this out if for no other reason than the fact that the bureaucrats will have to be fought with all manner of methods. This includes prolonged explanatory and educational work in the course of which we must find common points of contact with the bureaucrats.

But all the same, what makes our home-grown Soviet bureaucrat strong? What has enabled him not only to beat off all attacks over a period of 70 years but also to grow, to develop, to improve, and to embrace more and more new areas of our life?

First of all, the massive nature [of bureaucratism]. The enormous number of bureaucrats unquestionably gives a new quality to bureaucratism. Naturally this does not mean that we can speak about a special class here as some occasionally do.

But there is reason to believe that bureaucratism, like any other mass phenomenon, possesses exceptional tenacity and the capacity for mass reproduction.

Perestroika is in its fourth year. But according to sociologists at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, less than half of the working people are watching its progress. Only 27.7 percent are interested in the elections of leaders; 7.7 percent—in the restructuring of the work of the soviets; and only 18.6 percent participate in government. If things continue in the same vein, the bureaucrats can sleep soundly. There are plenty of ignoramuses and lazy people for their century!

Second, the high degree of organization. In this sense, bureaucratism has something to throw on the scales of history. The rigid centralism of its hierarchical structure has thus far proven itself when vitally important things were at stake. As historical experience has shown, an administrative system based on commands and the legal, economic, and spiritual oppression of the masses can

function for quite a long time if it is periodically renewed through the replacement of cadres that have compromised themselves, organizational structures, and ideological principles.

Bureaucratism continuously absorbs all the organizational attainments of socialism. Yes indeed, bureaucratism also learns—learning is vitally important to it. It has already long ago transformed most of our present state and public institutions and organizations into an instrument of bureaucratic action. With certain qualifications, it can be said that they have become forms of existence of bureaucratism (no sooner was a temperance society established than it was bureaucratized!) and we will have to wash and scrub them for a long time before we can restore the truly socialistic and innovative essence they have lost. This is also confirmed by the sociological data we have previously cited. Especially the data that attest to the steadfast desire to convince ourselves and others that the struggle against bureaucratism at the institutional and organizational level is being successfully conducted.

The exceptional degree of organization of bureaucratism consists in the fact that each of its representatives is perfectly oriented toward every "area of management" and knows his own maneuvers, the maneuvers of his neighbor, the maneuvers of the entire institution, the maneuvers of the entire bureaucratic system. Its stereotypical organizational actions have been long ago and thoroughly assimilated by the entire bureaucratic system. While they are ordinarily totally useless under exceptional circumstances, they usually feel like a fish in water in a conventional situation. Third, the ideology of bureaucratism. Such an ideology exists. It is very strong but it is difficult to detect because of its inherent mimicry properties. The point is that bureaucratism does not have its own class ideas. In principle it always confines itself to the ideas of organization and management, directing them into the necessary channel, and at the same time painting them with all the colors of society's dominant ideology. It is these colors that confuses those who seek its ideological roots.

Bureaucratism assumes the ideology of the state whose body it parasitizes. Slave-owners, feudal lords, the bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants have successively paid tribute to bureaucratism. With captivating sincerity, it pledges love and loyalty to everyone. But it loves only itself and is indeed true to this love to the grave.

It would be a mistake to equate all bureaucratism with bungling. Overly zealous performers are needed only as additional insurance. Here they proceed from the simple worldly wisdom that you can't spoil the porridge with butter. But this is the upper, superficial stratum of bureaucratic thought.

But on the whole, bureaucratic thinking is not as simple as it seems. As a rule, it is deep and many-sided. It is

closely connected with life and is highly flexible. Bureaucratism readily adapts any innovation to its own needs. Without any difficulty whatsoever, it readily turns all measures directed against it to its own advantage.

Bureaucratic ideology is mobile, very flexible, and even dialectical. It has the ability to ward off reality ahead of time if it is a matter of society attempting to rid itself of bureaucratic dominance.

Is this not indicated by the clearly expressed desire of lower level party workers to "strengthen" the primary party organization with a full-time technical secretary? This is supposed to make it possible for the party bureau secretary to concentrate on live work with people. Is everything correct? Is everything in the spirit of the time? With one exception: if this wish is fulfilled, hundreds of thousands more communists appointed to this new position will take up the pen and begin writing new papers.

Fourth, personal interest. There probably would not have ever been any bureaucratism if in deep antiquity man had not discovered the simple truth that it is not necessary to do a good job in order to eat well. The exploitation of this thought, which always generates an unhealthy interest, continues even today. Bureaucratism is one of the poisonous plants that are sown by personal interest in the field of management. Among them we find careerism, the love of power, vanity, and many other vices.

Bureaucratism opens up broad opportunities for the satisfaction of personal interests—this is the principal secret behind its tenacity. As a compensation for performing official duties, it permits the bureaucrat to focus his free time on things that interest him most. Whoever wants to can spend their Sundays thinking about open-hearth furnaces. But the majority prefer the family, soccer, and the other joys of life. They also dream about the time when it will be possible to have not 2 but 3 days off a week.

Is this perhaps not specifically the reason why our institutional youth are in no hurry to join in the struggle against bureaucratism? And why struggle if they find everything so good on the job the way things are. As long as the old bureaucrats are still sitting in their chairs, there is no need for young people to exert themselves. It is not by chance that only 32.1 percent of the people under 20 polled by sociologists of the Academy of Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee strive to occupy an active position in life. Between 20 and 39 years, this indicator rises from 44.5 to 46.5 percent. From 40 to 49 years—51.1 percent. The figure rises as a function of age. Almost 60 percent of the people between the age of 50 and 59 years desire to be active. Those 60 and older—62.3 percent. This is a strange trend, is it not? It does not benefit society.

Fifth, practicality. Only at first glance does it appear that bureaucrats are remote from life, from real life problems. In actual fact, this is not the case. They resolve their own life problems, usually in the very best way.

A bureaucrat is the creator of the cult of officialdom and is at the same time its voluntary slave. He compensates his servility before his superiors by tyrannizing his subordinates. Revolutionary restructuring is overthrowing the bureaucrat. It takes away his power. It strips him of the aura of state interests. It does not permit him to tyrannize other people. Finally, it deprives him of the pie he has not earned. What is a bureaucrat to do under these conditions? The best strategy is to love perestroika. To do so immediately by every means. To embrace it firmly and to smother it in the embrace. This is what the old bureaucrats are doing. But the young, unfledged office workers are as yet concentrating primarily on their personal concerns. They are biding their time.

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Discussion of 'New Youth Policy' Sought
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[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I. Ilinskiy, director of the Komsomol Central Committee Higher Komsomol School Scientific Research Center: "Change of Generation" under rubric "19th Party Conference: Restructuring Tasks"]

[Text] A great deal is written and said about young people. Informal organizations, rock groups, deviant behavior with "shocks" like prostitution and drug addiction.... We have brought hidden issues to light but have yet to find radical solutions. So what is the problem?

Young people are the mirror of society, in which its difficulties are reflected particularly sharply. But the youth problem, as an aggregate of many individual problems—from the philosophical to the practical and from ideals to working, social, and leisure conditions—the problem in all its integrity and urgency, it seems to me, has still to be grasped by society.

Surely we must have seen how young people's social activeness has been waning with every year? How they have become alienated from politics and from socialist moral values, how legal nihilism has grown in them? We saw but looked no deeper. Surely we must have heard how the voice of amateur rock groups burst discordantly into music to which our ears had become attuned? We heard but took no heed. We did not stop to look, listen, or think.

Society "did not notice" how its demographic aging had led to a reduction in the number of young people in social management (particularly in the middle and upper

echelons of authority), in science (the number of young people has been halved), and in the arts. We "did not notice" how young people were being squeezed out of the sphere of material distribution, how the approach to them was becoming increasingly consumerist, or how the intolerance and authoritarian tutelage of the older generation over the younger were growing.... Disregard of young people's needs and tastes in turn increased their dissatisfaction, irritation, and aggressiveness toward their elders. The succession of generations in society has meant that established attitudes are reproduced without actually developing. The conservative mechanism of continuity has led to a slowing down in the process of young people's developing civic maturity.

Restructuring and the policy of acceleration, intensification, and far-reaching change in social development objectively increase the demands made on young people's energy and abilities, and this is finding a response in them.

A public opinion poll conducted by our center soon after the 27th CPSU Congress showed that the mood of young people has taken a sharp turn for the better. In the fall of 1987, a total of 42 percent of the young men and women questioned said that in the last 2 years their confidence in the future had grown stronger. A total of 73 percent of young people had greater faith in the feasibility of our ideals.

Young people are acquiring a taste for social activity and setting up creative collectives, cooperatives, and amateur associations. Their interest in economic, philosophical, and historical problems is growing. Nevertheless, the situation among young people (particularly in large cities) is contradictory. Only some young people have become involved in the real struggle for restructuring. What are the reasons for this?

The first reason is that the younger generation's creative readiness for action is not up to the level of the demands society now makes on it. Fathers have brought up their children in the spirit of their own notions on life, having themselves lost their social activeness during the years of stagnation. How could this really fail to have an effect?

The second reason is that young people's efforts to show their abilities in forms of activity corresponding to their interests and level of development quite often come up against a blank wall of resistance from "adults."

The fact that some of today's young people are trying to gain independence in restructuring by stating their demands with unusual force is giving some people reason to suspect the younger generation of avant-gardism, rebellion, and dangerous political radicalism. They are indignant and afraid that this kind of behavior by young people will shake society's foundations. But the passivity, consumerism, and conformism of other young people are grounds for criticizing them no less zealously for

disregarding their civic duty. And in this respect, particularly in recent decades, we have found ourselves in a position no better than that of the fathers in Turgenev's time.

However, if there are to be revolutionary transformations in society's fundamental structures there must be a "break in the gradualness" of its development, including the process of continuity between generations. The scale and complexity of social change require an innovative potential in young people that is consonant with this thrust: new thinking, a new level of awareness, new morality. But this potential can only be disclosed and cultivated in action. There is a powerful core of keen-minded young people who have no time for empty words and concentrate on achieving real results, although there are fewer of these people than we would like. But progress has never been determined by the arithmetical preponderance of a majority.

Progressive young people have long rejected the condescendingly patronizing attitude shown to them by the older generation. Critical attitudes are strong among them. The younger generation asks questions that society finds difficult to answer. How are we to regard previous generations in light of what is now happening in our society? Who bears the responsibility for distorting socialism and deviating from its principles? How can we avoid a repetition of our mistakes? We unfortunately have to admit that many older people have no reason to try to tell young people how to live. We cannot restore young people's trust and love through tedious moralizing and stories of how we lived difficult, heroic lives. Everyone must understand this now. The basis for trust is the purging process which it is important to see through to the end. Society now finds itself in a position where all lies and hypocrisy must be unmasked. Faith in the old sense of the word is now collapsing. It is collapsing wherever it was built on naive dreams, ill-considered political decisions and programs, and social demagoguery. This faith is being replaced by healthy doubt—a more subtle, complex feeling, which seeks to verify our new plans and programs. A stern, brave, responsible attitude to present-day reality is growing on the basis of this feeling.

The romanticized image of handing tradition from generation to generation is now the least suitable of all for our relationship with young people. The older generation is in no hurry to hand over the "baton of tradition," while the younger generation by no means calmly regards the prolonged wait. I remember the storm of applause from the sports and concert hall packed with thousands of people when the Leningrad rock group "Object of Ridicule" performed the song "Our Era":

"We have been told since childhood:

"You were born for struggle,"

"But when we were eager to get into the thick of things,

"They told us to cool it....

"A new time!

"We have come just at the right moment,

"The revolution is here—this means our time has come."

I want to be correctly understood: I am not talking about a conflict between fathers and sons but about tension in their relationship. We simply do not know the degree of this tension. It could increase, however, if we lull our minds with the stereotyped idea that "there can be no conflict between fathers and sons in our country."

According to information provided by the sociological survey mentioned above, one-fifth of the respondents (this figure includes 32.9 percent of school children, 23.9 percent of vocational and technical school students, 20.3 percent of students, 15.7 percent of workers, and 7.5 percent of engineering and technical personnel) indicated that the older generation fails to understand young people's interests in our country today. These differences were much more marked with regard to opinions on music, dancing, fashion, and modes of conduct.

The future does not promise us any respite. The revolutionary transformations in society are only just beginning, and they are causing a polarization of forces. The future of socialism depends to a considerable extent on how young people take restructuring.

If we really want to elevate the ideal of socialism in young people's souls, we should be afraid not of exposing the mistakes of the past but of being vague in showing what needs to be done now, and how, and what the next step should be. For all their need to have an honest memory of history, young people are geared to the future in their plans and intentions. It is obvious that the young people of today will gain a great deal from the implementation of the program for our country's socioeconomic development through 2000. But I am convinced that this is not enough to satisfy their minds. If young people are to be really enthusiastic about future prospects, they must be interested now. Youth problems—primarily social problems—must be clearly highlighted as separate sections in social programs and state plans.

But for the moment these problems are not being solved or are being solved only partially. For many years we have been taught to divide the whole into parts. There was a secret purpose in this: This kind of approach revealed individual problems but did not make it possible to discover what was really happening. Attention was focused on the economic difficulties of sectors and oblasts, plants and kolkhozes, but there was no "problem with the economy as a whole." Everywhere, it seemed, everything could be "perfected," "improved," and

"enhanced," without changing anything in principle and without touching the foundations of our life, which seemed unshakable. But this policy doomed us to instability.

Now is a time of synthesis and broad generalizations, because only they open the way to radical solutions to urgent problems.

So what kind of approach should we take to the youth problem? First of all we must evolve a new type of state youth policy: constructive, realistic, consistent, and integrated rather than conservative, fragmentary, without guarantees, and inconsistent. If, relying on young people as a creative force of development, society gives them even medium-term material and political credit by changing and improving the conditions in which they live, society itself will be able to improve by the beginning of the 21st century. You will be thinking: "To give to someone you have to take from someone else." Must the fathers, whose chests are covered with orders, sacrifice something for the sake of their children who are not always obedient and grateful? No, there is absolutely no question of having to make sacrifices—all that needs to be done at present is restore social justice, which has long been violated with regard to young people. And young people are acutely aware of this. Here are a few figures from research carried out last year. A total of 36 percent of young workers under 25 questioned were satisfied with their life as a whole. At 19 years of age 53 percent of young people were satisfied with their work, at 24 the figure was 37 percent, and at 29 it was 26 percent. By the age of 30 the majority of young people questioned were not happy with their material situation. We must ensure that young people receive the benefits commensurate with their real contribution to the development of society—especially production. Ultimately the principle "to each according to his work" must be applied not only to the individual but also to different social groups.

For this purpose it would be worthwhile to draw up a comprehensive, targeted program to resolve young people's social problems at every level of social administration—from an all-union scale down to the labor collective. There is also an urgent need to pass a law on young people that will provide legal guarantees of youth policy being implemented.

The idea of a state committee for youth problems has long been in the air, but it is now being superseded by a more relevant, realistic idea—to establish a public state youth fund which, as a unified, all-union, centralized system, would monitor and coordinate the financial, economic, and sociocultural activity of state organs, enterprises, and organizations in the sphere of youth policy.

This idea is already being put into practice in some rayons, cities, and enterprises. Youth cooperatives and other independent associations are earning large sums of money and using up to 30 percent of their profits to help

solve young people's social problems. In other words, the youth fund is already evolving "spontaneously" from below. All that we need now is for this movement to be supported from above!

Our center recently asked 1,000 young people the following question: What do they think of this idea? The result: 76.3 percent support the idea of the fund, 8.1 percent are against it, and 15.6 percent found it difficult to answer. In answer to the question of possible sources of finance for this fund, they replied as follows: 68.4 percent said it should be financed from resources earned by young people and 17.9 percent thought it should come out of the state budget. I think that a youth fund could be a great help in our work with young people. This public state organization could operate on the basis of the principles of self-organization and self-government, combining the youth housing complex, the scientific and technical youth creativity system, existing youth initiative funds, and many other forms of the independent youth movement.

Of course, there may also be other suggestions and solutions. I think that their implementation would ease the job of the Komsomol, which is rapidly being burdened with a multitude of essentially economic functions before our very eyes.

The new youth policy envisages trust, which will elevate young people; attentive, calm affection, which will make them honest; patience, which will contribute to the inner emancipation of the individual; and, finally, open, honest dialogue between "fathers" and "sons," which will develop a sense of personal worth in young people.

We are constantly seeking reasons for the rapid germination of so-called "informal" groups. There are different reasons, of course. But surely it is obvious that one of the main reasons is their alienation from parents, teachers, and their elders generally and their desire for trust and sympathy? That is why young people are drawn so instinctively and fiercely to one another, creating their own private world which attracts and protects them.... And even if their world is sometimes lacking in lofty aspirations and glorious deeds, we should ask ourselves: Is it only poverty of ideas that leads them to "hang-outs" and "dens"?... The latter are often spiritually arid, but at least there is none of the inaccessible importance, know-it-all attitude, and cold indifference of the adult world. Some "children" are "overindulged," of course, but far more are "underloved." And as the general tenor of relations between society and young people and the general conditions in which young people live are unsatisfactory, should we be surprised that our efforts at education are failing to produce the desired results? Finally, is it not time to "allow" young people to take a more confident stand in society? Is it not time to give them the opportunity not only to take part in implementing political decisions taken by adults but also to play a part in the democratic evolution of these decisions, as

well as the opportunity to raise issues of concern to them for discussion and work toward a solution within the framework of existing legislation?

The idea of a new youth policy, the very concept of which seemed strange and "avant-gardist" to the majority just a year ago, is gaining increasing support. No practical steps have yet been taken in this direction, however. So why not discuss work with young people, possibly in a special section of the 19th party conference, as was done, for example, by the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks) at the stage of gathering all revolutionary forces? V.I. Lenin raised the issue of winning young people over to the side of the revolution. The problem today is to win young people over to the side of restructuring.

Having worked out the basic approach to work with young people in the new conditions at the 19th party conference, why not raise this problem for nationwide discussion?

Youth Official Discusses Challenges to Komsomol
18000375 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 21 May 88 p 2

[Interview with Valeriy Lukov, candidate of philosophical sciences; department head, NITs, Higher Komsomol School, Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol, by Yu. Sorokin, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent]

[Text] [Question] Valeriy, today it is often said that the Komsomol in recent years has changed from an organization of youth that operates in the interests of youth into an organization that is over youth.

[Answer] This change took place considerably earlier—in the thirties. It was specifically then that the Komsomol ceased to be what it was at the time it was conceived and created. This was connected with society's formation of an administrative system based on commands. In this system, the Komsomol apparatus was assigned the role of "drive belt" from the top echelons of government to youth, the role of executor of decisions handed down from above.

The deformation was not too obvious at first but this bureaucratic model of the Komsomol was cemented over the decades. Everything that "flowered" so luxuriantly in the next 20 years was already inherent in it. The growth of the apparatus was excessive: as is known, the bureaucracy makes its own work. There was an absurd (from a practical point of view) division of education into separate spheres (international, military-patriotic, etc.) and the apparatus was organized accordingly. The Komsomol at that time increasingly became a kind of labor exchange, a supplier of labor power for various construction projects, and became more and more remote from the interests of youth.

[Question] It was said at the 20th Congress that the Komsomol was "on the verge of a major crisis." Is it legitimate to compare this situation with the crises that had already taken place in the history of youth leagues in socialist countries—with the disintegration of the Hungarian Union of Working Youth in 1956, the Union of Polish Youth in 1957, the Czechoslovak Youth League in 1968 and the new political structures of the youth movement created in these countries?

[Answer] The social principles and causes are incomparable. Nevertheless, we must carefully heed the history and experience of fraternal youth unions.

We recall that the disintegration of youth leagues in socialist countries was as a rule preceded by their precipitous, artificially accelerated growth. Campaigns to reach the million mark in membership were "successfully" surpassed in an incredibly short time. The race for massiveness here inevitably led to formalism. Performance was measured not in terms of the influence on youth but on the basis of "figures." As a result of the policy of admitting "all comers," it was no longer an organization of like-minded people. Hence a "double morality" effect originated among its members.

We experienced such processes three times: between 1936 and 1949, the Komsomol grew 2.3 fold; from 1949 to 1953—2 fold; from 1971 to 1978—1.4 fold, and from 1936 to 1982 on the whole—more than 10 fold. At the same time, in Poland and Czechoslovakia on the eve of the crisis there was a dramatic reduction in the number of blue-collar Komsomol members. Nor can we boast that our blue-collar workers are eager to join the Komsomol. Recently a member of our staff was unable to conduct a poll of 25 young workers who joined the Komsomol after the congress because there proved to be only 13 such persons in the oblast center.

Today there is much discussion of associations that are independent of the Komsomol. The disintegration of the Hungarian Union of Working Youth also started when the Union of University and Student Societies broke away from it. The disintegration of the Polish Youth Union was prepared when the Association of Polish Students broke away from it in 1950 and the Union of Polish Harcerstwo separated from it in 1956.

[Question] I fear that your remarks may be construed to mean that independent associations are a threat to the Komsomol.

[Answer] No, that is not what I meant. This is a natural and a democratic process. It seems to me that the time has come for us to modify our views of the youth movement as such.

The "monopoly" to speak in the name of all youth has reached an impasse. This is already clear today. The Komsomol is a unified organization. It is homogeneous in its tasks and status. Demands are uniformly made on

all members of the Komsomol. But young people vary. A 27 year old might not always understand an 18 year old. Young people are very changeable. Their social, regional, and ethnic distinctions are clearly manifested. The Komsomol's political platform is uniform: Marxism-Leninism. But who will venture to say that all our young people, starting at the age of 14 years, are convinced Marxists? Philosophical pluralism exists among youth. Only formally is it possible to unite everyone in the Komsomol. And consequently there are more different voluntary organizations—more possibility for young people to express themselves. In what way is this a bad thing? I think the Komsomol must promote this and cooperate with other organizations if they emerge. The Komsomol will then be freed of an enormous number of "directions of work" and will be able to concentrate on the most important.

I think that the existence of organizations that are an alternative to the Komsomol is also entirely admissible. Why do we fear this? An alternative is not the total opposite of the Komsomol. Differences may concern tactics and certain particular problems. This will specifically be socialist pluralism, the plurality of opinions within the framework of the same ideology.

In this regard, it seems to me that it would not be bad in the discussion of future changes in the Regulations of the All-Union Komsomol to incorporate the right of everyone to voluntarily withdraw from the Komsomol. The loss of even a third of the current membership would be better than the ultimate loss of the Komsomol's authority.

Incidentally it seems to me that we should focus attention on the Cuban and Hungarian experience. The Cuban Young Communists League operates under the supervision of the communist party but is organizationally separate. The status of the YCL—the second organization in the nation after the party—is recorded in the constitution. The YCL is relatively small and its membership is very strictly screened. There are also other, independent organizations with which the YCL collaborates.

Here is a quotation from the documents of the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Union of Working Youth: the HUWY is a unified youth political organization but it does not want to be the only youth organization." Another quotation: "The interests of the HUWY demand the creation of a more highly differentiated youth movement." From the regulations of the HUWY: "The primary organization exerts its influence in existing collectives, groups, sections, and societies; supports the aspirations and corresponding objectives of the HUWY."

[Question] The quotations are good. It is unfortunate that many of our Komsomol and party officials are still very apprehensive about informal organizations especially if they call themselves sociopolitical. If they are

athletic, that is alright. But if it studies Marx or still worse Bukharin, it is regarded as a virtual threat to the state's foundations. We are presently eliminating the "image of the enemy" from our newspaper's international pages but the "image of the enemy" is still encountered in publications about our, Soviet youth.

[Answer] What can one say? There is not enough understanding of the fact that if one learns communism from Lenin rather than from Stalin, the participation of the masses in politics does not undermine socialist principles but to the contrary is one of the main features of socialism. What do people understand politics to mean? Today there is a very active ecological movement in which many young people, party members and Komsomol members participate. Is ecology not politics? Does it not directly concern thousands and thousands of people?

There is not enough elementary democratic sophistication. I recently attended a meeting with middle-level Komsomol leaders. They explicitly stated: "Do not create organizations that parallel the Komsomol!" And I thought to myself: what if they don't ask you, but go ahead and create them. What will you do then? Throw them all in the jug? That's "democrats" for you.

There are not enough chronic guarantees and democratic instruments. As is known, the Law on Voluntary Societies is presently being drafted. The draft of the law should probably be submitted for broad discussion. I think that this question is worthy of discussion at a party and all the more so at a possible Komsomol conference.

[Question] If the Komsomol has to operate on a "competitive" basis, will it be able to retain its leading role in the youth movement?

[Answer] Yes, if it protects the political interests and rights of youth. There are such interests that are common to all young people. They include: the formation of a young person as an individual, as a citizen, as a professional. This has always been proclaimed as one of the main tasks but in fact it has been in tenth place. The housing shortage, uncomfortable "obshchagi", inferior education, the low standard of living, low wages—these are the things that concern youth most keenly. There are thousands of problems here on all scales that we are not as yet even aware of. It is not by chance that drug addiction in our country is primarily a youth problem.

The Law on Youth is presently being drafted at the initiative of the 20th Congress. This is correct and necessary but it is not enough to adopt good laws—it is also necessary to secure their observance. There is a large number of unutilized possibilities here. The Komsomol is extremely timid in its relations with the Soviets of People's Deputies. It must decisively rid itself of this toothlessness. The Komsomol still does not fully exercise its constitutional right to nominate candidates for deputy. It should nominate energetic, active people; conduct an election campaign; get them elected; and then secure

the passage of their decisions in the Soviets through them. Why not create Komsomol groups of deputies, a kind of Komsomol "faction" in the Soviets especially since such experience already exists? The submission of requests, voters' mandates, and deputies' reports at the session—these are instruments that should be used. I am speaking not only about local Soviets. The USSR Supreme Soviet incorporates a Commission on Youth Affairs. There are few who know when and how many times it has assembled, the kind of questions it has discussed, and what it has decided. Why should the commission not give a public accounting of its activity? Why should the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee not assemble Komsomol members who are deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet and discuss with them its action program or its, if you please, policy in the supreme organ of power?

The Komsomol has a sizable press—a combined printing in excess of 80 million if I do not err. This is a power that can also be used to exert pressure on legislative and executive organs. I have never read a single report of a session of the Supreme Soviet that, for example, calls into question or simply does not make an unequivocal commentary on one or another decision. The Komsomol can and should express its evaluation, its position on youth issues. The 20th Congress finally once again included in the Regulations the characterization of the Komsomol as a sociopolitical organization. Let us now commence our political activity.

[Question] It is no secret that relations between party and Komsomol organs are frequently based, on the "superior-subordinate" scheme. A Komsomol secretary who opposes his opinion against the opinion of a party secretary, even if the latter is three times wrong, is obviously wrong, is an extremely rare phenomenon. Given such a situation it is hardly possible to speak seriously about the independence of the Komsomol.

[Answer] The political leadership of the Komsomol is exercised by the party. That is unquestionably the strength of the Komsomol. But administration by mere injunction can hardly be justified. Not "pressure by force" but influence by authority—this is the principle of relations that is more appropriate here. It seems to me that this question should be discussed at the 19th Party Conference. I think that the 28th Party Congress could supplement the formulation in the Regulations of the CPSU stating that "the All-Union Komsomol works under the direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The work of local organizations of the All-Union Komsomol is directed and overseen by the corresponding party organizations." I propose the addition of two points. 1. The All-Union Komsomol works under the political leadership of the party. 2. The All-Union Komsomol is organizationally independent.

[Question] The 20th Congress proclaimed a policy of democratization of internal party life. Many good decisions were made: many rights were transferred from

higher organs to primary organizations; a provision was included in the Regulations requiring the approval of the most important instructions at plenums of the Central Committee after wide discussion in the Komsomol. Democratization of the election procedure: it is now possible, for example, to nominate not one but several candidates. But a year has passed since the day of the congress. It is obviously possible to go farther today. For example, the so-called "nomenklatura" is still in effect. Elections frequently become a fiction because most candidacies have been coordinated beforehand by higher organs.

[Answer] In my view, the "nomenklatura" should be abolished. It belongs to the administrative system that is based on commands. Or take the selfsame election procedure. Why must it always be uniform everywhere? The following form, for example, strikes me as curious: a primary party organization elects a secretary and he forms his own personal "cabinet"—the Komsomol committee, i.e., he selects a team of like-minded people. If the Komsomol organization expresses its lack of confidence in its secretary half a year later, the secretary and his "cabinet" goes into "retirement." This is only a particular example. There may be a great multitude of forms. We must try different things and experiment. Today the party is going forward with its democratization program. The Komsomol is following too timidly behind it. It seems to me that the situation should be reversed: the Komsomol can test all manner of democratic procedures because youth is more attracted to the new and because the risk is relatively small in the event of error.

[Question] How would you relate to the idea of such an experiment: making a youth newspaper not the organ of the Komsomol obkom but the organ of the oblast Komsomol organization? Today a youth newspaper has virtually no possibility of expressing a position differing from the official position of the apparatus of the Komsomol committee, and cannot criticize various actions of the obkom.

[Answer] I am in favor of the idea. I would like to see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and not the Central Committee as the central organ of the Komsomol so that the editorial collegium would be elected by the congress and would report to the congress. In my view, this would only serve to expand glasnost today. It also seems to me that we also need a youth press that is not in any way an organ of the Komsomol. Why, for example, should the Student Council not publish its own newspaper?

[Question] The final question. I know that your center has conducted a sociological study on the results of perestroika following the 20th Congress.

[Answer] At the time of the study, only five percent of the respondents acknowledged that perestroika had commenced in their organizations. The others either totally denied that there was any kind of change or else acknowledged them in very nebulous form "to a certain degree."

There is much evidence that there have been no radical changes in the Komsomol a year after the congress. There is little comfort in the fact that a year is a short time. There is no room for delay today.

5013

Kryuchkov Discusses Preconference Debate
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in Russian No 22, 28-May-3-Jun (Signed to Press
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[Article by G. Kryuchkov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department: "Progress in Preparations for the 19th All-Union Party Conference"—first paragraph is ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction; boldface as published]

[Text] In connection with the forthcoming 19th all-union party conference, we are receiving from our readers questions concerning the preparations for the conference, the procedure for the election of delegates, and the nature of the proposals put forward by Communists and nonparty working people. The article below offers answers to some of these questions.

Essentially preparations for the conference started immediately after the 27th party congress, whose decisions gave a powerful boost to the processes of revolutionary renewal. A lively discussion was launched in party and public organizations, in labor collectives, and in the pages of the mass news media on problems connected with the democratization of all aspects of our society's life, the implementation of radical economic reform, the solution of a broad range of social problems, and ideological backup for restructuring.

After the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum adopted the decision to convene the 19th all-union party conference and approved its agenda, preparations for the conference moved on to the practical plane. All this work is being done—and I would like to place special emphasis on this—directly by the CPSU Central Committee. The platform for debate which was submitted by the Central Committee Politburo and approved by the CPSU Central Committee May (1988) Plenum—the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference—incorporated numerous proposals by Communists and nonparty people.

Preparations for the conference are regularly examined at sessions of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat. The entire range of problems which are due to be discussed at the party forum was the topic of detailed conversations at the three meetings in April between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the first secretaries of union republic Communist Party central committees and party

kraykoms and obkoms, and also at the 7 May meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with leaders of mass news media, other ideological institutions, and creative unions.

The CPSU Central Committee receives a vast quantity of letters in which Communists and nonparty people share their opinions and ideas and make specific proposals. There is active press, radio, and television discussion of problems suggested for examination at the conference. Statements are made by scientists, specialists from the national economy, figures in literature and art, workers, kolkhoz members, and party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol officials. Proposals are carefully examined, discussed, analyzed, and reported back to the Central Committee.

The present task facing party organizations is to organize in a businesslike fashion the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference and to scrupulously take into account the proposals which will be made in the course of this responsible work. Not a single valuable idea should be overlooked.

Who Should Be Elected as a Conference Delegate and How [subhead]

In conformity with the norm of representation established by the CPSU Central Committee (1 delegate for every 3,780 party members), there should be 5,000 elected delegates (as many, by the way, as the delegates to the 27th CPSU Congress). Delegates are elected by secret ballot at plenums of obkoms, kraykoms, or union republic Communist Party central committees (at obkom plenums in party organizations in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan). A total of 3,053 delegates had already been elected by 25 May.

The elections of delegates generate great interest in the party and among the whole people. And this is natural: Soviet people are keen to know who will be entrusted with the right to make decisions on vitally important and crucial problems of our society's development.

The CPSU Central Committee required party committees to be guided by the main political stipulation—to elect active champions of restructuring for the conference. Furthermore, and in contrast with past practices, there were no quotas [raznaryadka] (in terms of delegates' occupation, sex, age, and so on) assigned to obkoms, kraykoms, and union republic Communist Party central committees.

The CPSU Central Committee issued guidelines of fundamental importance to the effect that the selection of nominees should involve without fail consideration for the opinion of party organizations, labor collectives, and party raykoms and gorkoms and should take place openly, with glasnost, and in a businesslike and principled atmosphere. No regulations were issued governing

procedures in this work. Party committees consulted the aktiv and the public, after which the candidates who emerged from the nomination process were discussed at party meetings and Communist group conferences involving broad participation by nonparty comrades, enterprise and farm leaders, and representatives of various categories of the intelligentsia, while in a number of party organizations they were also discussed at party raykom and gorkom plenums. As a rule, the number of candidates examined was greater than that of delegates to be elected. For example, the Voronezh Oblast party organization, which elected 57 delegates to the all-union party conference, discussed a total of about 300 candidates. Most party organizations published in the press the names of nominees for candidate before holding plenums.

Lofty demands were made everywhere of the political and businesslike qualities and moral image of delegates. The main emphasis was placed on their stance on restructuring and their ability to firmly uphold the course of the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th party congress and to repulse antirestructuring moods and manifestations of conservatism and phrasemongering. If nominated candidates failed to meet these requirements, they did not gain support.

The right to submit to obkom, kraykom, and Communist Party central committee plenums the nomination of candidates for election as conference delegates was vested in the bureaus of the corresponding party committees. The plenums themselves heard detailed reports on how the process of delegate selection proceeded, and what other candidates had been nominated by party organizations apart from those submitted for discussion by the bureau. There was active and keen discussion of every candidate. The Crimea, Cherkassy, and Zhitomir party obkom plenums, for example, were each addressed by 40-50 people, while more than 100 spoke at the Lvov Obkom plenum. Party committee members had the right to reject nominated candidates without restriction and to nominate new ones.

This work was not completely free of shortcomings, especially at the stage of nominating possible candidates. In some places the discussion of these questions was done hastily and formally. It is still possible to feel the effect of the commitment of some party committees to the old approaches and their insufficient preparedness to solve such questions in the spirit of democratism. Such instances were reported in our press. It was typical that, in such cases, no doubts were expressed about whether worthy Communists were being recommended as conference delegates. It was something else that caused legitimate perplexity: Why were people not consulted, why were their opinions not heard? Reaction to such facts was effective and principled. For example, because the Astrakhan Party Obkom had been clumsy in organizing the selection and discussion of possible candidates by party organizations, the obkom plenum was postponed at the request of party committee members.

Despite certain shortcomings, it is the most authoritative party members, active participants in the changes taking place in our society, and ardent champions of socialist renewal who are elected as conference delegates. They represent Communists working in different sectors of the national economy, in all spheres of society's life. Among the elected delegates are, for example Comrades V.N. Klevtsov, roughing shop operator at the "50-Letiya SSSR" Metallurgical Combine in Cherepovets (Vologda Oblast); L.D. Bryzga, milking machine operator at the "Pamyat Ilich" Kolkhoz-Combine (Brest Oblast); A.I. Chabanov, general director of the "Rotor" Science-and-Production Association in Cherkassy; M.G. Vagin, chairman of the "Lenin" Kolkhoz (Gorkiy Oblast); N.N. Vorobyev, first secretary of the Pytalovskiy CPSU Raykom (Pskov Oblast); G.A. Ilizarov, director of the Kurgan Traumatology and Orthopedics Scientific Research Institute; and others.

What Is It Proposed To Discuss [subhead]

The substantive aspect of the work to prepare for the conference is naturally determined by the range of questions on its agenda: On progress in implementing the decisions of the 27th party congress, the main results of the first half of the 12th 5-Year Plan, and party organizations' tasks in deepening the process of restructuring; and on measures to further democratize the life of the party and society.

In preparing for the conference the CPSU Central Committee carried out a serious and self-critical analysis of the work done since the congress, realistically assessed the processes occurring in society, and organized a profoundly scientific study of the problems facing the party and the country in the course of restructuring and the ways to solve them.

As for the suggestions made by Communists and working people in the course of preparations for the conference, they can be conditionally subdivided into four groups.

First, the suggestions which will no doubt be reflected in the All-Union CPSU Conference's decisions. Their essence, briefly speaking, boils down to the creation of reliable guarantees of the irreversibility of restructuring and the deepening of this historical process. There is active support for suggestions aimed at implementing a fundamental restructuring of our political system, with a more clear-cut definition of the position and role in it of the Communist Party, the initiator and guarantor of revolutionary transformations. There can be no doubts that profound gratification will be generated everywhere by the fact that the CPSU Central Committee Theses fully affirm and further develop Lenin's concept of the party as the political vanguard of the working class and all working people.

The suggestions expressed at numerous party meetings, at party committee plenums, in letters, and in the press are fully reflected in the specific measures elaborated by the CPSU Central Committee aimed at delimiting the functions of party organs and state and economic organs, further strengthening the party's ranks and boosting their combat ability, democratizing the procedure for constituting elected party organs, setting limits on holding elected office in party and state organs, improving control and auditing work in the party, fully restoring the role and powers of soviets of people's deputies, further developing the Soviet federation, completing the creation of a socialist state based on law, and ensuring the conditions necessary for the efficient functioning of public organizations.

Many questions will be resolved by the conference itself. In cases when it might be necessary to amend the CPSU Statutes, appropriate proposals will be discussed at the conference and will be submitted to the next CPSU Congress—the 28th. On a number of questions, especially those concerning changes in our society's political system and the improvement of the electoral system, the conference decisions will provide a political basis for the adoption of the necessary legislative acts or amendments to the USSR Constitution.

Second, some suggestions will be implemented by instructions and other normative acts to be approved by the CPSU Central Committee. This applies, for example, to giving local party organs the right to make final decisions on questions of structure and staffing, the simplification of paperwork in primary party organizations and party committees, amendments to the procedure for electing party leadership organs, and registration [uchet] of Communists. The appropriate documents are being prepared and will be submitted to the CPSU Central Committee immediately following the party conference with due consideration for its recommendations.

Third, quite a few suggestions and remarks are being made in connection with shortcomings in the practical activity of state and party organs—the slow implementation of the provisions, and even distortion of the essence, of the economic reform whose implementation is being paralyzed considerably by the bureaucratic stance of a number of ministries, departments and economic organs, the preservation of old-style administrative diktat (under cover of state orders, economic normatives, and other new methods of management), the extremely slow pace of scientific and technical progress, lack of persistence and initiative in some regions when it comes to solving the food and housing problems or utilizing existing potential to boost the output of high quality goods and expand the services sphere, and artificially created barriers against development of the cooperative movement and individual labor activity.

Of course, measures must be taken immediately in this sphere.

About "Party Purge," "Separation of Soviet Power From Party Leadership," and Other Matters [subhead]

Suggestions are received which either give rise to debates or are simply unacceptable. For example, many comrades suggest the institution of a "CPSU Member Badge." Their motives? This would apparently "remind party members of their communist duty and would restrain them from improper actions."

There some more serious issues. For example, some comrades propose the abandonment of the principle of democratic centralism and its replacement with the so-called "principle of democratic intraparty pluralism." This is justified by reference to past grave violations of the principles of collegiality and intraparty democracy and curtailment of the freedom of debate which is traditional for Lenin's party. Following the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, the party condemned this flawed practice. The solution to problems arising from this is sought by the CPSU not via the repudiation of the fundamental and guiding principle of its organizational building and activity, but via the fullest restoration of Lenin's perception of the principle of democratic centralism, according to which it is necessary to ensure freedom of debate at the stage when questions are discussed, and unity of actions after decisions have been made by the majority.

Many suggestions are coming in about conducting a purge of the party. As a matter of fact, similar suggestions were also made during preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress. One can understand the concern of comrades over the fact that the party ranks do contain a certain proportion of passive and indifferent people, and even people who have compromised themselves through bad work or improper behavior and whose lifestyle is contrary to our norms and ideals. The party is resolutely ridding itself of such people. Suffice it to say that almost 327,000 people have resigned or been expelled from the CPSU in the last 2 years—a considerably higher number than in the preceding 2 years. The Party Statute norms and the arsenal of means provided by it for organizational and ideological influence make it possible to maintain the purity of CPSU ranks, strengthen the discipline of Communists, and enhance their vanguard role without resorting to the purge methods applied in the twenties and thirties. The sociopolitical evaluation of Communists and the discussion of their work and their personal contribution to the social life of their collectives

and to the cause of restructuring at open party meetings, which will be carried out in the period between now and the next CPSU congress, will no doubt be very useful in this regard.

I would also like to dwell on the following issue. Articles appear in which the solution of the problem of delimiting the functions of party and state and of party and soviet organs is linked with the separation of Soviet power from party leadership. Doubts are raised in this connection about the justification for including in the USSR Constitution the provision about the party as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and its state and public organizations (as a matter of fact, this provision is also repeated in the CPSU Statute).

I do not believe that these claims can be accepted as indisputable. The fact that the USSR Constitution and the Party Statute define the nature of party leadership (defining the general prospects of society's development and the line of the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy, leading the Soviet people's creative activity, and imparting planned and scientifically substantiated features to their struggle for the victory of socialism), coupled with the clear-cut thesis that all party organizations function within the framework of the USSR Constitution, gives no grounds for concluding that the Constitution supposedly treats the party as part of the state mechanism. And if this has happened, the "culprit" is not the Constitution but the retreat from it, the retreat from Lenin's principles.

Vladimir Ilich never considered as debatable the question that the functions of the party and the state in socialist society must be separated, that the party must not be the subject of power, and that party organizations must function within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. But it was V.I. Lenin who spoke the following words (in his speech to the All-Russia Conference of Political Educators in November 1920): "...We must know and remember that the entire *de jure* and *de facto* Constitution of the Soviet republic is built on the premise that the party rectifies, prescribes, and builds everything according to a single principle...." "We must always bear in mind the recognition of the party's supreme role and must not overlook this when discussing the question of activity, of organizational building."

There is no doubt that a broad and businesslike all-party and truly nationwide discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses will enable the 19th all-union party conference to make considered decisions reflecting the will of the party and of the whole people, decisions whose implementation will make the revolutionary restructuring irreversible and will serve as a powerful accelerator of our society's advance along Lenin's path.

PRAVDA Readers Respond to CPSU CC Theses
18000395 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian First Edition
28 May 88 p 1

Readers' letters: "A Platform for Discussion" under the rubric "The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th Party Conference"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference were published yesterday. The issues that they bring up for discussion are of vital importance for the party and the country. They are now at the center of attention among communists and all workers. It is also suggested that the CPSU Central Committee document serve a platform for discussion of these issues.

PRAVDA has for a long time been carrying on its pages discussion on problems that readers have suggested should be discussed at the party conference. Today we publish letters, and also telegrams, that have just arrived at the editorial offices. They contain first impressions from a reading of the document. The proposals are sounding out: to discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses in a businesslike way and promote the success of perestroika in every possible way.

Telegrams in This Issue

Speaking frankly, I believed in perestroika 2 years ago but could not imagine the scale of the upcoming transformations. Today a situation has taken shape in the country that is truly revolutionary. And this is not mere words and phrases. The course outlined in the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th Party Conference is also inspirational because it helps us people to acquire the ability to think confidently and solve problems employing a full measure of independence and sense of responsibility.

For plants like ZIL, VAZ and KamAZ colossal opportunities are being opened up. And it seems that the sense of responsibility is also rising sharply. We are now obliged to determine for ourselves what we produce, and the level of production, and to be responsible not only for the production of good-quality output but also for the life of our products when they are being used. What I have in mind is maintenance and repairs handled by the firms. We machine builders are obliged to solve our own problems on a qualitatively new level. But we must be protected against petty tutelage and mistrust. Only the client has the right to judge the quality and merits of our products.

I would also like to say that democratization and economic reform make up a dual task. It is the key to the successful development of our socialist motherland, the key to comprehensive scientific and technical progress and the moral perfection of each Soviet person. The people at ZIL are gearing up to produce a new family of diesel trucks. Over these 3 years of perestroika we have already changed much in the design of our vehicles and

in the production technology. The general atmosphere of mobilization in the country is helping us to advance more quickly and to look to the future with greater confidence.

(signed) V. Koshkin, chief designer at the MosavtoZIL Production Association, Moscow.

In the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference we found lines that will undoubtedly please everyone. The party is posing the question of "the need to provide for a further buildup in the rates of housing construction." We welcome this, not because we find ourselves in cramped conditions and are waiting our turn on the housing list. We have our own home in the Oktyabrskiy housing development on the outskirts of Kiev. We are happy for others and for the further development of social policy. But we think that those lines will also help us.

The Oktyabrskiy housing development grew up a quarter of a century ago and consists of fine, individual structures surrounded by fruit trees and flower gardens. There are 513 homes in this planned development, with all urban conveniences. The population is 2,500, including 173 people who took part in the Great Patriotic War, 47 disabled persons, and many labor veterans. The value of the structures in the development, including the main services, is about R8 million.

It would seem that everything is fine and that people should be satisfied. But for some time alarm and concern about the future have taken up residence in our homes. Rumors have been circulating in the settlement to the effect that it is to be demolished and that in line with the general plan for Kiev, high-rise buildings are to be erected here. We have started to write letters to the gorispolkom and to go to the offices to obtain clarification about what we can expect. In a letter sent some time ago to A. Voloshin from the Main Architectural and Planning Department of the Kiev Gorispolkom, the deputy chief of the Main Architectural and Planning Department N. Korol reported that "in accordance with the general plan for the city, apartment building No 34 on Kostyuk Street and the entire Oktyabrskiy development will be subject to demolition sometime in the future. It is not possible to state a more definite time period..."

We reasoned that if even the gorispolkom does not change its mind earlier, this would happen many years from now. And so in way we have had to reconcile ourselves to it and live in expectation of eviction and accustom our children to the inevitability of it. But why? For what purpose? For what grandiose urban development plans will a beautiful development whose homes were built using people's savings from their labor be torn down? A situation has arisen that has not only spread alarm among the population of Oktyabrskiy but also

given rise to skepticism among those who, making reference to a recent party and government decree on individual housing construction, would like themselves to build their own homes.

(signed) O. Serdyuk and others; in all 30 signatures of inhabitants of the Oktyabrskiy housing development, Kiev.

Extracts from Letters

I speak with a proper sense of responsibility when I say that something is not quite right with us in the oblast wing of the party leadership, and I can no longer refrain from comment on something that is impermissible. It is precisely here that we have a great deal of "political twaddle" about perestroyka, and it precisely on the party obkoms and kraykoms that the fate of renewal largely depends.

I am talking about this based not only on the pieces published quite frequently in the press but also on my own personal work experience over many years as a party raykom secretary. The "one-man management" of the obkom first secretaries is too great, and there is still no effective way to counteract this.

In our environment, under conditions of the work of a collective and democratic organ, which a party obkom is, there should be none of this "one-man management." This is clear. In practice, however, things are quite different. For some reason it has become possible for the opinion of the "first secretary" always to prevail over other opinions.

And the way in which principled criticism is turned round is common knowledge: they try first and foremost to get rid of the critical, irksome person by creating an appropriate atmosphere around him and, shameful though it is, this is not without success.

Enormous power is concentrated in the hands of the "first secretary," and control over him is weak. Think about it, and you will find with bitterness that in ordinary life when a CPSU Central Committee agent or other official is seeking advice locally on particular issues he often takes into account only the opinion of the obkom first secretary while he ignores the other members of the oblast committee.

This can largely be explained by the fact that some people are left too long at the helm of power. I support the idea of limiting to two terms the time people can remain in elected official positions. With respect to election for a third consecutive term, this position would have to be considered a little more thoroughly.

(signed) A. Dimitriyev, member of the CPSU Udmurt Obkom, Uva village.

In order to study in greater depth the personal qualities of those applying for admission to the party as candidate members, in my opinion the period that the candidate must have been known by those recommending him in line with his production and public work should be increased from 1 to 2 years. For those being admitted to the party this period should remain as before but the primary party organizations should have the right to extend the period if need be.

In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee decree on the Tashkent party organization, it would seem necessary to strengthen in the Party Rules the provision covering preliminary examination of questions concerning acceptance into the party at meetings in party groups and shop party organizations. The instruction here could be that the primary party organization reviews all applications received for acceptance as candidate party members, selecting the comrades who are most aware and active and devoted to the cause of communism.

(signed) A. Revekina, apparatus worker in the Yena-kievo Coking By-Products Plant, Donetsk Oblast

Communists at our railroad junction are worried about the imperfect nature of the structure of the party organizations in transport, because of which many problems go unresolved.

A two-tier management structure has now been put in place: railroad management and the railroad division. All subdivisions on the railroad lines—depots, stations, track rail, signals and so forth—have now become, as it were, shops in the division, which handles all matters concerning cost accounting.

The party organizations have been left on the sideline, as it were. There are junction party committees that are unable to solve many urgent problems since the division is higher and the party committee cannot influence it in any way.

So who is to head the organization of political-indoctrination work on the railroad line? I think that this could be done by political sections in transport, which must be revived as they have been in civil aviation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The political sections for the railroad division and management could become effective organs for political work on the railroads.

(signed) G. Glenbotskiy, Honored Railroad Worker, member of the Crimean Council of Transport Veterans, Simferopol city.

09642

Reader Advocates 'Cleansing' Party
PM0106135588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Letter from G. Yuryev, CPSU member since 1953:
"Proclaiming the Truth"—boldface as published]

[Text] Voronezh—Over the last 3 years great hopes about the implementation of the ideals of October have been revived and nurtured. That is why the people have such an enormous desire to see the 19th party conference as a landmark event in the life of our party and state rather than one of the many events that have left not the slightest trace on the country's history.

In my view it is necessary to proclaim and clearly and definitely discuss the true reasons why our party leadership made mistakes for many decades in the economic, social, cultural, and, above all, political spheres. The people today can no longer be given explanations by innuendo, by dodging burning questions, or by explaining failures on the basis of dubious reasons. People now not only intuitively understand failures but are able to analyze them correctly. The people should be trusted; they are politically mature and have long ceased to need Stalin-type pastors.

For many decades we have been talking about the advantages of socialism while seemingly doing everything to ensure that they fail to come to full fruition. The bureaucratic apparatus of party, administrative, and other long-term workers that has ballooned grotesquely has become the most frightening obstacle in the way of restructuring. Lacking any living contacts with the masses, unable—and sometimes even unwilling—to listen to the voice of working people, apparatchiks often developed and adopted wrongheaded decisions and made flagrant mistakes in running society. We recall how many times we adopted highly promising directives on the resolution of the housing problem, the improvement of output quality, and the supply of foodstuffs to the population. But the results were depressing.

Do bureaucrats really receive along with their job the right to shut themselves off from people's needs and to view their lives merely through the windows of their personal cars and offices? Just wait: After 25 years of working in the apparatus they will have forgotten their roots. In their place arrogance, conceit, and total license will have appeared. Neither they themselves nor the members of their families have to stand in line as a rule, and for the same reason senior civil servants are quite indifferent to the way in which housing, kindergartens, and creches are being built or the transportation system is working.

And the leaders of the services, medical institutes, stores, and so forth under their jurisdiction show no particular zeal either: After all, senior leaders virtually never check on them. And the state system of monitoring enterprises' work is in the hands of the same bureaucrats.

Social injustice, whose indicator is the numerous privileges available to bureaucrats, has generated complacency, apathy, a reduction in creative activeness among the people's masses, low-quality work, the spread of drunkenness, and other vices that demoralize society. Intellect is devalued, modesty seems like a "vice," and for many people it has become "shameful" to live on one wage packet. On the other hand, certain adventurers, speculators, and bribe-takers prosper at the expense of honest workers. Is it no paradox that people unburdened by education and living on unearned income gaze from on high out of their cars at both modest intellectuals and honest workers at their machine tools—people who earn the same wages and therefore have no opportunity to buy a car. Is not this an erosion of society?

Destroying the bureaucratic management system and returning to the Leninist principles of extensive socialist democracy in all spheres of human activity—this is what we need today. We must create all the conditions for the human personality to blossom, for creative labor, and for the constant growth of creative activeness. We must make it impossible for pernicious vices and social evils to emerge. And in order to do this we must create a new structure for the mechanism of running the country's life.

This essentially revolutionary work must, in my view, be the main task for the party, all its committees, and all real Communists. This work will be incredibly difficult and will be complicated by the numerous branches of the braking mechanism that have put down deep roots both vertically and horizontally and by the opposition of hidden and overt forces operating because of inertia based on the methods of the stagnation period.

In the process of this work our party must inevitably rid itself of bureaucrats, careerists, time-servers, drunkards, and unscrupulous people in general who have lost or never had firm ideological convictions, and by their presence in the party besmirch the good name of Communists. I wholly support the proposal put forward in the CPSU Central Committee Theses of carrying out the sociopolitical certification of Communists in order to cleanse and strengthen the party. The party's numbers may be reduced as a result of the cleansing process, but this will be a gain of immense spiritual importance rather than a loss.

Only we should in no circumstances entrust this enormously important work to the aforesaid bureaucrats. We must not allow certification to be used to frustrate creative and principled people who are inconvenient to the advocates of command and imposition (komandno-nazhimnyye) methods. This must be firmly and unambiguously stated without fail at the 19th all-union party conference.

Under the new conditions of extensive, real socialist democracy the party's main concern will naturally be the ideological sphere. Soviet and economic organs, enterprises, and organizations will successfully cope with all

tasks without excessive commands or constant patronage from higher party organs, provided the party and people trust them implicitly. After all, these methods have lasted since the time of Stalin, when there was distrust and suspicion of senior workers and labor collectives which were allegedly full of wreckers, enemies of the people, saboteurs, and spies. This now seems anachronistic and paradoxical.

The party presence in labor collectives is quite large, it should be relied upon at work. There is no need to undermine economic organs—the practice of many years shows that no good will come of it. Patronage is harmful since it shackles economic initiative, deprives leaders and entire collectives of their independence, and merely leads to a ballooning of the party apparatus. And what, one wonders, can a young instructor from a party committee's industrial department teach an experienced economic manager?

In my opinion our spiritual and educational work has been very neglected. It must be revived during the course of restructuring. It will need titanic efforts from talented and convinced party figures to create a healthy atmosphere in society.

I am sure that restructuring will win a complete victory, since it is in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people and is for the sake of rehabilitating socialist ideas—which were damaged in practice by the command and bureaucratic management system—in the eyes of the world public. I am convinced that with our powerful industrial, scientific, and spiritual potential, with our rich resources, and with the active participation of the entire population we will be capable in the next few years of ensuring that our motherland genuinely prospers. And the results of restructuring will be a historic example of bold revolutionary transformations.

G. Yuryev, CPSU member since 1953

PRAVDA Readers Discuss CPSU CC Theses

18000398 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition
30 May 88 p 1

[Reader letters, published under the heading "The Debate Forum of the Readers" and entitled "We Discuss the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] **The Calling of a Propagandist**, by G. Zinchenko, deputy head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Tajikistan Communist Party from Dushanbe

I feel that many of those who have read the theses of the CPSU Central Committee several times already can imagine the questions which are to be discussed at the All-Union Party Conference. The idea of reforming the political system of Soviet society, as they say, has gotten loose. Now it has gained concrete development in this party document.

As is known, the aim of political reform is to actually involve the broad masses of workers in administering state and social affairs. Literally everything turns on this. It is time to put an end to the alienation of others from power. And here there must be new approaches, including in propaganda and without which the political system cannot function successfully.

Political propaganda in its present state is a very cumbersome mechanism as if specially set up for serving an administrative-command system of social administration. But up to now it continues out of inertia to reproduce the old political culture. The arsenal of its means, forms and methods is clearly out of date. The words of a lecturer, propagandist or agitator frequently evoke mistrust among many persons.

The reasons for this are rooted in the fact that the administrative-command system and its propaganda apparatus have instilled in many workers the psychology of a "little man" and have replaced his real involvement in state affairs with illusory rituals. Democratization and glasnost have made many changes in the nation's ideological and political life. They have been brought about primarily by a turning to man and a resorting to his real nature.

However, in order to securely overcome the alienation of the workers from politics and from managing the affairs of society, it is essential to break up the very mechanism of the old propagandist influence. It is a question of eliminating the bureaucratic distortions in the organization of propaganda.

As an example, let us take lecture work. In our republic, along with the party committees, this is carried out by the Znaniye Society, by a number of the ministries and departments and by creative unions. There is a total of 26 organizations. Many of them impose their propaganda measures on the labor collectives, having first collected a large fee for this.

Just what do they not think up for this: the concluding of contracts, the distributing of subscriptions and so forth. If the people go to meet a lecturer, they go away nonplussed. The main thing is to first collect the money. In taking advantage of this, certain enterprising figures have begun poaching on the idea of education.

There is also a need to rethink the role of the propagandist. At present when only the truth is being accepted, many propaganda cadres have been unable to provide a convincing rebuttal against their comrades.

In supporting the thesis on the need to carry out a sociopolitical certification of the communists, I feel that this should involve the propagandist corps first. "A constant, constructive political dialogue, a civilized debate, extensive information on the questions of domestic and foreign policy, and a study and consideration of public opinion must become inseparable traits

of party life." These words, like the Theses as a whole, create a sensation of newness and internal unshackling. We would like social apathy, indifference and alienation of the people to disappear once and for all from our life.

Advanced as an Instructor, by V. Ratkovskiy, party bureau secretary of the Frunze Motor Vehicle Assembly Plant under the Kirghiz Motor Vehicle Association in Frunze

The Theses of the CPSU Central Committee have rightly raised the question of the primary party organizations as their work must be fundamentally revised considering the radical economic reform and democracy. Take the party organization of our association. Just during the first quarter of the present year we had at least five inspections of the party line and two of these were so-called comprehensive. Understandably, our Otkryabskiy party raykom also had a hand in this. I am not even counting the other inspections, for example, those conducted under people's control (there were many of them). How much energy and time this all takes up! And the result? Usually zero, because the efforts basically go into paper, like water into sand.

I feel one of the reasons for such a superficial approach is the weak instructor personnel of the raykom. This is not the first time that we have discussed this, but the situation as yet has changed little. Just take a look at who becomes instructors: young people, most often those who have never sniffed the powder of grass-roots party work. What can they provide a primary organization and its secretary?

For this reason, at the All-Union Party Conference, in discussing the question of changing the structure of the party bodies, I propose focusing particular attention on the instructor cadres. It is essential to revise the practices of their recruitment, promoting to this responsible job basically communists who have experience in leading shop and primary organizations. Their training must be organized.

10272

Readers' Letters View CPSU Conference Theses
PM0106130988 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 31 May 88 p 2

[Letters feature under general heading: "19th All-Union Party Congress: Behind the Lines of the CPSU Central Committee Theses"—boldface as published]

[Excerpts] Opponents "on Principle?" [subhead]

Who do I call the principled opponents of restructuring? Primarily those whom the renewal of Soviet society does not threaten with the loss of their job, who are not affected materially, who are not required to make changes in their work style or their relationships with people. In contrast to the management apparatus worker obliged to change his "chair" and to part with his usual

"paper" work, with his privileges and his unjustifiably high salary, which should generate in him concealed or overt resistance to changes in society, the principled opponent of restructuring is a convinced opponent.

The strength of the principled opponents of restructuring lies in...theory. To be more precise in the lack of theory of its supporters. The time has passed when victory in debates was won by the person who was able to slip in an appropriate quotation on any subject more rapidly, so what do the participants in today's debates say and how? They speak of the threat to socialism, the destruction of socialism, the renunciation of socialism.... What are the supporters of restructuring calling for? The resurrection of socialism, its purging of deformations.... Appeals achieved through suffering, long awaited appeals—but how theoretically convincing are they?

For decades one single model for socialism has been set forth in sociopolitical literature, textbooks, scientific articles, and monographs. An entirely specific idea of what socialism is took shape in the awareness of many millions of readers. Popular articles which have been published recently about Lenin's ideas of economically accountable (khozraschetnyy) socialism contain little that is comprehensible and abound in general arguments about democracy, the public form of ownership, the cooperative movement, the law of cost, and so forth. So we failed to receive an in-depth, comprehensible reply to the questions: Where were the objective social laws and when did lawlessness and tyranny occur? Why did the right to ownership by the entire people not prevent the large-scale crimes by the party and economic leadership in a number of republics and oblasts? What was natural and what fortuitous in the history of our society?

The principled opponents of restructuring can for the time being quite well permit themselves the luxury of simply not understanding that nowadays the term "socialism" is used by people to signify a whole conglomerate of discrete forms of exchange, management, and ownership based on different principles which are sometimes essentially opposite.

Let's recall how many uprisings of the oppressed, how many revolutions both successful and defeated, there have been in the many thousands of years of man's history. Surely the oppressed were not motivated by the desire to establish public ownership of the means of production? Always and everywhere they were motivated by just one thing—the desire to put an end to oppression, injustice, and exploitation. And any form of exploitation is always the appropriation of the results of one man's work by another. How this is done is a secondary question. Whether a thief puts his hand in your pocket before your very eyes or whether he first forces you to put "your purse in the common coffer" and only then takes part of the coffer's contents—the change in your material living standard will be the same. It is not the method but the size of what has been appropriated which is important. How to determine it? Obviously

only through work. Work is a physical quantity. And man's exploitation of man is a physical and therefore calculable quantity. For a correct assessment of any social phenomena this quantity must be computed and its absence should not be declared "once and for all." Can this quantity be computed or modeled during the transition to economic accountability (khozraschet) of a supporter of restructuring? No, it cannot. Just as nothing else in society can be computed or modeled. A theory of society is needed for this. And we do not have this theory. That is our main weakness.

I believe that during the 19th all-union party conference it is essential to show graphically the theoretical unsoundness of the principled opponents of restructuring. I am convinced that this could be preceded by an all-union conference on the theory of restructuring. At this conference it is essential not only to show the theoretical unsoundness of its opponents "from the left" and "from the right" but also to discuss various rival models for restructuring from its supporters. This discussion of models will promote the successful work of the party conference.

[Signed] G. Shenderyuk, Moscow [passage omitted]

Pressure on Local Press [subhead]

It is universally recognized that one of restructuring's most powerful supports today is the central press. But locally the situation is different: people there frequently seek to keep the local papers strictly in check. As a result bureaucrats of all hues and ranks fear only the central press. And correspondents from Moscow are not such frequent guests even at oblast centers, never mind the backwoods.

If the local press starts to speak in the same voice and the same language as the central press, conservatives and time-servers would lose their cozy seats far more quickly and they would be replaced far more quickly by people like Gorbachev and Kolbin.

I like to leaf through the newspaper files of the first half of the twenties. When you read old issues of PRAVDA you are convinced that then in the full sense of the word there were no zones of individuals closed to criticism. Anyone could criticize and could conduct polemics with whoever he chose. No one compared the height of the posts held. I remember how surprised I was when I read in PRAVDA a letter from a peasant disagreeing with Lenin on some question. Here you are surprised that now, a little more than 60 years later, some rayon or oblast leader believes that the local press should not contain even a hint of a rebuke against him. Here, many local leaders are sincerely convinced that a ban on criticism in the local press is nothing other than the observance of the principle of party leadership of the press and not the grossest flouting of this principle. In the opinion of some comrades, you see, it is unethical for a party obkom organ to criticize an obkom secretary.

No less absurd, in my view, is the idea that the youth press should not criticize party workers. This opinion is enshrined nowhere but locally it virtually has the force of law.

As a result of this attitude of the oblast leaders toward local newspapers, an absolutely specific type of local newspaper editor has taken shape. Most often they are cautious people who heed their bosses' voice with sympathy. At least that was what the editors were like in our Kaluga Oblast youth newspaper.

I suggest that the 19th all-union conference precisely stipulate the status of party and youth publications, fully restore Leninist norms of the party leadership of the press everywhere, and stipulate the right to criticize any officials. On the economic plane profitable newspapers should become economically accountable organizations with all their rights in questions of forming the staff structure and paying wages.

[Signed] Journalist E. Samoylov, Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast [passage omitted]

Monthly speeches on television analyzing current affairs and prospects in programs like "Problems—Quest—Solutions" would impart great authority to our party leaders—the Politburo members and candidate members.

I also believe that every CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and candidate member should regularly write in the central newspapers and journals close to his work specialty.

The CPSU Central Committee must regularly hear reports from CPSU Central Committee members and candidate members on their personal contribution to the restructuring with the publication of these items in the press.

[Signed] V. Filatov, member of the CPSU and teacher, Magnitogorsk

Conference Delegate Opposes Third Elective Term
PM0306085588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 31 May 88 First Edition p 1

[Sovkhoz director A. Veprev letter under general rubric "Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Conference" and general headline "Toward the New Image of Socialism"]

[Text] About the Exclusive Right [subhead]

I fully and entirely share the view of the party's Central Committee that the absence of a limit on the tenure of elective posts has disrupted the process of the natural renewal of cadres. More than once I have witnessed and objected to a situation where certain leading officials in our Krasnoyarsk Kray began to regard their posts as if

they were for life. They regarded themselves as infallible and persuaded themselves of their "exclusive" right not only to influence the economy but also the destinies of rank and file Communists.

We have asked ourselves more than once how we could create political mechanisms and guarantees which would rule out any future possibility of the violation of the Leninist principles of the leadership of society. And now one such mechanism has been proposed by the Central Committee: Establishing a uniform 5-year term of office for all party committee posts. At the same time, it is proposed to limit tenure of elective posts to two successive terms. Well, 10 years in one post are quite sufficient not only to master the specific features of a region to perfection but also to implement the best possible constructive improvements and changes there for the benefit of the people and the state. After all, this is two whole 5-year plans!

Therefore—I believe—it should be understandable why I have misgivings and serious objections to the "addendum" about the possibility of electing a party leader for a third consecutive term. Outwardly this clause is subject to considerable restrictive conditions: There has to be an initiative on the part of Communists and a preliminary decision on authorization to run; it has been laid down that there has to be a compulsory 75-percent majority in a secret ballot. Nonetheless, my experience of life suggests that after 10 years in office it will not be difficult either to find the necessary initiators or to comply with the rest of the conditions. We might thus be providing a loophole for the legalization of life terms of office which is, in turn, fraught with the emergence in our cities and rayons of people who build themselves little empires. In addition, such a long stay in one office is not devoid of the danger of a relapse into sluggishness and stagnation.

Two terms of office are quite sufficient. And in order to ensure that the process of natural renewal of leading party cadres is not disrupted, it is necessary to put forward more candidates than there are mandates in elections.

A. Veprev, director of the "Nazarovskiy" Sovkhoz, Hero of Socialist Labor, delegate to the 19th all-union party conference. Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Idea of Party Monitoring Body Welcomed
PM0306151588 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 1 Jun 88 p 2

[Letter from M. Morskoy, CPSU member, under the heading "Greater Democracy, Greater Creativity"]

[Text] It is very good that a document has appeared which designates the subjects to be discussed by Communists at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference!

Pluralism of opinions and the open contrasting of ideas and interests have undoubtedly given people an opportunity to not simply reveal their intellectual and moral potential but also to considerably enrich and develop that potential. People are standing up straight before our eyes. There is no question that restructuring is gathering momentum. But to my mind it is still too early to say that all social forces are consolidating on its platform. Unfortunately, the vast administrative apparatus as a whole is still a long way from taking a firm, principled stand for restructuring.

But this apparatus is a considerable force which determines a very great deal in our life.

That is why one can only welcome the demand contained in the Theses that full power be given to the soviets. I also feel it is essential to rule out the election of representatives of the administrative apparatus to any leading party bodies or control bodies.

I would like to say a few words about the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. I believe that with the responsibility to implement decisions, freedom of discussion must be ensured not only when considering the issue but also in the preparatory stages. The CPSU Central Committee Theses are an example of precisely this kind of democratic discussion. I am confident that a considerable number of valuable proposals will be made in the time remaining before the conference. But I have an observation to make.

It is quite unclear how the Central Committee is to be renewed in the period between congresses. I think that if we are to guarantee democratic norms and increase responsibility at election time, the question of Central Committee membership must only be decided at congresses. If this had been so, perhaps we would not now be mourning N. Bukharin or other comrades and thinking agonizingly about the future. The Theses are right to raise the question of creating a mechanism to guarantee against any corruption of the Leninist principles of leadership. In this respect, there is no doubt that the organization of a unified control body could help—we must do our utmost to achieve this. But it is only necessary to ensure that, apart from these functions which it is planned to entrust to it, the control body is mainly responsible for monitoring the observance of democratic norms and the principle of collective leadership in all elected leading party bodies, including the CPSU Central Committee (without interfering in their activity).

M. Morskoy, member of the CPSU, Moscow.

**PRAVDA Readers Discuss Economic Reforms,
Cadres**

18000396 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian First Edition
1 Jun 88 p 3

[Letters from readers under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU CC Theses"]

Alternative to the Ministry

[Text] I am very concerned about the selection of the way of restructuring economic management. The role of ministries and departments remains not fully understandable. After all, the Law on the State Enterprise proclaims the independence of labor collectives from ministries. Nor do the CPSU CC Theses clarify this matter completely.

Self-administration and self-financing give labor collectives the right to solve many production problems. Why then do we maintain the huge apparatus, which has now become useless and at times even harmful? In order to pay tribute to "respected people"? After all, the ministry cannot help commanding and interfering. These people will not want to realize that one can manage completely without them. Therefore, as any useless body, it will try to prove its "importance."

In general, an efficient antibureaucratic mechanism is needed. For example, instead of hundreds of committees, administrations, and ministries, we could establish an economic information center, including in it the most important elements of services of Gosplan, Gossnab, the State Committee for Statistics, and other departments and restructuring them fundamentally. This center will not be a collection of "commands," but a bank of data, recommendations, and so forth. Every enterprise, if it wants this, will present the necessary report on its activity, including in it the assortment of output, quantity, prices, plans, and so forth. The center will help to select the optimal production variant, the consumer's address, and the type of product and will give recommendations on the application of a certain invention, change in prices, and other important economic information.

Naturally, information should require payment. This will stimulate the center's work according to the principle "more deeds with small forces." Furthermore, an enterprise will be able to "sell" the developed efficiency proposal or an invention at a profit to the center, which will sell it to interested clients.

S. Dymyskiy, fifth course student at the Forestry Engineering Academy, Leningrad

Debtors... by Order

The success of restructuring in localities largely depends on how central departments carry it out. We agree with the idea expressed in the CPSU CC Theses and the 19th

All-Union Party Conference: "Restructuring at the level of sectorial ministries obviously lags behind restructuring at enterprises." It is almost a year and a half since the USSR Ministry of the Automotive Industry transferred us to self-financing. It did this like throwing a man not able to swim into water.

We turned to PRAVDA for help and at the end of last year the newspaper published the material "Profit... Under Snow" about our disastrous situation. After that the ministry helped in something, but the plant continued to be in a difficult situation, especially with respect to the provision with accessories. In 4 months we did not receive, in particular, from the Leningrad Carburetor Plant imeni Kuybyshev, 11,125 carburetors and, naturally, we underdelivered consumer goods—spare parts—worth 2.5 million rubles.

The disorganization in production and disruption in the labor rhythm lead to the necessity of working before and after lessons and on days off and holidays. People are dissatisfied and the turnover and outflow of manpower from the plant are growing.

How are we to engage in self-financing if, according to work results, in 4 months of this year we paid 200,000 rubles of fines and obtained 150,000 rubles of profit less than envisaged? Over 1 million rubles less than envisaged from the turnover were given to the state budget.

The enterprise's trade-union conference asked minister N. Pugin and A. Kashirin, chairman of the Trade-Union Central Committee, to give concrete help in improving deliveries from the enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Automotive Industry, primarily from the Leningrad Carburetor Plant. However, matters are not moving yet.

The following words also appear in the CPSU CC Theses: "It is necessary to condemn uncompromisingly actions that distort the essence of the economic reform and directly or indirectly undermine the Law on the Enterprise." We would like to propose: Not only to condemn, but also to strictly punish those that act in this manner.

M. Marchenko, G. Semenova, A. Prus, and other representatives of the labor collective at the motorcycle plant, Kiev

To Look After the Manager

I often have occasion to deal with economic managers. In their majority they are exceptionally decent, honest, and industrious people. They are deeply devoted to the cause of our party and the state. They possess quite high erudition and skills.

A shocking figure—18 million—settled in the minds of many of us. Not long ago the State Committee for Statistics made it more precise: 17,718,000. So many

workers in our country are employed in the administrative apparatus. It goes without saying that the army of managers is big. A part of them can and should be reduced. However, upon closer familiarization with the essence of the matter it becomes clear that the basic apparatus of economic management bodies (all-Union and republic industrial associations, trusts, and so forth) comprises 0.6 million people, that is, about 5 percent. The main material values in our society are created with their direct participation. The bulk of the conductors (according to K. Marx's figurative comparison), who do their utmost so that musicians (workers) play less out of tune, that is, work better, are concentrated in these 5 percent. As we know, quite a great deal depends on the conductor.

How do these conductors-managers live? Who are they? How did they get to head the orchestra-collective? We raised these and other questions in the course of a special investigation among economic managers.

To the question "if you were to start everything from the beginning, would you have liked to be a manager?" one-third of them gave a negative answer.

This is explainable. The present manager works essentially under extreme conditions until he is worn out—on the one hand, a lack (at least at first) of experience in practical work and of special managerial training and a gradual disqualification as a specialist and, on the other, a steady increase in demands.

Means of mass information also have their effect. Everyone is talking about the published articles on abuses on the part of managers. They cause a completely justified indignation. Unfortunately, the ominous shadow of the "heroes" of these published articles is cast on many thousands of honest people, whose contribution to our economic development is vast. It is already difficult to find a person for the position of a shop chief and even a plant director. Then how can we talk at all about the selection of managers? After all, a selection is preference given to one out of two candidacies or more. And what if not only two do not exist, but even one does not exist?

According to the data of medical science, the risk factor for getting a heart attack has occupied the first place among directors and chairmen recently. Therefore, let us together look after managers. Their talent and health are public property.

V. Travin, candidate of philosophical sciences, Moscow

A Superfluous Link?

All those that closely followed the course of party committee plenums analyzing bureau work on the management of restructuring, to be sure, noticed that quite often they discussed the following situation: Two rayons are located

next to each other and hardly differ in the conditions and material base of production and labor resources, but the results are different. At times the difference is significant. What is the secret here?

Party members most often drew the following conclusion: It lies in the different level of party management and organizational and political work of party committees. Analyzing the method of this work, as a rule, participants in plenums did not disregard sectorial committee departments either. A great deal of sharp criticism was leveled at them and the question whether they were needed at all was raised. Is this not a superfluous link? It seems that with due regard for this the CPSU CC Theses stated the need to make changes in the structure and composition of the party apparatus.

If we go back to rural raykoms, there the sectorial department, usually, is one—agricultural. What does practice show here? We shall try to generalize it on the basis of a study of numerous published addresses at and materials of the mentioned plenums, which discussed the work on restructuring, and the sociological research on this topic recently conducted by us. The research was conducted in 12 regions in the country, in such large party organizations as those in Khabarovsk and Krasnoyarsk krays and in Kirov, Sverdlovsk, Tula, Chelyabinsk, and Ulyanov oblasts, as well as in a number of rayon party organizations in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia.

The introduction of collective, lease, and family contracts and the mastering of advanced innovations in production are now the urgent concerns of rural areas. How, in the opinion of those questioned, do agricultural departments contribute to this? Only 10.9 percent of the raykom secretaries consider their work on the introduction of intensive technologies satisfactory. Only one out of 11 (9.3 percent) spoke positively about the effect of departments on the application of new equipment in plant growing and animal husbandry. Many activists are convinced that raykoms should deal more with personnel work, the preparation of a reserve, control and check of the execution of adopted decisions, and increase in the activity of party members in production. At the same time, they persistently advise that raykoms give up day-to-day, in any form whatsoever, work on the management of economic affairs, not prescribe what to do and when, and not prepare compulsory orders. Sectorial departments, most of all, sin with this, pushing the committee into the old rut.

The participants in the questionnaire stress that without new approaches to work with people raykoms will hardly be able to affect restructuring in the economy actively and to uncover the potential inherent in the new forms of management in a full volume. Adopting them, kolkhozes and sovkhozes will try to manage things not the way someone not directly involved in this likes and not the way this is advantageous for the report, but according to the laws of cost accounting and technical progress.

Having no other choice, the committee will have to find methods of helping them in this. Apparently, the wishes of party members to give rayon party committees more independence in the solution of problems concerning the structure of the apparatus within the framework of a certain wage fund and general staffs are not devoid of common sense. Let them themselves decide for what period and for what purpose they need a sectorial department.

Ye. Okhotskiy, head of a department at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee

11439

Party Officials Surveyed on Reaction to Conference Theses

18000389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Jun 88 pp 1, 3

[Letters from A. Maleyev, Moscow, CPSU member since 1965, and M. Amirov, director of the Belebeyevskiy "Avionormal" Plant and deputy in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Bashkir ASSR, and article by V. Lichenkov, chief national news editor of TASS, candidate of philosophical sciences, and Ye. Dugiya, deputy chief of the ideology department of the NII for the Study and Summarization of Practice in Party, Soviet, and Ideological Work of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee, candidate of philosophical sciences, under the "We Are Discussing the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference" rubric: "Proven by the Progress of Restructuring—Rapid Analysis of the Opinions of Party Officials at the Rayon and City Level"; first two paragraphs are editorial summary]

[Text] The Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Congress have put up for discussion of party members and all the Soviet people even the fundamental issues of restructuring in the activity of party committees. How urgent they are is indicated by the results of the regular experiment in rapid analysis of the work style of party committees under the conditions of restructuring which is being conducted by the main national news editorial staff of TASS together with the NII for the Study and Summarization of Practice in Party, Soviet, and Ideological Work of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee.

About 100 party gorkoms and raykoms in RSFSR took part in the survey that was conducted. The overwhelming majority of secretaries of party committees (more than 80 percent of the number surveyed) expressed firm conviction of the need for serious changes in the procedure for shaping elective party bodies and support the provisions of the Theses to that effect.

[Maleyev Letter]

Certification Needed

First I would like to express through your newspaper sincere solidarity with and full support of the proposal carried in the press about conducting an exacting certification of all CPSU members. I am deeply convinced that restructuring must be guided by people free of the virus of narrow-mindedness, bureaucracy, embezzlement, extortion, protectionism, by people with a clear conscience. But do all party members meet these high requirements today?

Not, of course, if we judge by how things are going. So we need first of all to purge the ranks of the party of those who are not on the restructuring road, of those who are in favor of it only in words, while in their deeds they set up obstacles.

I put forth the following proposal for consideration of the 19th All-Union Party Conference: to supplement Paragraph 9 of the CPSU Bylaws with the following provision, which might be stated approximately this way: "A party member who commits theft, engages in speculation, abuses his official position, or is caught in other acts that do injury to socialist property and the ethical principles of Soviet society, regardless of past merits and the position occupied, shall be expelled from the ranks of the party and deprived of the right of subsequent reinstatement."

I think this would precisely meet the high requirements of our time and would correspond to the spirit and goals of revolutionary restructuring.

[Amirov Letter]

Under the Surveillance of the Masses

The Theses have raised the question of the advisability of setting up a system of combined social-state oversight that would be under the jurisdiction of the elective bodies of government. As a member of the oblast people's control committee, I have quite often pondered why our effort is not very effective.

One of the reasons, we feel, is that the activity of people's control entities is largely burdened with an "economic" bias. Controllers' attention is concentrated predominantly on quantitative indicators (short deliveries of products, falling behind schedules, failure to complete projects, and so on), and has little to do with the way things are done and the relations among particular bodies. Rarely do they go to the point of analyzing such adverse things as bureaucracy, red tape, window dressing, percentage mania, figure padding, crudity, callousness, uncivilized behavior, and so on, and yet it is precisely these things that are the first cause of everything. What is more, the activity of people's control entities is overorganized, they mainly act on orders, initiative from the masses is needed.

What sort of combined system of social-state control would we like to see? The main thing is that it must afford a possibility for will to be vigorously asserted from below. At an enterprise this might be a body elected in the plant conference and independent of the management, but also not a substitute for it, and it would be subordinate to the workers' council. At the municipal level it must be elected in a session of the city soviet and be accountable to it, not to the staff and to the ispolkom.

In our plant we have undertaken a sharp reduction of the number of controllers, leaving in the groups only people who are really helpful. We have established a procedure in which every people's control activist and every worker can go to the people's control staff and enter his warning, suggestion, or complaint in the journal or convey them to the person on duty. What is valuable about our practice is that when the workers take part the control group can verify and take steps in any of the aspects of plant life. Later, we intend to include sociologists and psychologists as group members. So that we do not evaluate the manager solely in terms of the percentage of plan fulfillment, but according to his skill in making contact with people and organizing work.

[Article by V. Lichenkov and Ye. Dagiya]

Proven by the Progress of Restructuring—Rapid Analysis of the Opinions of Party Officials at the Rayon and City Level

"My attitude toward the practice of the present 'ex officio' approach to forming the elective bodies of the party," writes A.V. Kozachko, first secretary of the Yashaltinskiy Rayon Party Committee in Kalmyk ASSR, "is negative. Their symbolic members serve no purpose. We have eliminated from the raykom buro the first secretary of the Komsomol rayon committee and the chairman of the rayon committee of the trade union of agroindustrial workers. Nor do I think that there is a need for the third secretary of the party raykom to be a member of the buro. Thought should also be given to the chief of the RAPO, who is concerned with purely economic matters...."

"One of the main causes holding back formation of an elective party body that is effective and works creatively is the present practice of subjecting its membership to rules concerning age, sex, social composition, and other formal criteria. But is it possible for an instruction to take into account the entire diversity of conditions in which party organizations operate at the local level? It should be left to the party organization itself to decide all matters related to forming the elective body." (A.V. Nesterov, first secretary of the Zayeltsovskiy Rayon Party Committee in Novosibirsk)

"As a matter of fact, up to now we have been held to rigid limits in forming the membership of elective bodies, and not just those in the party.... For example, in advance of the rayon party conference in 1985 the party obkom's

organizational department set down the qualitative composition of the raykom: no less than 45 percent workers, 27 percent women, 20 percent party officials, and so on. It is clear that there can be no question of any democracy here. Sometimes it goes to absurd lengths. During the period of nomination of candidates for deputies in the republic's supreme soviet, when there were two candidates to be nominated, in addition to preparing personal files, photographs were taken of as many as 30 people for obkom officials to examine as to external appearance." (G.G. Makhauri)

The survey also exposed another point of view. Yu.A. Yermakov, first secretary of the Sovetskiy Rayon Party Committee in Kurgan, for example, takes this position: "The ex officio approach does not have the primary importance, but it cannot be entirely carried out. For instance, the chairman of the rayispolkom, the first secretary of the rayon Komsomol committee (provided he is a member of the CPSU), and the head of the organizational department of the party raykom must be members of the buro of the party raykom."

"The membership of the elective party body must correspond to the qualitative composition of the rayon and primary party organizations, providing maximum coverage of the number of organizations, including the primary organization." (I.A. Korsakov, first secretary of the Zhdanovskiy Rayon Party Committee in Leningrad)

The opinion of a majority of party officials taking part in the rapid analysis was vividly expressed in the viewpoint of V.V. Lomakin, first secretary of the Inzenskiy Rayon Party Committee in Ulyanovsk Oblast: "A strange stereotype has sprung up—once you become a leader, then you have tenure in the elective body until you retire. The result of this is that many of those 'ex officio' activists turn into 'pillars of silence': they come to the plenum, they sit out the time required, and they cast their votes. They are not even concerned about speaking in their own party organizations about the problems taken up in the plenum."

An absolute majority of party leaders at the city and rayon level, as shown by the analysis, concur with the provision of the Theses as to the need for changes in the procedure for forming elective party bodies, particularly emphasizing in this connection the role of competitiveness, broad glasnost in deciding on candidates, and the importance of the secret ballot in elections. The official's ideological, ethical, and businesslike attributes, his position on restructuring, the breadth of his views, and his thorough competence are referred to as the main thing in forming elective party bodies. "The main criterion," in the opinion of V.F. Osokin, first secretary of the Kineshma Party Gorkom in Ivanovo Oblast, "must be the attitude toward restructuring and the specific contribution to it."

The problem of the relationship between the party committee and its executive body—the buro, the party committee and its staff—is also closely related to the procedure for forming elective party bodies. In expressing their reflections on this matter, many secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms back them up with specific cases and talk about sprouts of something new and interesting generated by the progress of restructuring. "As a matter of fact," says N.A. Shirshov, secretary of the Bessonovskiy Rayon Party Committee in Penza Oblast, "in practice it often happens that the committee ends up 'at the beck and call of the buro.' In my view, the way to break up this practice is for buro members, including the first secretary, to have to report in plenums." "The first attempt to break up the practice of the buro's guidance of the party committee is for the buro to have to report on leadership of restructuring." (M. Barsukova, first secretary of the Yugo-Zapadnyy Rayon Party Committee in Angarsk, Irkutsk Oblast)

"It is the role and activity of gorkom members that needs to be enhanced, not the role of the buro that needs to be diminished. Not long ago the plenum met to hear the report of the buro. I called a meeting of members of the gorkom in advance, passed out all the material and asked them: Tell us everything that you think. And the result was healthier than ever before. I got it good, and so did other buro members as well." (Yu.A. Kuznetsov, first secretary of the Petrozavodsk Party Gorkom) "As is well-known, the buro is altogether accountable to the committee. In practice it often works out the other way around: the committee ends up 'at the buro's beck and call.' How is such practice to be broken up? The following steps should be taken to improve the practical activity of the buro and to make it more accountable to the committee:

"1. Committee members should be elected in primary party organizations and nominations should be confirmed in conferences.

"In order to invigorate the effort of committee members specific orders should be issued to prepare a topic for the aktiv and the plenum. These orders might vary in their character: participation in the proceedings of commissions, an article in the newspaper, taking part in writing the draft of a decree, and so on." (A. Drachev, secretary of the Chaplyginskiy Rayon Party Committee in Lipetsk Oblast)

Many of the party officials surveyed feel that for a time there has been a disproportionate growth of the role of the staff as an executive body to the detriment of the elective body. It has become established practice for staff members to attempt to take full responsibility on themselves, for all practical purposes removing raykom members from oversight of their activity and the activity of the buro. Proposals have been advanced for drafting and adopting general provisions concerning the staff of the

party body, to involve raykom members more extensively in preparing topics for plenums and buro meetings and also in following up on execution of decisions taken. (Ponyrovskiy and Kastorenskiy Party Raykoms in Kursk Oblast)

Leaders of party committees have taken a particularly interested and concerned approach to problems related to the activity of instructors of party committees. "So far," in the opinion of G.G. Makhauri, "we have not been successful in making the instructor a really central figure of the party staff. The time has come to give serious thought to relieving him of his function as statistician and 'expediter.'" "The instructor of the party committee must be competent in all matters in the theory and practice of party activity, not a specialist confined to a restricted sector. He should not pass on a command, but motivate its prompt execution, foresee the social consequences of its execution and whether there will be favorable changes.... In my opinion, the very term 'instructor' has become out-of-date; it would be more correct to refer to him as the 'party organizer.'" (G.P. Dobrukova, first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Party Committee in Arkhangelsk) "In addition to the changes in the structure of the party staff that have been outlined, there should also be a change in the position title 'instructor' to one that is more popular with the people, for example, 'raykom or gorkom party organizer.'" (V.P. Solovyev, first secretary of the Chelyabinsk Party Gorkom) "It seems unwarranted in the meantime for enrollment of instructors in the Higher Party School to be restricted. Enrollment of this category in party schools should be expanded. And people should be taken on the staff of the party raykom or gorkom only if a recommendation has been given by an assembly of party members, above all by the person's work collective." (V.I. Sheretyukov, first secretary of the Novosmanskiy Rayon Party Committee in Voronezh Oblast)

The 27th CPSU Congress set the task of delineating the functions of the party, soviet, and economic domains. The acuteness of this problem has also been emphasized in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference: "Party bodies have begun to take upon themselves more and more the actual solution of the current problems of economic and administrative management, taking the place of soviets and other state agencies." What opinion is held on this matter by leaders of city and rayon party organizations?

N.A. Shirshov, secretary of the Bessonovskiy Rayon Party Committee in Penza Oblast: "For the party raykom to duplicate matters that are in the jurisdiction of the soviet and economic domain is holding back the cause of restructuring.... At the same time...the initiative for its preservation is coming from soviet and economic bodies, which appeal to the buro (to the first secretary) of the party raykom their own inability (reluctance) to solve the problem."

A.F. Gordiyenko, first secretary of the Ivanovo Party Gorkom: "Why are party bodies forced today to intervene in all matters of the daily life all the way to hauling away trash? One of the reasons is that most of the people's deputies merely represent the people in the soviets, but they are not involved in the specific organization of things in their own districts. But the main thing probably lies elsewhere—today the people's deputy has the right to represent his work collective, has the right to put a delegate query, has the right to turn up in the office of any bureaucrat when he is receiving the public and to request something for his district, but the ordinary deputy does not have the real right to put pressure for the settlement of economic, social, and other issues."

Yu.G. Vdragov, first secretary of the Ordzhonikidze Party Gorkom in North Ossetian ASSR: "The following are necessary if the functions of party, soviet, and economic authorities are to be distinguished from each other: eliminate the following sector departments—construction, municipal utilities and services, industrial transport, administration, trade and financial agencies, science and educational institutions, and so on. The following structure of party committees would be most efficacious now: a department for party organizational work, an ideology department, and a general department."

Yu.A. Kuznetsov, first secretary of the Petrozavodsk Party Gorkom: "The problem is that most of the city's enterprises are connected in their operation to Moscow, and are not subordinate to local soviets. So, to influence them even through party channels the gorkom has to intervene. A procedure needs to be established so that everyone located in the area of a given soviet be subordinate to local soviet authorities."

G.V. Zdrapin, first secretary of the Yukhnovskiy Rayon Party Committee in Kaluga Oblast: "We are getting away from taking the place of managers in the economy. That is simpler. It is more difficult with the soviets—they, just like we, are concerned with the social sphere, so that the functions intersect. The soviets are weak when it comes to financial resources, they do not have real power, they have to make up for it with the authority of the word of the party."

A.V. Kovachko, first secretary of the Yashaltinskiy Rayon Party Committee in Kalmyk ASSR: "We feel that the raykom and rayispolkom must be accountable for the entire economic life of the rayon. A cooperative has been created in the rayon for production and technical supply of farms and has fully justified itself. We decided to organize another two cooperatives—for the production and processing of animal products and products of cropping. Beyond them is the future. But they must be managed entirely by the rayispolkom and its RAPO. Our job is to work with people, with party members."

Many party leaders emphasized that the situation is compounded by the fact that all the higher-level party, soviet, and economic authorities try to settle all their matters exclusively through party committees. This case was cited: Even at the height of the election campaign the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR turned, for example, on all matters to the Nadterechnyy Rayon Party Committee rather than to the rayispolkom. What does this signify—a lack of confidence in the capability of his own executive organ? As a consequence, it is reported from the rayon, certain responsible officials of the rayispolkom do not themselves even consider it necessary to take part in the voting.

The party officials surveyed feel that the restructuring in the activity of soviet and economic authorities is being hindered by the numerous instructions, prohibitions, cumbersome reporting forms, and so on. Quite often leaders do not display initiative and a readiness to take responsibility on themselves and wait for instructions and clarifications "from above."

Party committees are engaged in a search for new forms and work procedures. Their objective is in the spirit of the Theses to impart a strong new thrust to the revolutionary process of restructuring, to clear away everything standing in its way, to work out reliable guarantees of the irreversibility of the course towards democratization and glasnost, and under the new conditions to enhance the role and responsibility of every primary party organization and every member of the party.

07045

Party Veteran Urges More Open Leadership Debate

PM0020614498 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Jun 88 Second Edition p 5

[Letter under the "More Glasnost!" rubric: "To the Very Top"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference strengthened confidence in the irrevocability of restructuring and in the current policy of democratization and glasnost. But to all that the Theses have to say about restructuring the work of the soviets and the activity of deputies at all levels I would like to add the following: These revolutionary changes must affect the very top—the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo as well.

I will start with the Supreme Soviet. When fragments of its sessions are shown on television, the impression is that the deputies work mainly with their hands. They are either tumultuously applauding speakers or voting all

together, unanimously. One does not get the feeling of an exchange of opinions, of different views even on the most important decisions taken. Are they really in total agreement on everything?

Now for the Central Committee and Politburo. I believe they too should set an example for all party organizations, for all of us. The people must know how decisions are taken and what kind of exchange of opinions and views there has been. Only matters of defense significance and foreign policy strategy and tactics can be considered in private. Unfortunately, many full and candidate members of the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries are little known to us.

Lastly, we have neglected public opinion in the country for too long. A center has now been set up to study it. It is necessary not only to carry out an extensive study of public opinion but to make the results of the study public. And maybe also entrust to the voice of public opinion the establishment of our top leaders' level of popularity and the evaluation of their performance? This would greatly increase their personal responsibility to the people.

B. Tyagunov, labor veteran. Moscow

Public Criticism Must Extend to General Secretary
PM0206115588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 3

[V. Parinov letter carried as part of "Editorial Mail" feature under general heading "19th Party Conference. Reflecting on the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Example From the Top"]

[Text] Having carefully studied the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, I immediately sat down to write this letter. While I support the Theses, I nevertheless feel forced to note that some provisions and formulations are somewhat incomplete and vague.

First: No mechanism has been created to develop criticism from below (and this alone is the most effective and most democratic form of criticism) in the party and in society. This can be seen, if in nothing else, in the fact that the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo, and the general secretary remain outside the scope of criticism. And unless they can be criticized, there will be no criticism of leading personalities at oblast, city, and rayon level. After all, the example is always set at the top.

Second: The formulation that "during elections, Communists are entitled to nominate more candidates than there are vacancies" is very vague. It will unwittingly lead again to the flawed practice of nominating just one candidate (this is also confirmed by the practice of nominating candidates for the 19th party conference, in which Communists on many occasions have been

deprived of the right of choice and assigned the role of extras raising their hands for a candidate nominated by somebody else). In my view, it is necessary to formulate this provision as follows: "During elections to all party committees the secret ballot lists must contain more candidates for elected office than there are vacancies; it would be expedient to put on the lists 2-3 candidates for every elected office."

Third: I believe that it is necessary for the congress to elect, in addition to the Central Committee, some other central control organ vested with the appropriate powers and responsible to the congress alone. Obviously, in the same way the USSR Supreme Soviet must appoint an apparatus for public and state control. It could possibly be elected by nationwide vote, like the Supreme Soviet itself.

Fourth: The number of lay judges must certainly be increased so that they can hear all cases, because it is impossible to draw a distinction between the "most important cases" and less important cases. All cases are important.

V. Parinov, CPSU member since 1961, Moscow

Leaders' Functions Differentiation Urged
PM0306090588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 p 3

[Letter from feature under general heading "19th All-Union Party Conference: Behind the Lines of the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "It Remains To Be Proved"; boldface as published]

[Text] Let the present lesson of preparation for the 19th party conference become the first step toward establishing genuine intraparty democracy. The conference should decide once and for all that the party's opinion is the opinion of the majority of its members, not only the leading cadres. That is why any resolution on the most important questions of our life should be preceded by extensive discussion in the primary organization (and not the other way round!) and any resolution on fundamental questions should be preceded by all-party debates. In summing up the results of discussion and debate the relevant party organs should provide a public [glasnyy] analysis of opinions and proposals (and primarily of those which cannot be adopted). Incidentally, this procedure for summing up results should be adhered to in submitting any drafts and directives for nationwide discussion. And a second point. Has the time not come to renounce the proclamation of the party's role?

The party can and must be a political vanguard. But not a proclaimed vanguard. The role of vanguard can only be won: not by quashing dissidents, not by repressions, but by progressive theory, scientifically substantiated strategy and tactics, and the formation of goals and tasks which grip Soviet people's minds and hearts.

Following Lenin's principles, the 19th party conference should discuss and propose a political structure in which the functions of the party leader and the state leader would be differentiated. The party leader is one of the most competent theorists, ideologists, and organizers of the political vanguard. The state leader is the head of the state elected at general direct elections by the entire Soviet people from several candidates enjoying trust and respect.

With this approach we should of course stipulate that in the event of a party leader being elected head of state he should be relieved of his duties or retire from the post of general secretary (leader, first secretary, what this post is called is unimportant) to avoid concentrating power in a single pair of hands.

And one last point. The course of electing delegates to the 19th party conference is already giving grounds for thought. The lesson is as follows: Whatever the Central Committee recommends on the procedure for elections, the party apparatus locally is doing everything possible to put forward the candidates it has selected. This is considerably assisted by the accepted procedure of the multilevel selection of candidates at party committee, raykom, and republic Central Committee bureau levels. Instead of electing candidates in primary party organizations the alleged discussion and support of appointed candidates is often organized.

G. Polyakov, member of the CPSU since 1966, sector chief of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Electronics and Computer Technology, Riga.

Readers' Letters Comment on Conference Theses
PM0306103588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 First Edition p 2

[Letters feature under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference" and the general heading: "Renewing Life Step By Step"]

[Excerpts] Musical Chairs.... [subhead]

I want to express my view of one clause of the Theses for the 19th all-union party conference and at the same time take to task the authors of several comments on this subject in your newspaper. It is a case of the proposal to restrict the term of office of the party committees' leadership to two elected terms. If this is accepted, it will lead to the point where, after his two terms have expired, M.S. Gorbachev will be obliged to leave the post of CPSU Central Committee general secretary. Will his successor be a worthy continuer of the transformations initiated in the country?

Yes, the Theses contain an addendum to the effect that exceptions, that is election for a third term, may be allowed. But it must be understood that when any stipulations appear they can cancel out the limitations which are introduced.

Of course, when their term of office expires leaders who have given a good account of themselves in elected work can be transferred to another rayon or oblast to a post of equal importance. But under this practice the candidates for particular elected posts are appointed, not elected.

This rule could lead to the point where nomenklatura cadres will begin to play musical chairs—moving from soviet organs to party organs and from there to soviet organs, and so forth. Will this protect us against secrecy, back scratching, and lack of principle? In my view, only elections held by democratic means and not formal restrictions can prevent this "roundabout."

[signed] B. Lebedev, deputy shop chief at the first Moscow clock and watch plant. [passage omitted]

Deputies Ex Officio? [subhead]

I believe it is time to fundamentally alter the principles for forming soviets. After all, right now almost 40 percent of the membership of the USSR Supreme Soviet consists of deputies ex officio—leading workers of the CPSU Central Committee, union republics, party kraykoms, obkoms, and gorkoms, the USSR and union republics' councils of ministers and Supreme Soviet presidiums, the Armed Forces, and so forth. That is one side of the matter.

There is also an obvious distortion with the other, let's call it the "grassroots contingent"—the disproportionately broad representation of outstanding seamstresses, weavers, milkmaids, pig keepers, shepherds.... And there is an undoubted shortage of representatives of the scientific, creative, and technical intelligentsia—scientists, economists, lawyers, writers, doctors, teachers....

In my view, with the present composition everything is decided by apparatchiks from the ispolkoms and the deputies at the sessions merely raise their hands, sometimes, as one deputy I know put it, unanimously but far from single-heartedly. At some time the power of the people was replaced unnoticed by the power of the bureaucrats.

There is one more consideration. There is a special need to create an effective mechanism in the country for studying public opinion, without which feedback in revolutionary restructuring is impossible.

I propose creating regional institutes for studying public opinion.

[signed] N. Numerov, candidate of technical sciences.

Between Congresses and Conferences [subhead]

I familiarized myself most attentively with the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference. And I will say frankly that I am pleased that many provisions formulated there were consonant with the ideas nurtured by our Communists.

It is not from hearsay that I know what people live by and what causes them heartache in the primary organizations. I also know that living work with them demands that the party worker pull himself together, strain every nerve, and put as much of his heart as possible into educational work. There is no denying that not everyone can cope with this burden. So there is sometimes a reshuffling of party cadres.

In this connection there occurred to me the following proposal for party conference delegates. To the Theses' paragraph stating that to ensure a constant influx of fresh forces we should provide for the possibility of renewing the Central Committee in the period between congresses we should add "and also the CPSU obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms in the period between conferences." And then according to the text.

I believe that this will ensure a more responsible and balanced approach toward forming the party aktiv.

[signed] N. Gavrilova, lathe operator at the "Kurgan-pribor" Production Association and member of the Kurgan CPSU Obkom Bureau. [passage omitted]

PRAVDA Reader Views Conference Theses, Party Role

PM0606110388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Jun 88 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences O. Osipov from the "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses" "Discussion Platform": "The Party and Restructuring: On the Path of Democracy"]

[Text] Omsk—What do I want to propose for the examination of the 19th all-union party conference? What thoughts occur to me on reading the CPSU Central Committee Theses?

First point. The election of bureau and party committee secretaries from the bottom upward should in my opinion be carried out only by secret ballot. Recently there has been frequent talk of direct elections. That is correct in principle. But in practice it is possible only in the primary party organization, when there is no difficulty in gathering the organization together at any time. But what is to be done if an obkom or union republic Communist Party Central Committee secretary has to be reelected ahead of schedule? Should a congress or conference be convened? That is scarcely justified. So let them continue to be elected as before at plenums of the relevant party organs, but by secret ballot.

Second point. What is the benefit of a secret ballot if, as before, just one candidate is offered and that is recommended by a higher-ranking party committee? Where is the democracy here? There should be several candidates. Here too I support the Theses.

Third point. The principle of cadres' replacement and renewal should be enshrined in the CPSU Statutes. Elected party posts should not be held continuously by the same people. Today there are many bitter examples for the party showing that as a rule this has been of no benefit. Renewal as a principle is not only an incentive to vigorous, creative work, but is also a guarantee against stagnation and abuses of power. The Theses raise absolutely correctly the question of how no one can hold elected party posts for more than two (and only in exceptional cases three) terms in the same place. Opponents usually object that the longer a leader works in one place the more experience he has. But how then to explain that the largest number of violations of party norms and the greatest degree of lagging have occurred precisely where elected posts have been held by the same people for dozens of years and even for life? At the same time, if they knew that during their set term or after it Communists could make them answerable for everything, would many of these people who have "led" continuously embark on violations of party democracy, still less abuses? Of course, there are people who during the set time will show only their good side. In that case they can work in another party committee, in soviet, trade union, or economic work, in science, or as consultants.

Fourth point. We must ensure in practice everywhere the regular reporting of party committees, whose benefit has been shown quite obviously by party committees' reports on work in leading restructuring, and we must consider the procedure for the early recall of party leaders who have failed to comply with their function.

The attributes of power which have taken shape in the country in previous years, and which are now promoting the formation of the authority not so much of the individual as of the post, merit critical reappraisal. They include, for instance, the award of orders for birthdays depending on rank, the renaming of cities, a wide range of welcoming and send-off parties, the installation of busts, and so forth. Life has shown that abundant and sometimes undeserved honors and eulogies for top people, and this happens not only in republics, krais, and oblasts, but also in cities and rayons, merely impede real business and generate dissatisfaction among people.

The problem of party organs' attitude toward the law also arises in practice. Everything here would seem to be clear. The USSR Constitution and the CPSU Statutes clearly state that party organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution. This is confirmed by the Theses. But only recently talk of how a particular party leader had violated the law was regarded, locally at least, as an encroachment on the party's leading role. Even

today violations of legislation in party work are still no rarity. In some cases attempts are made to justify them by reference to the imperfection of existing legislation or special local conditions, in others by reference to the need to support the masses' initiative. But the main reasons lie in the imperfection of the mechanism for the management of society, especially the national economy, and in assessing the work of party committees in terms of the fulfillment of plans in the rayon, city, oblast, republic, and so forth. And, of course, in local prejudice. These phenomena will be overcome in the course of restructuring but attention toward them must not be slackened because these serious reasons will not disappear of themselves, automatically. Here too it is very important that any violations of the law by the party organs should meet with a relevant assessment at party meetings and plenums and in the party press.

But even that is not enough. For instance, who in the rural raykom will speak of the violation of the law by the first secretary to the first secretary himself? Who will put him right? The prosecutor, the rayon internal affairs department chief, the judge? The newspaper editor? Most often no, because all these people are in the raykom nomenklatura and even today the first secretary's opinion on cadres questions is of decisive significance. Only a higher-ranking party organ can put him right, if it finds out. But what if it does not find out?

Party life teaches us that disregard for socialist legality and law and order often leads to subjectivism, to permissiveness, and even to the abuse of power. In my opinion the 19th all-union party conference should address this problem. It is very complex. We must completely rule out any possibility of violations of legislation by party organs. To this end perhaps we should define the statutes of the law enforcement organs so that their activity in preserving the law and citizens' rights and legitimate interests is fully guaranteed against arbitrary pressure through party channels?

If we look closely at the work of many party organs, then often in a number of instances of their usurpation of economic, soviet, trade union, and other organs, it is possible to see without great difficulty that this is also a unique kind of incorrect attitude toward the law. And the party committees are not always to blame here, often it is their misfortune. Let us recall that the entire command and administrative system, which used to require the unconditional fulfillment of the instructions of higher ranking organs, for many decades accustomed us to think that the only law was the order from the center. To fulfill it we were permitted to arrogate any rules and resort to various measures depending on the situation. Examples? Look no further than the recent epic involving the grain, cotton, vegetable, and potato harvest. What violations of legislation did not accompany this campaign!

Usurpation is always intolerable and it ultimately results in loss. But the party organs often interfere in the work of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and construction organizations.

Of course, it is impossible to overcome immediately the inertia of the past, when even the most unimportant question was not resolved without the party organs. What is to be done if even now there are many party workers, particularly locally, in the backwoods, who are convinced that their gradual removal from management functions is the restriction of the party committee's leading role?

When you study the work of the kolkhoz, sovkhos, enterprise, and institution primary party organizations, as a rule you do not succeed in detecting any usurpation, because Communists discuss questions directly linked with their vital interests, questions which do indeed perturb them and which they themselves resolve in practice. Usurpation usually begins at party raykom level and above, when there is frequently a strong divergence of interests between enterprises and institutions situated in the same rayon, oblast, and so forth. The collectives are led by different ministries and departments which often have nothing to do with each other. The enterprises themselves lack independence and rights and numerous misunderstandings constantly arise between them and the central organs because the economic mechanism of their relations has long been displaying shortcomings. And then the territorial party organ, as the "local soviet of the national economy," resolutely intervenes in the enterprises' economic functions, forcing some to cover others' nonfulfillment of the plan. Unless you want to be slapped down you will do everything possible to ensure that gross indicators are "up to par." But this is blatantly tripping up the reform!

The time is now coming when the labor collectives will themselves resolve all their own production, supply, and sales problems. The economic reform is leading to this. But today there are still party organs where this activity still takes up three-quarters of working time. Will they be able, without painstaking preliminary work, to switch immediately to their own affairs which simply no one but they can resolve and for which they formerly lacked the time? Not an easy question. But one thing is clear—by proceeding along the old road and using the former methods, the country came up against stagnation. And the conference has food for discussion here.

Letter Opposes Limit on Term of Office
PM0306092188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 p 3

[Letter from feature under general heading "19th All-Union Party Conference: Behind the Lines of the CPSU Central Committee Theses"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses say that for all party committees from raykom and gorkom level up a single term of office of 5 years is established and that the holding of elected posts in the CPSU should be limited to two successive elected terms. If the question

had been put like that 10 years ago, I would have voted for this proposal with both hands. But now I am categorically opposed to it, and here is why.

A leader has now emerged in our country who can lead it out of its impasse and scale the necessary heights. If we approve the proposal whereby in a few years time we will have to elect another general secretary, who will stand to gain? The fervent enemies of restructuring, of course! Here they will triumph. And restructuring may be ruined.

[signed] Yuriy Ivanov, Brest Oblast.

Creation of Official 'Opposition Center' Urged
PM0106190588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 p 3

[G. Dzyuba letter carried as part of full-page feature under rubric "19th All-Union Conference: Beyond the Lines of the CPSU Central Committee Theses"]

[Text] The lack of opposition parties dictates the need to set up a legalized special opposition center whose duties (according to the principle of forensic advocacy) would include the advancing of opposition arguments from the most diverse viewpoints so that the party and civil authorities, in countering them, could gain a clearer view of themselves and not be lulled into the honeyed sleep that ensues when there is unalloyed unanimity and approval to the point of absurdity. Since there is always a department behind any information organ and that organ's objectivity is only relative (departmental), this center must have a press organ of its own or sections in the news media so it can publish its own opinions and those of its opponent. The center's independence could be guaranteed if it were elected by the congress and accountable to the congress. The center could also take on the role of a Central Control Commission. Fertile ground for the center's work could be provided by an "ideas bank" summarizing and monitoring criticisms voiced in letters, as well as by the news media....

G. Dzyuba, Leningrad.

'Extraordinary' CPSU Congress Proposed
PM0206100188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 p 1

[Contribution to "There Is An Opinion!" feature from Candidate of Philosophical Sciences S. Yushenkov: "On Discussion of Questions of Restructuring Public Life"]

[Text] S. Yushenkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Moscow: [subhead]

The discussion which has developed in the country has created an atmosphere of unusual creative activeness in all strata of society. But the fine ideas which have already been expressed, even if they are approved at the 19th party conference, may remain unrealized. The point is

that the conference is not empowered to introduce changes to the Statutes—that is the prerogative of a congress. Yet without organizational backup these ideas may be doomed.

Taking this fact into consideration and also the fact that it is far from everywhere that the delegates to the party conference have been elected by genuinely democratic means, I suggest that the conference discuss the question of convening an extraordinary CPSU congress, the election of delegates to which could be implemented on the platforms set forth by the candidates.

Reinterpretation of Democratic Centralism Urged
PM0906121788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Letter from Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor K. Lyubutin under the general heading "Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Exchanging Opinions"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses are literally suffused with humanity—from the assessment of the development of the economy to the concept of the state of the whole people accepting the rule of law. This is particularly gratifying because our society has also been affected by a dearth of humanity and by social alienation.

I don't think anyone would reject the claim that not only socialism's aims and values, but the means of achieving them and human worth are by no means matters of indifference to us.

Yes, we need a permanently operating mechanism for exchanging opinions. The Theses do not call into question the established one-party system, but some people have a different view on this score. Countering it with a viewpoint based on Lenin's teaching is above all one of the paramount tasks of social science.

There is another important aspect. While condemning factionalism, Vladimir Ilich Lenin was resolutely opposed to persecution of party comrades for having different views on particular issues. Let us not adopt an extreme stance and become arbitrarily subjectivist and dictatorial. But what does "dissidence" mean in the party sphere? How are the CPSU Statutes supposed to ensure a constructive dialogue between party members? These are questions that demand an answer. The Theses point out that it is necessary to fully resurrect the Leninist concept of the principle of democratic centralism, whereby freedom of debate at the stage of discussion of the next tasks and concerted action following the adoption of a decision by the majority must be ensured. But I believe it is not just a matter of resurrecting the aforementioned principle. It must be reinterpreted and intensified. In fact, the basic tenets of party building

were formulated in the prerevolutionary period, when the party was operating as an illegal organization, forced to adhere to the toughest demands of discipline and operating procedures.

Another question. The Theses state that a great deal of work has to be done to improve and codify Soviet legislation. In my opinion, the review process should also take in party documents, decisions of congresses and plenums, and resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee. It is necessary to clear the ground here as well and give a principled assessment of a number of documents of the cult and stagnation times which even established a theoretical periodization of the history of the CPSU and of the country, a periodization that proved to be clearly unfounded. But, according to the principle of democratic centralism, every Communist is still supposed to treat these documents with proper respect. And this, you will agree, is hindering development and the establishment of new thinking.

In short, the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the upcoming party conference are rich in theory and are orientated in practical terms toward restructuring. They provide food for thought and for debate, without which, in fact, there can be no search for the truth and no movement forward.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor K. Lyubutin,
Urals University, Sverdlovsk.

PRAVDA Reader on Points Arising From Theses
PM0306154988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Letter from L. Lelchuk, member of the CPSU since 1960, under the rubric "More Democracy": "No Provisos")]

[Text] Even people who are far removed from our ideals may, after perusing the Central Committee Theses, have a clear picture of how, figuratively speaking, the Soviet citizen has straightened his shoulders and taken a deep breath.

What I would like to talk about is this:

In my opinion, the main reason for the appearance and subsequent repeated revival of the personality cult in our country lies in the absence of any critical analysis of the activity of top party leaders. Since the end of the twenties, since the death of V.I. Lenin, it has become established practice that everything coming from top organs of leadership is automatically approved and strictly carried out. This is the source of our hypertrophied centralism. What is more, it seems that this practice is still largely maintained today, despite the appeals to eliminate "zones exempt from criticism." I regard this as the biggest danger for the future.

Of course, there are a considerable number of brave, single-minded people among the new leaders. They have taken an enormous responsibility upon themselves. They have our respect and gratitude for this. But a person is only human, whatever post he may hold. He can make mistakes and not see his own errors.

Or take the policy directed against high-handed, administrative methods of management. But surely the measures to combat drunkenness and alcoholism are arbitrary and administrative in the main? This approach has already greatly harmed people and the national economy. If we do not stop and rectify our mistakes, this damage will be even more considerable.

The Central Committee Theses outline a series of provisions designed to further democratize internal party life. They propose in particular to limit the term of office in elected party work. There can be no question that this is a good measure. But in my opinion, it still does not guarantee success. I would like to remind you that a similar proposal was made in N.S. Khrushchev's time. However, then as now, provisos were made which allowed exceptions which subsequently became the rule. Consequently, I believe that we should amplify the current procedure governing the election of first secretaries of party committees.

What do I specifically have in mind? To make regular partywide referendums on the attitude toward top party leaders standard practice. I imagine this would proceed roughly as follows. During report and election campaigns in primary party organizations, every Communist would not only elect by secret ballot the staff of the party bureau and the party secretary but also fill in a ballot paper giving a "yes" or "no" evaluation of the performance by top party leaders of various ranks. Communists' opinions would be summed up. Any top leader receiving more than 50 percent "no" votes would automatically lose the right to retain his position. [Signed] L. Lelchuk, member of the CPSU since 1960

Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy

Reader Seeks Conference Assault on Privileges
PM0306145788 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 23, 4-10 Jun 88 (signed to press 2 Jun 88) p 3

[V. Syroyezhkin letter under the rubric "From the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Mailbag": "What Else Should the Conference Discuss?"]

[Text] The campaign for the election of conference delegates has brought many negative aspects to light. In many places, the system of "multiple" [kustovoy], multistage elections enabled the party apparatus to exert greater influence than the masses on the course of elections.

Much has been said recently about privileges, and it was admitted that they were artificially created, that they are local initiatives. But for some reason this was not reflected in the CPSU Central Committee Theses, this phenomenon seems to have simply been overlooked. And yet people really expected this. Hushing up this important aspect of social justice does not help to enhance the party's prestige. I think that the management apparatus contains a certain number of officials who, if deprived of their privileges, would give up their work, and this can, of course, be only beneficial to society. I am convinced that the abolition of privileges will benefit restructuring, because they are condemned by all working people, they are discussed everywhere—in private conversations, at meetings, in shopping lines. It is time to put an end to this. I suggest that this question be added to the range of problems to be discussed at the conference.

V. Syroyezhkin, Chelyabinsk

Theses Lack Clarity on Defense Parity
PM0606091988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Jun 88 First Edition p 1

[Letter from Captain Third Rank A. Petrov carried as part of feature under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference: We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "To Preserve Parity"; letter is first item in feature, which leads the front page]

[Text] As a military man, I expected the CPSU Central Committee theses to reflect more extensively the question of maintaining the country's defense capability at the necessary level and continuing to preserve military parity. Despite the relaxation of political and military tension and the emerging reduction in the two leading world powers' arsenals of weapons, the task of defending the socialist homeland remains one of the most important tasks. The theses do mention this, but not clearly enough, in my view. And should this be so—especially when you consider the growth of pacifist sentiments among certain strata of our society and the exacerbation of the problem of training young people for service in the Armed Forces?

As a Communist, I believe that defense building must always be at the center of the party's attention and that we have no right to allow the loss of military parity with the West, which we had difficulty in achieving.

Many officers on our ship share my opinion.

Captain Third Rank A. Petrov, senior assistant commander of the cruiser "Aleksandr Nevskiy," Northern Fleet

Tenure Limit Should Count Party, Soviet Work
PM0706091588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Jun 88 First Edition p 2

[Letter from Captain P. Glazkov under the general heading: "From the Current Mailbag"]

[Text] I believe that limiting tenure of state and party elective posts is by no means a guarantee against violations of Leninist principles of the cadre policy. For even during the period of stagnation itself there was "renewal" of leaders whereby "requisite" workers spent decades switching from party post to soviet post and vice versa, remaining "at the helm" in one way or another. This was (and still is) a guarantee of something different—the guarantee of a quiet life for people once ranked among the so-called nomenklatura.

It seems that the relevant clauses of the Theses should be amalgamated: The total tenure in party and state posts must be limited to two 5-year terms.

Second, I am in favor of genuine competitiveness, broad discussion of candidacies, and secret ballots when forming elective party organs: from primary organization to union republic Communist Party Central Committees and the CPSU Central Committee. I believe that this mechanism must also be employed when electing the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Two-Term Limit on Party Officers Unnecessary
PM1406094988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Letter from reader P. Sayapin under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Against Communist Arrogance"]

[Text] During the discussion on democratization certain sociologists have proposed making from the "informal" groups virtually a second party to act as a check and in order to avoid any repetition of the personality cult. No, we do not need another party! The CPSU Central Committee Theses defined what the CPSU should be and who should control its activities.

In order to avoid the domination of bureaucratism in the party and communist arrogance on the part of certain conceited party workers, I believe that the conference should establish:

1. Direct secret elections for leading party workers, all the way up to the CPSU Central Committee, with the right to recall those elected [izbranniki] if they fail to fulfill statutory demands or to justify Communists' faith in them.

2. To instruct the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to introduce into criminal law an article henceforth preventing people who have compromised themselves from taking part in leadership work.

Perhaps then there will be no need to restrict anyone to two elected terms.

P. Seyapin, CPSU member since 1942. Leningrad City.

Mailbag on Party Conference Theses Sampled
PM1406184588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Viktor Kozhemyako review under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "And No one Is Indifferent"]

[Text] I have before me voluminous files full of letters and telegrams. Just now the whole country is sending them to PRAVDA, to many other editorial offices, and straight to the CPSU Central Committee. Our mailbag, for example, has recently increased almost 50 percent. The reason is understandable: People—both Communists and nonparty people—want to make their contribution to the preparations for the 19th all-union party conference.

The publication of the CPSU Central Committee Theses has given rise to a new influx of ideas and suggestions. This is a platform for further discussion in the period immediately preceding the all-party forum. Hence the tremendous interest in them and the thousands of businesslike, interested responses.

On reading them, you think what significant changes have occurred in our people's consciousness over the past 3 years. How did things stand in the past when such documents were published? There was mainly a monotonous breaking of waves of enthusiastic approval. This was easily explained: Since everything had been thought out there, "up above," it only remained to approve and adopt it. To suggest cosmetic amplifications, perhaps. Little depends on little old me, people would say....

The situation has now changed radically. People are reading the party document as its coauthors, enjoying full rights, reading it attentively and sometimes critically, analyzing it and pondering on it. Their views frequently clash, and then an argument flares up, in which, as is known, the truth is born.

"I am 'pro'?" Sovkhoz Director Yu. Kuvakin of Aktyubinsk Oblast affirms concerning the sociopolitical certification of Communists. "The question is ripe," he believes. "In recent years quite a lot of party members have ceased fulfilling their vanguard role and compromised themselves in people's eyes...."

"But I am 'con'?" V. Bykovskiy, a party veteran from Minsk, declares. And he cites his arguments.

Many similar disagreements arise in letters. Well, everyone has his own view, his own viewpoint. And the more frankly they are voiced in the course of debate, the better.

The sense of personal involvement in the affairs of the party and the country is probably the chief aspect uniting this whole huge mailbag. Some people believe that the Theses devote insufficient attention to the need to develop criticism and self-criticism. "Must this weapon of the party really be consigned to the archives already?"—this question is raised in a letter from Kharkov.

Journalists have noticed that the Theses say nothing about the role of the press at the contemporary stage. "It is very disappointing that such a serious subject is quite absent," a group of newspapermen write from Sverdlovsk. "The press, in the person of its best, most active workers, is marching in the vanguard of restructuring. And there are many problems here, particularly in the local press which is meeting with very strong resistance from the official, bureaucratic apparatus."

Doubts have been created in many people by the point in the Theses dealing with the creation of local soviet presidiums. "Is such an additional superstructure needed? And if presidiums are to be created, let them replace the ispolkoms," two experienced workers in the RSFSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs, who have for many years been connected with soviet organs, write.

I cannot dwell here on all the wishes and suggestions. We endeavor to print the most interesting ones. Many letters are included in the reviews sent regularly to the CPSU Central Committee. Everyone in the editorial office—from chief editor to literary staffer—is working on letters devoted to the Central Committee Theses and the upcoming party conference. Our sincere gratitude goes to all the writers. May this column serve to answer your letters: It is simply not possible to answer every one by mail.

...I reread the letters and telegrams. "We suggest adding to point 5 of the CPSU Central Committee Theses that public glorification of the general secretary and other party leaders is to be considered a violation of party ethics. Tomilkina, Mochalova, Selinov, Chernyrtak, Kishinev City." "Please include in the Theses the point that it is not enough to conquer and finish off bureaucracy. It must be made to work for restructuring. Aleksandr Petrovich Voloshchuk, Tkvarcheli City."

Do you sense behind these lines the intensity of people's thoughts and feelings and their ardent interest? And no one is indifferent.

Program Explores Public Opinion of Theses

LD1206005188 [Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1445 GMT on 11 June broadcasts the 15-minute program, "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference—Thinking Aloud: Soviet People Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses," presented by journalists Ya. Smirnov and B. Simonov. Consisting

of interviews with people from various walks of life, the program reviews the evolution of attitudes toward the Theses. The presenters mention that they have received 7,000 letters since the launch 6 months ago of a questionnaire on restructuring, and that these letters lately have become more critical as people begin to shrug off old concepts and evolve toward a more active civic stance.

A State Committee for Standards employee, who identifies himself as (B.S. Kokhan), says: "We may, indeed, be in a period of transition, but for the moment it is clear that all these innovations are coming up against an administrative apparatus that has evolved over many years, and they are progressing very, very slowly. I even get the impression that they are not moving in the direction we would like."

(Kokhan) is followed by repair mechanic (S.P. Gavrilov), who says: "Where I work, some people want to take up the struggle, but others are simply afraid. If they try to struggle against the bureaucracy, they might be deprived of their bonuses or have some other measures taken against them, right up to being fired under some specious pretext. It goes so far that even when you ask some elementary question about, say, why a certain thing has to be done, they just reply: It's none of your business. Shut up and get on with the work."

An unidentified lawyer then confirms that the restructuring is proceeding with difficulty and appeals for a resolute party conference. "This restructuring in the direction of democracy sometimes takes on monstrous forms, in my view. Take Pamyat, for example. It has sprung up on the basis of democracy, but just take a look at it. I could give numerous other examples where people are using the opportunities for expanding democracy for evil purposes. Democracy is a fine thing, but there still must and ought to be law and order in any state."

(L.I. Galyukova), a public catering worker from Moscow, then states that "the party conference will be a great relief to us all, because people are unhappy about these special order centers and all these special shops. Those who are higher up than us were not elected by us; they simply were appointed." She adds: "All these special shops and rest homes have to be abolished; they are totally unnecessary. Let the higher-ups live like ordinary people. Let everyone live just the way all of us do. This restructuring has really opened our eyes. Before, we used to be deaf and dumb; we did not have the right to say anything about anything at all."

A second woman, (S.E. Arayeva), supports this view: "As long as we have here in Moscow a fourth directorate, and special supplies and deliveries for those above us, there can be no restructuring. We go to polyclinics, and stand around in queues and shops. Let them use our shops and our services as well! They are already living under communism, but where are we living? Everyone knows how bad supplies are! It now has gone so far that sugar is rationed! Only when there is no differentiation among us will there be restructuring, but will this be taken into consideration?"

Further interviewees quote sections of the Theses and express their support.

Summing up the program, Smirnov says: "From the letters and the recordings we have heard in this broadcast, it is not hard to reach the conclusion that the irreversibility of the changes underway is becoming more and more evident. There is a growing number of active supporters of the reforms being implemented on the party's initiative and under its leadership, and it is natural that anyone who is concerned not just about the present day, but about our society's future as well, wants to find his place in transforming socialist potential into a genuine triumph of socialism."

Scientist Opposes Party Control of Science
LD2805221188 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 28 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast; "Towards the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference" feature presented by L.M. Mukhin, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences]

[Text] The decisions of the party conference must be much more specific than are those proposals outlined in the Theses. As for the Theses themselves, one can only agree with them, but one would like these Theses to be embodied in some specific decisions.

I believe that the section of the Theses that is concerned with the development of criticism and self-criticism, and with greater discussion ought to be defined in more specific terms. That is, criticism, self-criticism, and glasnost ought to permeate the whole of society, from top to bottom. At present this is not the case. We have a stratum of society—the top party organs—that is protected against criticism. And I do not believe that this is right. For instance, we do not know why discussions in the Central Committee are very laconic and concise. We are only told who spoke, but not what they spoke about. This is clearly a lack of information.

We know nothing about the discussions in the Central Committee of the party; we do not know to what extent there is a polarization of opinion in the Central Committee of the party. One would like there to be none of this ivory tower seclusion and reticence—which that have become a tradition in our society—after the party conference. This is just one example.

But since I am professionally involved in science, I would like to say a few words about science. I believe that the tradition that has built up over many years of the party controlling science is not right. This has led to tragic consequences in science. We know this by the example of Lysenko, by the example of the struggle against (Eastmanism) and Morganism and against cybernetics. By and large, this was a policy pursued by party penpushers. And therefore, the interaction of the Academy of Science, let's say, with party workers has to be defined more clearly. I realize that this cannot appear in the Theses, but one must now imagine very clearly the possibility of the decisions of the party conference turning out to be as wooly and vague as phrases [words indistinct] are now general. There are very many generalities in the Theses.

So, anyway, here we have a watershed. Here we cannot permit any mistakes. Absolutely clear and specific decisions must be taken, because the continued cost of these mistakes will be very great.

'One-Man Leadership' of Obkoms Deplored
PM3105145788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Letter from Udmurt CPSU Obkom member A. Dimitriyev under the rubric "CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "Platform for Discussion"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference were published yesterday. The questions which are being submitted for its discussion are of vital importance for the party and the country. Now they are the center of attention of Communists and all working people.

The problems which readers suggest should be raised at the party conference have been under discussion for a long time now. Today we are publishing letters and telegrams which the editorial office has recently received. They contain people's initial impressions of the document just read. They also propose that the CPSU Central Committee Theses be discussed in a businesslike way and that the success of restructuring be comprehensively promoted. [passage omitted]

From the Mailbag [subhead]

[Dmitriyev letter] I can say with the utmost responsibility that some things here are not absolutely right at the oblast level of party leadership, things which we cannot continue to ignore. Quite a lot of "political twaddle" about restructuring has been spouted here yet it is on party obkoms and kraykoms that the fate of renewal depends to a very large extent.

I am talking about all this not only in the light of the quite frequent articles in the press but also from my own many years' experience of work as first secretary of a party raykom. There is too much "one-man management" on the part of obkom first secretaries, a phenomenon to which there is no effective counter as yet.

There should be no "one-man leadership" in our midst in the conditions pertaining to the work of a collective and democratic organ such as the party obkom. That is clear. But in practice matters are quite different. For some reason it has become possible for the opinion of the first secretary to prevail over everybody else's.

And everyone knows what becomes of principled criticism: Primarily they try to get rid of the awkward critic by creating the appropriate atmosphere around him and, what is galling, this is not without success.

Vast power is concentrated in the first secretary's hands and furthermore it is poorly monitored. When you think about it you discover bitterly that in everyday life the

instructor or other executive of the CPSU Central Committee, when seeking advice at local level on a particular question, often considers only the opinion of the obkom first secretary and ignores the other obkom members.

This is largely due to the fact that some people are in power too long. I support the idea of limiting the tenure of elected posts to two terms. As for election for a third consecutive term, that rule should be considered more thoroughly.

A. Dimitriyev, member of the Udmurt CPSU Obkom.

Uva settlement, Udmurt ASSR.

IZVESTIYA Editorial Views Party Conference Theses

PM0206085588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 May 88 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "On the Main Salients of Restructuring"]

[Text] A few days ago the party Central Committee plenum approved the Theses for the 19th all-union party conference. They have been published in the press, they are being read and discussed, answers are being sought in them to the questions which have arisen in the course of restructuring and many people are involuntarily comparing the Theses and their arguments with the political documents which used to be declared historic and warmly welcomed by the entire people on the day they appeared.

Historic? But only time and history can answer that. Warmly welcomed by the entire people? We must also wait. But it has been said!

The Theses which have been published are not geared to mindless exultation. Their aim is different: enlisting all those who are not indifferent to the country's destiny to give advice on how to live and work in the future.

Many people have noted that the Theses do not contain the prattle about imposing goals, bright ideals, and so forth we were used to in political documents of previous years. The party and people have been asked to think about things which are today far more real, important, and urgent. The Central Committee Theses above all provide an analysis of what has been done at the first stage of restructuring and of the problems generated by restructuring and then say what ways and means it sees for turning our society into a modern, dynamic, democratic society, how to give socialism a new countenance, and fully reveal our system's humanitarian potential.

The Theses contain a logical continuation of the course adopted 3 years ago by the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum and later approved by the 27th party congress. Here it is understood that only a year ago these ideas could scarcely have been considered in such a profound and comprehensive manner and expressed so

widely and openly as now, today. Indeed, even today, there are many people who may interpret a number of the Theses' provisions as too radical.

These "variant readings" are natural by virtue of the fact that many changes caused by restructuring are entering our life so rapidly and introducing to it so much that is unexpected and new that it is something our consciousness is not accustomed to. The most recent example is the USSR Supreme Soviet session which has just been held and which did not, as used to be the case, automatically approve the Law on Cooperatives, but adopted it with a number of amendments which substantially altered the draft initially submitted. Who only yesterday could have supposed that would happen?

"Variant readings" are also inevitable because we are all different by virtue of our experience, situation, interests, and position in restructuring. And, dialectically reflecting these differences, the Theses do not supplant them with the assertion of our moral and political unity, but acknowledge the establishment of a socialist pluralism of opinions and the possibility of the open comparison of different ideas and interests. Constant constructive political dialogue, the standard of debate, broad information on questions of domestic and foreign policy, the study and consideration of public opinion, the Central Committee Theses say, are called on to become an inalienable feature of our life. But, let us add, not to become such a feature automatically, but as a result of the struggle of the new against the old. The very course of preparation for the conference, the election of delegates to it, which has proceeded in the struggle of two principles—on the one hand, the democratic desire to elect the participants in the party forum and, on the other, the desire to appoint them once again as usual, to impose them from above for "unanimous approval"—have become an example. Yet it is understood that the kind of conversation which will take place at the forthcoming party conference and the decisions it will take depend on who is elected a delegate and how.

The open, free discussion of problems of the past and present and the development of a permanently operating mechanism for the comparison of different views and criticism and self criticism in the party and society—these measures are presented in the Theses as means for the moral normalization of society and the solution of the contradictions which are inherent in it as they are in any society, and for the prevention of errors in resolving very important questions.

The material basis of renewal lies in the sphere of economic and social development, which has occupied a very important place in the party's activity since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum.

In this time much has been done to extricate the economy from the precrisis state into which it was plunged during the years of stagnation.

As a result of the efforts which have been made the development of negative trends in the economy has been successfully overcome. That does not mean, however, that an end has been put to the old expenditure-based economy.

The document's third section is devoted to the comprehensive development and maximum utilization, in the course of restructuring, of the intellectual and spiritual potential contained in the development of science, education, and culture and this section frankly states that although positive advances have appeared in the development of science, there have been no substantial changes in scientific and technical progress. The slow rate of assimilation of scientific and technical innovations has led to a lag not only in a number of important sectors of technology but also in science itself, whose developments have often gone no further than the laboratories. That is why its conclusion is correct: It is necessary not only to strengthen the testing and experimental base of science and create new structural formations but also to seek effective mechanisms for including the labor collectives' interests in this important matter.

Noting the raising of the general tone of the country's political life achieved as a result of the assertion of the norms of glasnost, truthfulness, criticism, self-criticism, democratization, and self management, the Theses acknowledge that this is as yet only the lead-in to the real, in-depth and comprehensive democratization of society, to the overcoming of working people's alienation from the authorities, to the reform of the entire political system of society, to the creation of a socialist legal state.

Of course, the Theses are theses and not a detailed elaboration of positions concerning this political system or legal socialist state that is the guarantee of the rights and freedoms of the individual. That is why the press and in particular IZVESTIYA is called on not only to explain these concepts to readers but also to consider their opinions and wishes on this score.

The party. A large section—the fifth—section of the Theses is devoted to it and notes that the party has not only acted as the initiator of restructuring but is also beginning restructuring with itself, with its own style and methods. The thrust of this restructuring is the resurrection and development of the Leninist traditions of party life. The resolute rejection of methods based on issuing orders, the struggle against bureaucracy in its own ranks, the overcoming of Communist arrogance, the division of the functions of party, state, and economic organs, the renunciation of "allocation schedules" in forming party ranks, the changing of the procedure for forming elected party organs, sociopolitical testimonials for Communists as a means for the party's self-purging and consolidation, the resurrection in the party of an atmosphere of openness, debate, criticism and self criticism, party comradeship and discipline, collectivism, and personal responsibility—these and other means of consolidating the party

have to be discussed not only at the forthcoming party conference by its delegates but also during preparation for it by all those who wish to do so.

This should apply to no less an extent to the soviets—the fully empowered organs of the people's representation. Successfully combining the principle of statehood and self-management, they have fully proved their viability but to this day have not fully revealed their inherent democratic potential. Worse, they have lost a large part of the powers inherent in them while the soviet ispolkoms have in practice usurped the power to which they are obliged to subordinate themselves. And not only have they usurped it. A large part of IZVESTIYA's mail consists of requests to resolve problems which the ispolkoms can and must resolve locally.

But it is not only this aspect of present-day life which is reflected in the Theses—they suggest how to overcome stagnation. The arsenal of means and methods of the soviets' work, born of life and tested by life, is rich and varied. And today, in the course of the development of economic reform, there is a possibility of expanding this arsenal, putting the soviets' activity on a firm economic basis and linking them with the labor collective councils. On the eve of the conference we await readers' suggestions, wishes, and descriptions of their experience—everything useful must be put into play.

The same ideas—the ideas of democratization—are developed in the section of the Theses devoted to the Soviet federation as part of our political system.

On all these and other salients, we read in the Theses, it is essential to make further headway, revealing the potential contained in the nature of socialist society and resolutely eradicating distortions and deformations which are the result of authoritarian methods of management alien to socialism and of deviation from Lenin's principles of state life.

A major legal reform will consolidate the positive changes in life. It should be attended by the principle that everything not forbidden by law is permitted.

Socialism is the creation of the masses. But the masses are social groups with the most diverse interests. To express them they create their own public organizations—without relying on them the political system cannot function to the full. Recently there has been a sharp increase in the number of these organizations and in their diversity and this accords with Soviet people's increased social activeness, conditioned by restructuring, glasnost, and democratization. The name of informal groups, or "informals," hastily given to them is obviously inaccurate, first because all other organizations are thus classified as "formal." Second, on finding their feet, many of the societies, foundations, groups, and so forth which are being created rapidly not only "make themselves formal" but also often become bureaucratic. How to make them the state's real partners

in implementing people's rights and interests? How to represent them in the local soviets of people's deputies to resolve problems of social and spiritual life? How to enshrine their rights in legislative form? All these questions are merely outlined in the Theses. Their more specific elaboration and discussion once again lies ahead. And once again no sober opinion here will be superfluous.

The international aspect of restructuring lies in the new thinking, in the overcoming of the stereotypes which have accumulated over the years, in our country's new, more dignified position in the world, in the improvement of the overall climate, in the reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

"The party will build its policy by clearly basing itself on the humane principles and goals of socialism and seek to achieve the implementation of its policy by humane and democratic means," the Theses note. Man is at the center of this policy.

It may boldly be said that the Theses which contain 10 sections—10 main salients for joint actions by the party and people continuing the revolution—are addressed to Man, to the citizen and patriot of our fatherland, the convinced builder of a new world.

The Theses have been published. Each person can express his opinion of them and assess them. That is important. Nonetheless today specific deeds are more important than any words. Deeds contain the assets of restructuring, the main guarantee of transformations in our life.

PRAVDA Editorial Examines Party Conference Theses

*PM3105093788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 May 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Editorial: "Consulting the People. The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference—A Platform for Debate"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference, which is due to open 29 June, were published the day before yesterday. This tremendously important document immediately occupied a central position in the life of the party and the country and evoked a broad international response.

Approved by the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum, the Theses constitute a platform for debate on vitally important questions. They present in organic unity what has already been begun, what has been accomplished during the 3 years since the memorable April plenum, and what still has to be accomplished at the present stage of restructuring in order to sweep away the obstacles standing in its path and give a new and powerful boost to the revolutionary process of renewal.

The CPSU Central Committee Theses have been submitted for nationwide discussion. Everyone is entitled to express his views on them, Communists and nonparty people alike. This discussion will be held at open meetings of Communists in primary and shop party organizations and party groups, in labor collectives, military units and formations, in public organizations, in the press, and on television and radio. A lot of responsible work lies ahead and there is not that much time left in which to do it, and this must be borne in mind. Full and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, our entire party and ideological aktiv, and the delegates elected for the conference are all called upon to play an active part in this work.

On what should attention focus? First, the discussion of the Central Committee Theses will make it possible to more profoundly reveal to everyone the social meaning of our transformations. Second, the Theses were published for the purpose of creative discussion and debate. This means that it is necessary to resolutely abandon formalism and stereotypes and the stage management of these discussions, enabling everyone wishing to do so to express his opinion. It is clear that what is needed is not "general and overall" approval but a most serious and businesslike interpretation of what has been done in the country and in every labor collective during the years of restructuring, a critical analysis and comparison of viewpoints and opinions. Particular importance will attach to proposals aimed at creating reliable guarantees of the irreversibility of restructuring. The participants in discussion must rise above local and group interests and must be guided by the interests of the country.

The discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses must be of a specific nature. It is well known that restructuring has entered its second stage, a more complex and most responsible stage, when its ideas have been translated into the everyday language of practice and directly affect every person. It is necessary to determine more clearly where restructuring is successfully gathering pace, where it is progressing only slowly, and where it has been reduced to nothing more than hot air. Why do things like this happen? Why is it that advanced methods of labor organization are poorly implemented in some regions or collectives, who is to blame for holding back the development of glasnost and democratization, where is the braking mechanism still operating and why, and what specifically must be done to demolish it—these and other questions must be answered by participants in the discussion, and this demands serious thinking, a critical and fresh look at things, and principledness. A look at things not from the fence as it were, but the look of a keen and civically minded steward.

Today we have taken a resolute stance against the bureaucratism and departmentalism which have taken root in various administrative components. But it must not be forgotten that the effect of fear of the new, passiveness, indifference, and conservatism can also be

felt in some strata of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. During the discussion of the Central Committee Theses we will speak bluntly and frankly about the further strengthening of law and order and discipline, about slipshod workers and absentees, about idlers and pilferers, about those whose words diverge from their deeds. We will resolutely reject parasitical sentiments and the stagnation period habit of consuming more than we produce.

At the same time it is necessary to energetically back those who are marching in the vanguard of restructuring, the toilers and foremen of restructuring, people who are boldly struggling for lease and team contracts, people who are setting the tone in new forms and methods of labor organization, fighters for scientific and technical progress.

The party is banking mainly on man and his spiritual and creative potential, his personal interest, his devotion to the cause of socialism, and his personal experience for success in restructuring. If after a meeting, held in an atmosphere of debate and heated arguments, people become even more clearly aware in their hearts and minds of their role in restructuring and really sense their key importance, this would mean that the discussion has left its mark and has been beneficial. People, from worker to leader of any rank, must be judged not by their words and assurances, no matter how ambitious they might be, but by their specific actions and only by their actions, by their desire to develop restructuring and support it.

Of course, this applies primarily to Communists. Now is the time to really check party members' true qualities—their ideological conviction and political maturity, their honesty and loyalty to the party cause. From this moment on, every Communist and every primary party organization are called upon to conduct their entire ideological, political, and propaganda work in the spirit and on the basis of the Central Committee Theses.

The discussion is not a polite exchange of opinions, it is not a matter of reporting support to higher-ranking authorities, of reporting that a meeting was held and gave its approval. The discussion of the Theses is a matter of collective creativity and quest, of making decisions on how to live and work in the future. There is no doubt that numerous specific and valuable suggestions will be made during the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses. These suggestions must not vanish without trace, as so often happens; they must be taken in hand and immediately put to use for the sake of the cause, with the collective being regularly briefed on the course of their implementation.

The mass media have a special role to play in the discussion. The course of debates and the diversity of opinions must be given the fullest coverage possible. This must be done from the human angle, reporting

people's opinions and stance. When bringing local problems to light in their depth and diversity it is necessary to focus attention on the ways to solve them, giving scope to fresh ideas and approaches and to unconventional creative thinking, conducting a vivid journalistic conversation. At the same time, excessive haste, rushing ahead, and enthusiasm for secondary problems or problems which are clearly unrealistic at present—all of which occur at times—will not promote the interests of the cause.

Economic leaders must play an active part in the debates. Unfortunately there are still fairly frequent instances when they avoid and are afraid of frank conversations with working people in shops, in teams, or at their places of work, and prefer the official style of contacts. It must be firmly borne in mind that the time of discussions and decisionmaking "behind closed doors" has gone. It has receded irretrievably into the past.

Party organizations have basically completed the elections of delegates for the 19th all-union party conference. Who else if not they should take part in the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses, share their assessments and reflections in speeches to working people or through the press, and describe their personal stance and the mandates given to them for the 19th all-union party conference.

The nationwide debate that is being launched in the country on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee Theses is the party's consultation with the people. It will enable the party conference to make profoundly considered decisions making the revolutionary restructuring irreversible.

Role of State Orders System Discussed
PM3105130588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[D. Valovoy article under the rubric "Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "State Orders. Principled Discussion on State Orders Recently Held at USSR Council of Ministers Presidium Session"—bold-face as published]

[Text] Cases attesting that certain ministries are operating in the old way are regularly cited in the press and the other mass media: First, at many enterprises state orders make up 100 percent of output. Second, a considerable proportion of state orders is not backed up by material resources. And third, output for state orders often fails to find consumers. The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference state:

"One cannot fail to see that the measures to implement the economic reform are considerably paralyzed by the bureaucratic position of a number of ministries, departments, and economic organs. In many cases the former

administrative diktat is essentially maintained under the guise of state orders, economic normatives, and other new management methods."

Taking account of the fundamental importance of state orders and the implementation of the radical economic reform, the government instructed the USSR Gosplan and Gossnab together with other central departments to generalize initial experience of the planning of state orders, to reveal the shortcomings in this work, and to outline ways of eradicating them when compiling the plans for 1989 and 1990. During the discussion of this question at a session of the all-union government presidium a number of ministries and departments were seriously criticized. N. Ryzhkov in the chair cited many cases of unprincipled approaches in defining state orders. When acting in the role of producer-executant [proizvoditel-ispolnitel], the ministries strive to adopt as few state orders as possible, thereby giving "their own" enterprises as much autonomy and room to maneuver as possible in formulating their production plans and concluding contracts. But when they become clients and consumers they do a complete about-face and propose including in state orders a very extensive list of articles, including spares. Thus, the medical profession has elevated tablets and pipettes to the status of state orders. Some people are trying to preserve this "procedure" for 1989, too.

V. Ginko, first deputy minister of railways, wrote to the USSR Council of Ministers:

"The exclusion of girders for switches and bridge girders from state orders will increase the existing shortage of the aforesaid materials. In this connection we request that ties and switch and bridge girders be retained on the itemized order lists."

A request that the government retain the aforesaid girders on the itemized order lists was also made by O. Makarov, first deputy minister of transport construction.

In a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers V. Klyuyev, USSR minister of light industry, states that "production of certain kinds of output vitally necessary for the fulfillment of statewide and social tasks is currently economically disadvantageous for enterprises." Just what did the minister suggest in order to eliminate this position? I quote: "Special-purpose goods should be additionally included in state orders: gauze and cotton wool for health needs, woolen fabrics for school uniforms in public education, sport and leisure goods...."

V. Klyuyev proposed a more extensive list of articles obtained by the ministry from elsewhere [so storony]. He asked that the itemized state order lists should include:

For the agro-industrial complex: mulberry silkworm cocoons; genuine flax fiber from the total production of flax fiber; fine and semifine wool from the total amount

of wool purchases; skins and pelts, with the emphasis on pelts obtained from cage fur farming; and coarse leather, pigskin, and fine leather from total leather raw materials, including sheepskin for clothing and other uses;

For the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry: chemical fibers and yarns—everything, including artificial textile fibers and yarns and synthetic textile fibers and yarns; dyes and textile treatment [tekstilno-vspomogatelnyy] substances; and polyurethane compounds based on complex polyesters;

For the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry: granulated compounds based on divinyl styrene thermoelastic plastic;

And for the machine-building complex: spares for technological equipment installed at light industry enterprises.

AUCCTU Chairman S. Shalayev sent N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, a long list of cheap goods requesting that they be included in state orders. These include:

Young people's coats—up to R130.

Children's coats—up to R25.

Young people's suits—up to R100.

Children's trousers—up to R8.

Children's dresses—up to R11.

Raincoats for young people—up to R70.

Leather boots for schoolchildren—up to R11.

Ankle boots—up to R15.

Shoes—up to R6.

Boots for adults—up to R40.

Ankle boots—up to R8.

Shoes—up to R10.

Sandals—up to R7.

No doubt about it, people need sandals. And gauze too. Railroad workers find it even harder to get by without girders for switches. But does anyone seriously think that at a time when the independence of economic links is being expanded the production and distribution of these items should be carried out at all-union government level?

This approach to the formulation of state orders was condemned at the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium as an attempt to retain administrative edict methods. Past experience convincingly shows that the inclusion from above in enterprises' plans of items that are disadvantageous to them failed to produce the desired results. In order to improve the practice of planning state orders in 1989 N. Ryzhkov demanded that there be a resolute turn toward economic methods and that better use be made of material incentives. Production of goods that society needs should be advantageous for producers both materially and morally! In this connection the following question was asked:

"Why do producers around the world chase orders—particularly state orders, using any means, including bribes, to obtain them—while our enterprises avoid state orders like the plague? This situation can only be overcome by expanding and strengthening economically accountable (*khozraschetnyy*) relations and enhancing partners' mutual responsibility. It is necessary to give producers an economic interest in making full use of production capacities and in providing additional incentives for the timely and complete fulfillment of state orders. It is time to put a end to illusions about the omnipotence of directives and various administrative directives."

M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly said that the new tasks cannot be resolved using the old methods! This wholly applies to the organization of the state order system, too. In showing concern for the production of cheap goods S. Shalayev is pursuing a noble aim. He writes that "during the expansion of economically accountable activity the process of the 'erosion' of cheap goods, which has a very negative effect on the living standard of low-income population groups, has been accelerated." But old methods are being proposed to eliminate this position. After all, goods for children, young people, and elderly people were previously included in the plan on a directive basis, special decisions were even taken for many of them, yet the process of their "erosion" continued and expanded. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that if, under present conditions, an enterprise produces cheap goods on command from "above," it will be unable to guarantee the collective's wages.

In this regard it seems to me that trade unions can make a more major contribution to restructuring the organization of wages. A clearly abnormal situation has emerged in this area: Workers are paid to all intents and purposes on the basis of the labor-intensiveness of the output they produce, while an enterprise's wage fund is "tied" to the volume of commodity (gross) output. Is it right to force a collective to produce cheap goods if wage norms have been made dependent on the production volume achieved in rubles—a volume which has increased for decades as a result of the "erosion" of cheap products and the assimilation of more and more expensive new products?

The AUCCTU together with other departments has tasked ministries with "completing in 1987-1988 the creation of sectorial systems for administering the labor-intensiveness of output.... Methods for forming wage funds are to be elaborated, while ensuring differentiation in the norms determining the funds used for remuneration according to the level to which planned or normative labor-intensiveness is achieved...."

How is this task being resolved? Its implementation is a realistic and economically substantiated way to create favorable conditions for the production of cheap goods.

Everything in the economy is interlinked and interdependent. Clear-cut organization of the state order system with strict observance of the Law on the Enterprise requires resolution of the whole range of measures outlined by the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum. These were discussed in a meaningful and interesting manner by the speakers at the session.

The presidium instructed specific executants to formulate a draft "Statute on the Procedure for Formulating State Orders for 1989 and 1990" taking account of the results of the discussion and to submit it for ratification. It was proposed that the questions of a differentiated approach to sectors when determining the volume and makeup of state orders and the relationship between state orders and control figures, of economic incentives to enterprises for the acceptance of state orders, and of the procedure for reimbursing collectives for any material damage caused by changes to state orders be additionally examined. A desire was expressed for more detailed work on the question of how to ensure balance between production and demand for output not included in state orders and how to give substance to the rights and duties of central departments during the organization of this work.

In the current year many economic leaders have attempted with the help of state orders to retain the former procedure for planning detailed itemized product lists at the level of the Gosplan and sectors. The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium devoted particular attention to the fact that the planned significant reduction in the makeup and volume of state orders requires a radical restructuring of the work to interlink the production activity of economic components at all levels of economic management and to improve the direct ties between producers and customers. This position is an immutable condition for the normal functioning of the national economy as a whole and each enterprise individually.

Recently the press has been increasingly actively stating a fundamentally different approach to state orders. Certain economists propose giving production collectives new independence. These collectives would find customers and clients for themselves and agree with them on what and how much should be produced for what price. This view was also voiced at the all-union government

presidium session. To be frank, it was basically a question of the elimination of centralized administration and planning. In the opinion of the advocates of this approach, "the economy under socialism should be self-regulating, just as it is under capitalism." "No physical indicators!"

Our economy was on the verge of a crisis. There had been no noticeable improvement in the last few 5-year plans in meeting the demand for prime necessities, the scale of shortages had increased, and prices of a number of goods had risen. The advantages of a planned system do not seem very convincing under such circumstances. In the capitalist countries there is a choice between expensive and cheap goods—for the poor and the unemployed, who receive a pittance in welfare. The capitalist countries pursue technical innovation, while we postpone innovation for decades. In the prevailing situation proposals about complete independence for enterprises seem attractive, and have therefore become fashionable. But fashions come and go, while objective economic laws remain.

The advantages of the centralization and concentration of production are common knowledge. Their correct utilization makes it possible to significantly improve production efficiency. But the administrative edict system of economic management that arose during the Stalin personality cult period not only ignored objective economic laws but even largely contradicted...common sense. To make judgments about the advantages of the planned system of economic management on the basis of these management methods is to go from one extreme to the other and throw the baby out with the bathwater. Can a fundamentally new machine be objectively assessed if during tests the regulations governing its operation are blatantly broken and sometimes ignored altogether?

In the opinion of journalist V. Selyunin, "it's either one or the other: Either we are unable to make use of the advantage that has fallen to us, or it just isn't an advantage. Incidentally, in either case the practical conclusion is the same."

But why is the *a priori* "conclusion the same" both when there is an advantage and when there isn't? And need we rush to abandon the "advantage that has fallen to us" without looking into the matter?

The great diversity of output under the conditions of technical progress is used as an "argument" against centralized planning. Thus, N. Shmelev writes about "the fruitless attempts to centrally plan the entire itemized list of our industrial production, which runs to more than 24 million items." But just a minute! Such a task has never been set. Planning millions of items at the national economic level is tantamount to trying to indicate street names and house numbers on a globe. All cities and settlements are indicated on maps of individual regions. By the "geographical analogy" it is sufficient

to take account of just several hundred of the most important types of output in order to balance the national economy on the Gosplan "globe." Tens of thousands of varied items ("streets" and "houses") will then be produced out of the metal and grain. But they are only of interest to their producers, their production-sharing partners, and the consumer.

The appearance of disproportions in our country is explained not by the expansion of the itemized list of articles, but by the fact that for the last 20 years the targets for the 170 most important types of product under state control have not once been fulfilled. For some of these products the underfulfillment has run to 20-30 percent and even more. In each individual case this has caused a chain reaction of disruption and disproportions, which has created "planning anarchy." This in turn has been an "objective" excuse for a chain reaction in downgrading plans to fit the actual situation. As a result, billions of rubles in unearned wages for unproduced output have annually entered circulation and exacerbated the imbalance between the supply of goods and the money supply (*tovarnaya i denezhnaya massa*). With such a "planning" system maintaining proportions has become harder and harder. One "way out" was the artificial expansion of the itemized products list controlled from above. The larger the list became, the less manageable was the economy, and lack of balance permeated every pore of our economy and became a byword.

The situation would shape up differently if the targets indicated on the Gosplan "globe" were completely fulfilled (all the more so given corresponding reserves for a "rainy day"). This would create a normal situation for the 100-percent fulfillment of economic contracts which would indicate everything needed not only for balance by sector and region, but also for the satisfaction of the population's effective demand (the contracts would indicate not only "street" names but "house numbers"). The kinds of item and goods that are specifically needed for this are determined by consumer and producer, that is, by the contracting parties. Are such details really needed on the Gosplan "globe?" Undoubtedly not. Many of them are also not needed at the sectorial level. Just as street names and house numbers are most often of interest only to those who live there or are visiting. Are we really interested in how many thousand refrigerators, televisions, and cars are "fitted" with what kind of item? Not at all! What is important to us is their quality, their useful life, and...their price.

The utilization of the advantages of socialist production based on social ownership presupposes the utilization of the entire system of objective economic laws—the law of planned proportional development, the law of value, and the law of distribution according to labor. The scientific development of a mechanism for using them in practice is one of the central tasks in the creation of a cost-cutting economic management mechanism.

CPSU Role in Society Needs Legal Definition
PM0070613518 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 May 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Philological Sciences Professor V. Gorokhov in a feature headed "Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses" and under the rubric "Party Democracy": "To Avoid Mistakes"]

[Text] Moscow—Among the multitude of problems currently being discussed by Communists and nonparty people the problem of improving the CPSU's activity occupies a special place. We learned long ago that the state of affairs in the party has a decisive effect on the life of society. Therefore, intraparty questions are of universal interest and concern and affect everyone.

The most worrying element in the history of society and the party is the possibility of mistakes being repeated. The I.V. Stalin cult of personality, N.S. Khrushchev's willful actions, and L.I. Brezhnev's infantile "stagnation" policy have a common feature: These political phenomena arose as a result of the absence of a real mechanism ensuring monitoring of the leaders' actions by the masses (I will note in parentheses that the cult of personality mentality is exceptionally tenacious and is a distinctive factor in our current debate: Just as under Stalin, all the successes were notched up to the "leader," and then all the errors were subsequently put down to figures who had quit the political arena).

To avoid such errors it is necessary not only to deepen intraparty democracy as much as possible. This is correctly stated in the CPSU Central Committee Theses. It is equally important, I believe, to put the party itself in a position which, on the one hand, would undoubtedly guarantee its leading role in society and, on the other hand, give working people the actual right, protected by the law, to make exacting demands on the party. In other words, it is a matter of the party's constitutional status in our society.

There is still much to think about and decide here. The USSR Constitution says that the CPSU is the nucleus of the political system. This formula is metaphorical, it is appropriate in poetry or in the language of journalism. But metaphors are out of place in juridical documents. What does "nucleus" mean? Would it not be better to precisely define the rights and duties of party organizations in the system of relations between the party and other political institutions?

There is a clear desire now to delimit the functions of party and soviet bodies. One readily assumes that as the radical economic reform deepens and public life is further democratized, the actual political situation in the country will change, as will the nature of the party's relations with soviet, economic, and public organizations. A thorough prognosis is now essential. And if, at the party conference, it is going to be difficult to envisage all the details, then the concept, the methodological

principles of the party's collaboration with socialist society's other political institutions in restructuring conditions have to be elaborated now. In my view, this concept is essentially based on the democratic interdependence of the rights and duties of party organizations at all levels, starting with primary organizations and ending with the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. It is a "double" democratic check of party committees' activity—intraparty monitoring (of which much has already been said in PRAVDA articles) and democratic monitoring of party work by the whole people.

Party committees must bear full—intraparty and "foreign policy"—responsibility for the consequences of any decisions they make. One can and must rely on self-monitoring and on self-assessments and one must assume that the party committee's collective leading body is capable of accurately and comprehensively analyzing the positive and negative aspects of its work. But one must not fondly hope that the self-assessments are certain to be balanced. Past experience shows that a misconceived "honor of the regiment" and, sometimes, considerations that have no bearing on the matter, can distort the position of the elective party body and present a false picture of its activity.

I believe the CPSU Statutes and the USSR Constitution have to be "coupled" together and, maybe, a Law on the Party will have to be adopted enshrining the CPSU's leading role in state life and recording fully and exhaustively the rights and duties of party organizations. The following example will explain my idea. The CPSU Central Committee general secretary has supreme executive power in the USSR. He represents not only the party, but the state as a whole and makes decisions at top level both on domestic and international matters. In my view, this position should be recorded in the USSR Constitution.

Lawyer Argues Against Parliamentarianism
PM0030609008 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 May 88 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Doctor of Juridical Sciences S. Solov'yeva by IZVESTIYA observer Yu. Feofanov under the rubric "19th Party Conference: Reflections on the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Democracy, Legality, Power"—boldface as published]

[Text] [Feofanov] Someone once observed: If one person abstains at a vote in the Supreme Soviet, there will be a revolution. Please don't think, Sofya Vladimirovna, that this is a frivolous approach to a serious topic. Especially since the recent session differed markedly from previous ones. All the same.... Let us suppose the national economic plan is being discussed. Deputies get up and say that their regions' interests have not been taken into account, and ask the Gosplan to consider them. A report is delivered on the final version. A deputy's opinion has not been taken into account, and there is no explanation why. All the same, he votes "for." Yet he is a responsible

person, sometimes a major leader. What lies behind this? Fear of losing his seat? But the picture is the same at soviets at every level. What is the rayon soviet deputy afraid of? Is it indifference?

[Solovyeva] A number of factors combine to form the basis of a practice that became established many decades ago. Paradoxical as it may seem, the struggle "for Soviet power" is not over yet, although we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Soviet state. Why is this? Could the reason lie in the nature of the soviets as authorities? Lenin rated them far higher than the parliamentary form of government. The soviet organization, he stressed, has swept aside the negative aspects of bourgeois parliamentarianism. The soviets are a "working corporation": They themselves adopt the laws and they themselves organize their execution. But the soviets have not succeeded in approaching this ideal model.

Do not think that my main argument is to call on Lenin's authority. We can assume our readers know their country's history. So let us dot the "i's" forthwith—no difficulties or, as some scholars put it, "extraordinary conditions" could or should have justified deviation from the principles of the organization and activity of Soviet power. Not even war. There are values that cannot be forsaken in any circumstances. You cannot, for instance, be half a communist, you cannot be half religious, you cannot, if you will excuse me, be slightly pregnant.

So it is with the soviets. You cannot have soviets half diluted by a parliamentary system, as my colleague and your recent interviewee B. Kurashvili demands. That is like attaching a steam engine to an airplane.

[Feofanov] What is it that particularly worries you about the experience of parliamentarianism? The readers, if they know history, could, alas, also tell you many negative things about the soviets as organs of power. You say that yourself. You say they should not have departed from their principles—but they did depart from them, they "let go of power." Could this have been precisely because "two powers"—legislative and administrative—merged into one?

[Solovyeva] No, I do not agree. We failed to realize the superiority over parliamentarianism that is inherent in the very nature of the soviets: people's power, the direct resolution of state affairs by the people. Yes, we let it go. The leader (vozhd) and his apparatus usurped power, took it away from the soviets, and also from the party. But we should not return to parliament, but to the soviet in its original sense.

The syndrome of disregarding the soviets still persists in the conservative section of our apparatus. And that is the main brake on restructuring. This section ignores even the decisions of congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums. And you want the ordinary deputy to cope with this, when he himself was chosen by that same

apparatus. The ordinary deputy has nothing to fear. But year after year, a "unanimous" vote was regarded as a way of demonstrating our unity to the whole world. Incidentally, if some "stubborn" deputy did vote against, you may be sure that the next day's newspapers would print "unanimous." I must address that reproach to you too. Although, it is true, not nowadays.

[Feofanov] Very well. We have established one of the causes of the disease: The apparatus crushed everything, the command-and-administer system subjugated the representative organs and gave rise to the habit of mechanically "voting for" decisions sent down "from above." But if you think about it, those decisions come "from below," from the executive power to the legislative, from the subordinate to the chief. How can all this be put to rights? You do not agree with B. Kurashvili's recommendations on introducing elements of parliamentarianism into our state practice. To be frank, I too doubted whether these proposals were realistic. It is indeed like trying to adapt a different motor to fit your car. But on the other hand, if you assess the soviets' position honestly, however hard we drove them with "our" motor, they stalled.

[Solovyeva] We did not really try—that was the problem. It was all talk. Only the democratization of power can start the motor. In the fifties, after the 20th congress, the extraordinary system of administration was only cleansed of blatant instances of lawlessness and cruelty, it was not touched to the core. But once again the question arises: how to do it. B. Kurashvili says: We must transform the soviets from a "form of support democracy" into a form of "participation democracy." Fine words. But what lies behind them? Nothing, in my opinion. The goal we should pursue is to turn the soviets not into a form of "participation democracy," but into **decisive organs of state power**, with everything accountable to them and everything monitored by them. There is nothing "radical" about the proposed introduction of elements of parliamentarianism into our state practice. It only looks radical. Half a parliament is basically half a reform.

The Central Committee Theses raise the question of the in-depth reform of all structures and methods of activity of the soviets, backed up by legal guarantees. And the question of the relationship between the party and the soviets is placed in the forefront. We will achieve nothing unless we overcome the stereotyped thinking that has grown up and the political traditions that have not justified themselves in practice, but have put down deep roots, including the substitution of the state and party apparatus for representative power.

[Feofanov] Yes, the Theses touched on one of the most complex and burning issues. But how can the functions of the party and the state be demarcated, if they are mixed up all the time? I remember what happened 25 years ago when an article appeared in IZVESTIYA, signed by an obkom first secretary and the oblispolkom

chairman, against joint decisions. The following day we had to print an editorial on stepping up the party's leading role. The article was not actually described as a mistake, but there was a very clear reference to the fallaciousness of that position. You will understand that it was not the editorial office that initiated the editorial. But on the other hand, if the raykom, obkom, and so forth has to lead, what can they do about direct instructions taking the form of commands? Then it is thought that if a resolution comes from the party organ too, it has more authority. And not without reason.

[Solovyeva] Since 1957, six resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers on increasing the role of the soviets have not been fully or consistently fulfilled. And how could they be fulfilled, when the resolutions themselves contained total confusion? Think about it, the Council of Ministers is an organ that is accountable to and monitored by the soviet. And it signs a document on increasing the role of the soviets! That is not a formality. It shows the degree of disregard for constitutional law. It is therefore not only a question of reorganization, parliamentarianization, and so forth. It is a question of putting everything to rights. I often hear legal scholars proposing the utilization of the well known parliamentary theory of the "division of powers" in our state legal practice. Personally, I think that is not a retreat to October, from where we should begin everything, but to way back before October.

Every one of the concepts that exist in the arsenal of statehood: political leadership, state power, state administration—has a social value. And they exist not in the state in general, but in the Soviet state, the socialist state.

We have to start from scratch and build our own state, not someone else's. Yes, it has been the case that the responsibility for the state of affairs rests mainly with the party organs. Only recently this system was supported in every way by public opinion and the mass media and substantiated in scientific works. Raykom secretaries are still going on television to talk about intensive techniques and cultivation method. The housing construction program fails in Tyumen: The gorkom first secretary appears on the screen. Why not the local authority head?

The elimination of the sector departments of raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, and Central Committee, which is to be discussed at the party conference, is, of course, radical. But reducing the party apparatus without at the same time strengthening the state system can only cause chaos and give ammunition to the opponents of restructuring. The demagogues will attribute everything to the lessening of the CPSU's role.

[Feofanov] An RSFSR Supreme Soviet session was held only recently. The question of housing construction through the year 2000 was discussed. Is it necessary to point out how important this problem is? All the same, I thought: You can speak on this subject, but surely there

is nothing to discuss. Could any of the deputies come out against it? Of course not. Could there be any proposals that would change the program radically? Hardly—everything was considered, calculated, and measured by the Gosplan, Gossnab, and so forth—that is, the apparatus. I have a dream: What if they were to raise another question at the session—that of continuing the construction of the Yelabuga tractor plant, which is on everyone's lips now, or stopping it. First, it would interest all the deputies; second, they would really have to study the matter without fail, before they could say "yes" or "no." And there could be no abstentions here. At the moment the agenda is not drawn up by the deputies themselves, and so such a contentious issue would hardly find its way onto the agenda. That is the kind of mechanism you could introduce, that is how you could in practice make the soviet not an organ that approves everything, but an organ that decides the most urgent problems....

[Solovyeva] The Central Committee Theses reflect this problem. Suppose the housing construction program that was discussed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet had been formulated from the outset not in the offices of the Gosplan and Gossnab, but in the commissions, by the deputies. Not discussed at the last stage in a day and a half at the session, but actually formulated by them. I think that would be an entirely different matter. Incidentally, the deputies will not resolve the question of the Yelabuga construction without a detailed study, expert assessments by specialists, public discussion, and consideration of public opinion. It is not enough to say "yes" or "no." You have to say it authoritatively. But to that end you need a soviet that operates permanently. I absolutely agree with the provision in the theses on releasing deputies from their jobs to work full-time on the soviet and its organs. I would propose that one-third of deputies be full-time. The expenditure on maintaining them would not be burdensome, because 1.5 million deputies of rural and settlement soviets need not be released from their jobs. Moreover, the expenditure on maintaining full-time deputies should be borne not only by the state, but also by the CPSU, public organizations, enterprises, and cooperatives out of funds set up specially "for the fulfillment of work on elected organs."

At present sessions of the supreme soviets are convened twice a year and their work lasts 1-2 days, while at kray and oblast level it usually lasts 4-5 hours. In the majority of union republics local soviets, including rural and settlement soviets, have to convene four times a year. If you consider that one session is devoted to examining plans and another hears the ispolkom's report, two sessions are left for all the main questions of economic and social development. What kind of "decisive" role for the soviet is this? Therefore I want to support what the Theses say on this score. It would be a good thing to restore the procedure for sessions that Lenin argued for, in the report at the 11th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress. "It is necessary to ensure," he stressed, "that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee works more energetically and assembles correctly

for the sessions, which should be longer.... If the sessions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee are longer, they will be divided into sections and subcommissions and will be able to monitor work more strictly." These provisions were reflected in a resolution of the 11th party congress.

The historical experience of the holding of local soviet sessions and congresses is interesting. Thus under the RSFSR Constitution of 1918 provincial and regional congresses were convened at least once every 3 months, district congresses once a month, the city soviet met at least once a week, and the village soviet twice a week.

[Feofanov] But if these schedules were introduced now, I do not think the deputies would know what to do. In principle it is no exaggeration to say that we elect the worthiest people to the soviets. The apparatus has chosen worthy people. The real question, in my view, is: Has it chosen the right people to work on the soviet? Clearly if we want to have a decisive, effective soviet, the representation on it must be appropriate. It seems to me that the soviet should not be formed only by the labor collectives, but by public, unofficial, and informal organizations on the basis of residential districts. And only on that basis. The theses speak of the reform of the electoral system. The soviet is a territorial authority. The working people living in the residential district are the same people who work at enterprises. But in the labor collective there are people from different rayons, what do they care about the civic qualities of "someone else's" deputy? In my opinion the invariable or predominant nomination of candidates in the labor collective is a stereotype that we are afraid to get rid of.

[Solovyeva] I cannot agree with you there. That is not what the democratization of the electoral system means. First of all we should make it a rule to include at least two candidates on the ballot paper. Perhaps we should use the experience of certain socialist countries where the highest-level leaders are elected to parliament on the basis of a list. This system could also be established for the election of local soviet ispolkoms. But at the same time immutable rules should be laid down—no more than two terms. And no exceptions to that, for anyone. I consider it essential to have a rule that the post of deputy is incompatible with the holding of responsible posts in the state administrative apparatus. This is mentioned in the theses. But the nomination of candidates solely on the basis of residential districts is dubious. You could try to elect rural and settlement soviets and the soviets of small cities in the way you propose. But for oblast and rayon soviets in large cities, in my view people should be nominated both by residential district and in the labor collectives.

[Feofanov] The development of democracy, as you have already said, is inconceivable without strengthening the rule of law. The soviet as an authority must be first and foremost the guarantor of the rule of law. It seems to me that questions of the state of legality on the territory

should be discussed at every session. But at the same time the soviet is responsible for the fulfillment of plans and the opening up of new production facilities. What if a production unit is harmful? Or if it is sited to the detriment of the population's interests? Or if norms are violated? Expediency, the tasks and problems of the day, too often prevail over the rule of law. But if the soviet and its ispolkom are responsible both for the commissioning of projects, come what may, by a given date and, at the same time, for ensuring that all normatives are observed, then often something has to go. Our rich experience shows that the rule of law is forsaken to suit the "good of the cause." I am sure you will agree that it is a priority to make the soviet a reliable guarantee of the rule of law. But how can this be done?

[Solovyeva] Two very important social values form the basis of the political system—democracy and the rule of law. They form the basis of restructuring. But even laws that are the optimum expression of society's interests do not create the rule of law. That is only the legal basis of statehood. The basis of the law-based state that we seek must be the concept of the paramouncy of the law, its supreme authority.

Only the Supreme Soviets legislate. This activity was and is their main function. Of course, the soviet as an authority must first and foremost be the guarantor of the rule of law. But not the only one. The executive organs of the state are responsible for the strict fulfillment of laws, first and foremost the government. The Constitution lays on them the burden of organizing the execution of laws. But how do things stand in practical life? Frankly, the "guarantors" mainly violate the law. Because everything is under the command of that same apparatus. You know how tens and hundreds of thousands of instructions from administrative organs "amend the laws."

[Feofanov] So how can the administrative organs be guarantors of the rule of law?

[Solovyeva] I am not saying they are guarantors. They are obliged strictly to execute the laws.

[Feofanov] So is it correct to believe that the Supreme Soviet Presidium should be one of the main guarantors of the rule of law? But look at the agendas for their sessions. Nothing but economic, "Council of Ministers" questions. I have seldom heard of a Presidium giving an interpretation of the law or revoking unconstitutional acts by the government or the ministries, your main executors, Sofya Vladimirovna, of the laws. But how can a law-based society live without interpreting the laws and without constitutional monitoring?

[Solovyeva] Yes, they have lost sight of the interpretation of laws and monitoring of the legality of administrative organs' acts. Add to that the *wer's* role of the commission. Especially since our laws are not always ideally formulated, but you and I know that they are drawn up by that same apparatus, which is not always

legally qualified. It draws up laws that are convenient for subsequent fulfillment. Of course, our deputies too are not yet legally competent. But they can bring in legal scholars, experts, specialists. Most importantly, they lack the apparatus perspective. And getting rid of that "perspective" is one of the main tasks of restructuring.

Today the theoretical concept of the rule of law in our country is based on the principle "everything that is not prohibited by law, is permitted." That is very valuable. But even in legal science, in monographs and textbooks, the proposition is commonly found that the law is a most important means of administration. But the law is not a means. It is the basis of legality, an independent value, and all administration should be directed toward implementing the law, in which the state's policy is expressed.

Scholar Urges Reform in Legal Sphere

PM0706123588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by Academician V. Kudryavtsev under the "19th Party Conference: The Tasks of Restructuring" rubric: "Democratization and Legal Reform"—boldface as published]

[Text] Every stage of restructuring demands solid underpinning not only by political decisions and cadre reorganization but also by legal means.

The CPSU Central Committee Theses not only name those means but also propose a far broader task: The task of creating a permanent mechanism for democratic development and completing the formation of a socialist legal state.

The laws on the state enterprise (association), the cooperative system, and individual labor activity mark major landmarks in the judicial backup of restructuring. These acts form a fairly sound legal basis for the implementation of radical economic reform.

True, it is necessary to complete the work on one further document, which would form the core of economic legislation. I am thinking of the Law on Socialist Ownership. Unless the fundamental question of the forms of this ownership under modern conditions and of the property rights and obligations of state enterprises, cooperative, and other public organizations is solved, we will not be able to renew the economic mechanism.

The situation regarding the legal support for the second central task of restructuring—the broad democratization of our social life—is more fraught. Laws on the nationwide discussion of important questions of state life and on judicial appeal against unlawful actions by officials were passed last year. The impact of those laws has been weak to date. However, many acute problems of democratic development requiring judicial decisions have accumulated. I will name just three: Glasnost, social activeness, and improvement of the state apparatus.

Glasnost and all its components—information, openness, truthfulness, and responsibility—are a powerful tool of restructuring. The indisputable achievements of the policy of glasnost, the Central Committee Theses say, need to be consolidated and augmented. This involves, for example, ensuring that information about the work of state establishments and public organizations is accessible to any citizen if it affects his interests. Information about the work of local organs of power and management, including the economic situation in a rayon, city, or oblast would be of no less significance. The publication of such social statistics must be regulated by law.

We need not only a law on glasnost but a law on the mass media. While the first would regulate relations between state and public organizations and citizens, the second would regulate relations with organs of the press, radio, and television. It is time to clearly define their rights and powers, the extent of their responsibility, the procedures for settling disputes, and to proclaim and enshrine the basic principles of journalistic ethics in law. A permanent mechanism to enable the comparison of views, criticism, and self-criticism in the party and society is required. Such a mechanism is inconceivable without legal support.

Glasnost is, it may be said, the prime and simplest expression of social activeness. The task set by the party, the task of making the management of society and the state the direct business of actual working people, demands more developed forms. One of them is the formation and functioning of formal and informal public organizations. Legal safeguards for the development of individual activity by working people presupposes the promulgation of at least two new laws: A law on voluntary societies and creative unions and a law on the right of public organizations to participate in state decision-making.

This could be another law. It is important to judicially enshrine the status of the numerous forms of working people's public activity, including rallies, demonstrations, meetings, pickets, and so forth. Highly imperfect local resolutions aimed at deterring unusual forms of public initiative only complicate the issue. Yet it is not the form assumed by the activity (for example, an undesirable demonstration) but the real causes of it that are paramount here. And it is not public activeness but the renewal of the command-and-administer system, which ultimately generate tension and discontent among citizens, that must be combated. Speaking about the nationalities problems, M.S. Gorbachev rightly observed that if negative phenomena arise in this highly sensitive sphere of human relations, they do not arise in a vacuum but arise above all from bureaucracy and disregard of legal rights.

The Theses particularly stress the vital need for the constitutional freedoms (of speech, the press, assembly, rally, street processions, and demonstration, freedom of conscience, and so forth) to be exercised.

You quite often hear it said that the whole of restructuring amounts to appointing honest, sensible workers to posts of responsibility. If only that were so. Restructuring requires the democratization of the very principles of cadre policy, the elaboration of legal procedures for the appointment and transfer of state employees, and the creation of proper judicial safeguards ensuring their operation. Marx wrote: I do not think at all that personalities should serve as safeguards against laws; on the contrary, I think that laws should serve as safeguards against personalities.

Some things are being done here. I am thinking of the system of assessment, competition, and appointment by election relating to leaders. However, even tsarist Russia had experience of regular "examinations for posts," and many foreign countries have this experience too. A law on state service would regulate this sphere of our life.

When considering the problems of legal safeguards and the implementation of the ideas of a legal state you can clearly put forward many new laws and government resolutions. But here I want to dwell again on a more general question: The question of democratizing the actual activity of law-making.

Restructuring in the sphere of legislation shows itself by enhancing the quality of existing norms and their effectiveness and scientific validity, by drawing closer to the requirements of socioeconomic development, and by deepening the democratic procedure for their formation. Legal reform is primarily bound up with enhancing the role of the law in the life of society. However the actual weight of the law is not up to the role assigned it by the constitution. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which holds that a vast quantity of laws exist, they represent a very small proportion of the overall number of normative documents.

From 1938 (after the adoption of the 1936 USSR Constitution) through 1980 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed (excluding plan and budget laws) only 144 laws, and of them 87 (63 percent) ratified previously passed USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees. From 1980 through 1985 48 laws were passed, of which 33 were ratification of 125 decrees. So the number of laws in the constitutional sense of the term is not so great. Basic legal regulation was carried out by decrees which, unfortunately, in a number of cases substantially amended existing legislation.

Thus, since the adoption of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation (1961) and criminal codes, more than 300 amendments and supplements have been introduced by decree. The Code on Administrative Violations of the Law was amended 3 times in under 2 years: 15 new sections were introduced and 35 sections amended.

A situation has arisen whereby establishments and citizens rely not on the USSR Constitution or even laws but basically on departmental legal documents, which

receive de facto priority. Violation of the principle of the supremacy of the law disorganizes the system, undermines the authority of the laws, and causes law-enforcement activity to malfunction.

Reform of the legal system must ensure the supremacy of the Constitution within the structure of sources of the law, the direct and immediate operation of constitutional norms, and enhance the role of the law.

Since 1958, when the legislative rights of union republics were extended, excessive centralization of legislative activity has again prevailed. Virtually all the acts, of varying degrees of importance, passed in the seventies and eighties were passed by union organs. Here the republic acts (constitutions, civil, criminal, procedural, housing, and other codes) were prepared as a rule according to a single model, without adequate consideration of specific local conditions. Unfortunately, this still goes on. Such practice does not strengthen a sense of national self-awareness, independence, or initiative and leads to stagnation and deformation in the sphere of national and interrepublic relations.

Existing shortcomings can hardly be removed if the procedure for creating norms is not radically altered. The principles governing the preparation of draft normative acts should first and foremost be revised and the process thoroughly democratized.

The Constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of union and autonomous republics set up a clear system for examining draft laws. The whole point of the system is to take account to the fullest possible extent of the interests of different classes, groups, and strata of society and to enhance the effectiveness of the law as the embodiment of the will of the state as a whole. However, over the decades these principles have been systematically violated. The preparation of draft government laws, decrees, resolutions, and other normative acts is even now mostly carried out in camera, inside the executive organs. Draft laws are prepared as follows: The Gosplan deals with planning, Gossnab deals with supplies, and so forth, naturally primarily reflecting their own departmental interests. Draft laws, with the exception of rare cases of nationwide discussion, fall within the domain of Supreme Soviet deputies—the actual legislators—only shortly before the session and after they have been approved in the directive bodies.

Only the most recent session, when a number of items were thoroughly discussed in detail in the commissions of the chambers, proved a happy exception.

But drafts of governmental decrees, resolutions, and, in particular, departmental acts—and they are in the majority—are prepared exclusively in the executive organs and are not generally discussed democratically in

advance. The secret, departmental nature of the preparation of normative acts does not make it possible to take into account diverse social interests. Hence the poor quality of the acts and the inconsistency of many of them.

The main way to improve the creation of norms is to thoroughly democratize it. Draft laws and decrees must be mainly prepared in the legislative proposals commissions and the working groups set up by them. The commissions should be supplemented by deputies with good legal training. Drafts must be sent for finalization to the interested management bodies, competent scientific establishments, and party organs. When differences occur between drafts and final versions, the definitive decision must be made by the legislative proposals commission and a report on both the draft and the differences submitted to the Supreme Soviet. I think that decrees of a normative nature should also be prepared by the same procedure, although without submission to a session.

The main way to democratize legislative work is to involve soviet deputies in it. The practice of passing laws ratifying Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees without active discussion of them by deputies dilutes the democratic potential of the Supreme Soviet. It is clearly expedient to introduce the procedure adopted in many countries of a "second reading" of draft laws at sessions and to ensure free discussion of draft laws regarding amendments submitted, and to ensure that no law affecting citizens' constitutional rights, freedoms, or obligations can be passed in the form of a decree but must without fail be discussed by deputies, in the legislative proposals commission, and then at a session of the Supreme Soviet.

Improvement of the procedure for informing citizens and officials about the texts of laws is an essential condition for democratization of the legal system. The prevailing legal-information system has led to many important resolutions concerning various spheres of social life, particularly those regulating the activity and mutual relations of enterprises, associations, and ministries and other management organs in the conditions of restructuring of the economic mechanism, being virtually "classified as secret" and withdrawn from wide practical and scientific use. This leads to a paucity of information about the latest legislation and renders previously published acts unreliable, since there is no guarantee that they have not been superseded by later acts that have not been made public.

At a rough estimate, only 32.5 percent of all resolutions of a normative nature promulgated by the USSR Government in 1985-1986 were published in the Collection of Resolutions. From 1980 (the beginning of publications "in resume") through 1987 12.5 percent of resolutions were given in resume form. I will give a quite recent example. The USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution on restructuring Gosnab's structure and

activity. It contains not only a series of norms regulating Gosnab's work but the procedure for the material and technical supply of enterprises and economic associations under the new conditions. The resolution was not published even in resume. The same situation exists with the list of government resolutions superseded by the Law on the Enterprise.

This practice, built up over the years under administrative and bureaucratic methods of leadership, the absence of glasnost, and disregard of the requirements of legality, became an integral part of the braking mechanism, without the destruction of which restructuring and further improvement of social relations are impossible, since a considerable proportion of the government resolutions formally in force have in point of fact not been implemented for a long time... This deprives economic organizations and labor collectives of a firm legal basis for independent and resourceful management, creates grounds for violation of legality and the constant "reproduction" of administrative methods of leadership, and hampers the further improvement of legislation, putting a considerable part of it outside the "zone of criticism."

It is essential to clearly define the range of acts of the USSR Government, union republic councils of ministries, and ministries and departments subject to mandatory publication in relevant official publications.

The timetable for publication of government resolutions and departmental normative acts should be set by analogy with the procedure for the publication and entry into force of legislative acts of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and union republics and their presidiums. The following invariable principle must operate here: Acts not published in accordance with set procedure cannot possess force of law.

The functions of monitoring the practical implementation of laws and the social results of their operation must be accelerated as part of the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet and union and autonomous republic supreme soviets. The present forms of monitoring are not in tune with the spirit of the times.

Open sittings of the Supreme Soviet and its commissions—public hearings devoted to the analysis of the application of existing normative acts, with the participation of citizens and representatives of public and state organizations—could serve as a form of monitoring. The combination of representative and direct democracy during such sessions will afford legislators the opportunity to subject their activity to critical analysis from the population.

The USSR Constitution lays down that monitoring of its observance is carried out by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium. However, the necessary mechanism for carrying out such monitoring is lacking and no procedural rules have been drawn up. I think that the

proposals made in the press that a constitutional court be set up in our country or that the USSR Supreme Court be invested with such powers are correct.

The democratization of all aspects of our social life, including the judicial system, is an urgent imperative of our times, an objective requirement of restructuring, and a guarantee of its irreversibility. Restructuring and democracy are the route to a qualitatively new state of Soviet society and a new aspect of socialism.

Glasnost in Party Documents Urged

PM0206145188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by V. Rusakov, member of the CPSU and chief of the Sverdlovsk Agricultural Institute Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism, from feature under general heading "19th All-Union Party Conference: Between the Lines of the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "More Democracy, More Socialism; What Lies Behind the Mystery?"]

[Text] I cannot imagine the augmentation and consolidation of the policy of glasnost without the renunciation of the practice of attaching an unjustified secrecy to party life. And I am very glad that the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference spoke frankly of this.

Of course, it is not a case of state secrets. Throughout the world people know how to distinguish these things (particularly when they want to). And the fact that this question is arising in our country shows yet again the negative nature not simply of confusing state organizations and party organizations but of replacing the former with the latter. In our case it reaches the point of absurdity: The whole world has long been reading N.S. Khrushchev's "secret" report at the 20th CPSU Congress, only the overwhelming majority of Soviet Communists are unfamiliar with this document which so radically altered assessments in the development of the party and state. If the party conceals any pages of its history from the Communists, and by no means from considerations of keeping state secrets and confidential information, then it is absolutely clear that this does not serve the party's stability and prestige. Because later, when everything secret inevitably becomes clear, those Communists who always find it painful to accept "sudden mass insights" have to blush and feel acutely bitter because they cannot separate themselves from their party's "good" or "bad" history.

If our party's life had fewer secrets and more glasnost, then we would not have to rewrite today many pages in the textbooks on its history. In my view, any unjustified, bureaucratic secrecy which people attempt to justify by considerations of "top-level politics" in actual fact results in the basest political intrigue.

The country's Communists and entire population today are waiting for N.S. Khrushchev's report at the 20th CPSU Congress to finally be published, for the shorthand reports of all congresses, conferences, and CPSU Central Committee Plenums to be published.

What is being revealed in the studies and documents which have been made public must be introduced to public consciousness, overcoming the stereotypes and myths previously created and dinned into people's consciousness with the firmness of prejudice. This approach will really overcome the dogmatization which has appeared today with regard, for instance, to the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress. It is probably no accident that in the materials of the CPSU Central Committee January and June (1987) plenums assessments of negative phenomena had already become substantially tougher by comparison with the congress. And that is natural—a process of cognition and understanding is under way.

For intensive thinking work by every Communist in developing his own position and for the educational work in purging ourselves of the negative legacy of the past, the Central Committee commission created to examine questions of rehabilitation and the study of CPSU history should enlist broad public circles and publish books, anthologies of documents, materials of the relevant research, and the memoirs of those who took part in the events of the thirties to the fifties and the sixties to the seventies. The Communists must receive first hand and in an exhaustive manner all information about, for instance, how many people were repressed in different years, by whom, and when; what L. Kaganovich, L. Beriya, Sh. Rashidov, N. Shchelokov, and many others did and with whose aid. This is the only way of avoiding the transformation of the facts of intraparty life and its history into a topic of rumors, gossip, and malevolent falsifications.

It is the party which, by its own example, teaches democracy to all society, which takes its example from the party. The discussion of top party leaders and their candidacies should be accompanied by information, including information about their personal qualities as politicians, and by an indication of their "strong" and "weak" aspects, which will prevent their eulogization. At present we have grown so accustomed to the impersonal stamp of leaders' party character references that it is impossible to form from them any idea of the leaders from the purely human viewpoint. Most often there is either something good or nothing at all or even more often a mere list of his work places from which it is utterly unclear whether a person worked successfully or was simply restless. And a party character reference's indication of "weak" aspects or, worse still—shortcomings!—at a certain leader level is interpreted as the prelude to his removal from his post, and so forth. It is from this practice that the situation arises whereby a political leader is either an angel of heaven or a real fiend.

It is obviously worth thinking about holding party referendums on putting forward alternative options for the implementation of a particular party program decision and so forth. In my opinion attempts to turn the decisions and resolutions of the party organs and the assessments expressed in them into some kind of absolute suitable for all times and circumstances do not help the improvement of the situation in the party and the growth of its prestige. And later, years later, these documents are shamefully hidden away and people keep quiet about them.

In this connection it is appropriate to draw attention to the following problem.

The CPSU's scientific objective history is instructive in that it exposes a whole series of dogmas and political myths which for a long time were imposed as ultimate truths, as "self-evident" truths. How many people there are even now who are absolutely sincerely convinced that the victims and troubles of the thirties and forties were necessary, and, if that was the case, then that was the price that had to be paid; how many people there are who have exactly the same view of the policy of "kulak expropriation," believing that "there used to be order," that "Stalin ruled the bureaucrats with a rod of iron," and so forth. The level and nature of these dogmas and stereotypes may vary—some are at the ideology level, others at the public psychology level. But all together they comprise a system for muffling the objective and unbiased history of the party as it is, with all its victories and defeats, successes and shortcomings.

This situation, or at any rate its preconditions, will be preserved until specific measures are taken to make changes to the style of party life. The putting forward of alternative options for implementing the same decision would be of importance in overcoming every kind of mythology. Many resolutions of the seventies poured as though from a horn of plenty: Everything in them seemed to be correct, everything was said, everything was considered, but there was no "salt." Some determining link is always needed, but a choice should be made as to what it should be at a given moment.

Great importance for a correct attitude toward the documents of a political party would be attached to an indication of the initial authors of the draft, even if it later receives the status of a party decision. The human provenance of various party decisions and documents prevents them from becoming objects of fetishism. The impersonal provenance of party documents and the ascribing of "provisions and conclusions" to one person are all facets of the same coin.

Academics Criticize Conference Theses

PM0606160088 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 4 Jun 88 p 2

[Unattributed report on contributions to roundtable discussion by I. Diskin, deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for the Comprehensive Problem of Social and Cultural Development; Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Levada of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and the Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress;

Doctor of Juridical Sciences M. Piskotin of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law; I. Lukin, first secretary of Moscow's Proletarskiy party raykom; Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Popov of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute; and A. Shokhin, member of the Soviet Sociological Association Presidium, under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Via Debate To Action!"—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA KULTURA introduction]

[Text] The following took part in the discussion held recently at the editorial office: I. Diskin, deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for the Comprehensive Problem of Social and Cultural Development; Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Levada (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and the Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress); Doctor of Juridical Sciences M. Piskotin (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law); I. Lukin, first secretary of Moscow's Proletarskiy party raykom; Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Popov (USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute); and A. Shokhin, member of the Soviet Sociological Association Presidium.

Yu. Levada: "What do we need: unanimity just for show or real, workmanlike, thriving life within society and the party? Unanimity is almost always unthinking. The ancients' formula that 'truth emerges from argument' is something that we have still not grasped." [subhead]

The Theses confirm the main directions of restructuring, though not all expectations have been realized.

First, the Theses have been published just a month before the conference opens. This means that there is considerably less than a month for discussion of them. Yet without a critical debate we will end up with a consolidation of the existing situation. That situation is this. The ship is sailing on, very sensible and wise commands to change direction are ringing out on the bridge, but the ship is following its former course. Either the people in the engine room cannot hear these commands, or they cannot change direction because the mass of the ship is so colossal. However, the Theses are not all that much help in grasping what exactly the conference delegates should choose, what exactly they should decide. I think they seriously lack the presentation of alternatives, the opportunity to choose between different options.

Moreover, I think the Theses are influenced by the present juncture of compromise between different forces. The fact that conflicts and compromises exist is a normal feature of the political life of any society, ours included. But is it right to emphasize only the element of compromise? It is said that arguments and debates must not lead to confrontation and disunity, which complicates the resolution of vital tasks. But there are forces from which one must dissociate oneself.

After all, there is the trend that was described in April as opposed to restructuring. I think there is a need to dissociate ourselves from that trend, both from the people who spoke out and from those who supported the speakers.

The question of the rights of minority are linked with this. The Theses repeat the formula that total freedom of debate is possible until a decision is adopted. So after decisions are adopted are we supposed to think or not? Who adopted the decisions on redirecting rivers? If we had thought that they could not be criticized, that there must be nothing but unity of action in implementing them, we would have ended up in a mess that we would have been unable to get out of before the end of the century. That's not the only example.

What do we need: unanimity just for show or real, workmanlike, thriving life within society and the party? Unanimity is almost always unthinking. But we have a complex society. A unanimous vote is usually an indifferent vote.

Real people can never subscribe to a single viewpoint. If these people have voted in proportions of 6:3:1 then it is possible to believe: Yes, they have thought, yes, they have argued, yes, they have reached a decision, but some people hold a different view. But when we read that everyone has voted "in favor," this means that they have not thought and have decided to do the same as everyone else, according to the rules of commonplace standard conformism, because nobody is ever penalized for conformism.

One of the tasks of our present struggle is to attain a different way of thinking and acting.

The main problem of the movement toward democratization and toward efficiency in our economy is to remove the dead hand of the knot that ties together the political, economic, and ideological spheres in our country. Ties them together so tightly that it impedes movement. When, say, the functions of authority are monopolized by party organizations from top to bottom, these functions themselves change their nature and political leadership is transformed into petty control. The same thing happens when the Politburo allocates capital investments in the country. This means that Gosplan is discredited, the Council of Ministers too, and the level of leadership declines since its political functions are weakened. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the plan was fulfilled or underfulfilled, subbotniks were better or worse organized, but people were unable to counter the total corruption. And in Armenia, when people took to the streets, the Communists were unable to find their bearings in the situation. Thus political leadership has been partially lost. This is a result of the fact that the functions of fulfilling current plans have been reduced to chivying. And no one can handle these universal chivying functions performed by party organizations, they must simply be eliminated.

Here's another example. Our readers have learned a very important thing from the Theses for the first time: Our state budget has a deficit. However, each year the Supreme Soviet approves a report on budget implementation in which income exceeds expenditure. This recurs every year. Of course, specialists know that the real situation is different. But who is fooling whom? Why has no deputy among that huge body requested any additional information or voiced doubts? Because a deputy has neither the potential nor the time to probe the essence of the matter. That situation must be changed.

I. Lukin: "The administrative edict system is paradoxical in a way: The party committee, while being responsible for everything, in practice has not borne responsibility for its instructions." [subhead]

The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the party conference are not a readymade decision but a political platform on which a debate can and must be developed. What is to stop us from concretizing some propositions that seem rather general?

But there are cardinal questions that cannot be overlooked. I think that a stereotyped view has emerged in our country that party apparatuses cling strongly to their power and refuse to part with it. That they avoid the switch to political leadership methods. I think that the reasons here lie much deeper than they appear to at first glance. After all, there is another side to the question of handing over power. There needs to be someone to take it. However, we are observing a psychological unreadiness on the part of both economic leaders and soviet organs to assume full powers. After all, they have long been accustomed to parallelism, to the party apparatus being responsible for everything. But while being responsible for everything—and this is the paradox of the administrative edict system—the raykom has not borne an equivalent responsibility for the consequences of its instructions at enterprise level, for instance. At the same time, using its party authority, it has forced leaders to obey. This is how incompetent decisions forcibly implemented by party authority have come into being.

But I view things optimistically. Changes are under way. For instance, our major association, the Likhachev Motor Vehicle Plant, is proving its ability to act independently. But it has plenty of economists and organizers! Small enterprises lack such skills as yet.

Here's another example, this one from the sphere of our relations with the soviets. You remember how Moscow was suddenly full of fairs 18 months ago. The raykoms dealt with them down to petty details. Today this seems ridiculous. Soviet organs are coping without us, even though such fairs require very great organizational efforts. But I am convinced that soviets should not ask

for power from raykoms, but take it. And do so resolutely. Of course, it is an error to think that the reallocation of duties is proceeding smoothly. Everyone is very used to petty tutelage—both the raykoms and the soviets.... So let's relearn our ways.

There's a lot of talk of the conservatism of the party apparatus. But is it possible to forget that there have been very substantial changes in the apparatuses over the 3 years of restructuring? New people with a new mentality have arrived. For instance, in the capital's Proletarskiy Rayon both party committees and the raykom apparatus have been 70 percent renewed. I would say more—many people have lost out in terms of wages, and that in itself shows that their motives are not based on careerist goals. The new cadres have injected a strong fresh stream by virtue of both their age and the fact that apparatus work is new to them.

Mikhail Ivanovich [Piskotin] touched on the election of deputies. Indeed, today the voter has very little power over the deputy. Candidates are nominated on behalf of the labor collective, but people vote according to their place of residence and sometimes know nothing of their future representative apart from the biography posted in the lobby. In our rayon several candidates per seat were nominated in the last election. But even this is not a guarantee of genuine democracy, although, of course, people's political activeness increases with this procedure. The election system must be based on voters exercising real power over their deputies. And party organizations must use their authority by supporting real leaders and not supporting those who are obsessed only with personal ambition.

Overall, the Theses provide much food for thought. And we see it as our task, even in the short time remaining, to organize the discussion of them in such a way that all opinions can be taken into account as far as possible.

N. Popov: "It is necessary to foster anew a culture of pluralism, tolerance, and dissent.... We have emerged from the woods into a field, and the sun of freedom is blinding; we must get accustomed to it. At the same time we must not stop." [subhead]

First of all a few words about the document as a whole. It arouses feelings of deep respect in me. Its very publication is a step in restructuring. For the first time in over 50 years the party leadership is turning to ordinary members and the whole people not with a finished document to which it is proposed to make merely cosmetic changes but with an invitation to debate, to joint reflection on the fate of our country, and to self-critical analysis of what has already been done and what we have yet to do.

The various sections of the Theses are not equivalent in terms of the level of generalizations and the amount of detail, and many problems are merely mentioned. But on

the whole they offer an honest and realistic assessment of the present situation and outline the contours of revolutionary transformations in the political and socio-economic system.

Gratifying as it is that the Theses outline so many new, unprecedented approaches toward solving our problems, it is deplorable that in practice less than a month remains to discuss them. In a month it is impossible to have a serious discussion of even one new law, the Law on the Cooperative System, say, and here it is a question of revolution, of cardinal changes in almost all spheres of life. Clearly, by the time of the conference not only will this discussion be unfinished, it will be merely flaring up.

Moreover, it is already clear that by no means everywhere has it been possible to elect pioneers of restructuring as conference delegates, as the Central Committee urged. On the whole the apparatus has mustered its own people, leaders at various levels, and many true innovators have been left out.

So it is all the more important for the conference to be a nationwide forum and open debate.

In this connection I would like to turn to the first paragraph of the Theses, which contains many accurate descriptions of the present political situation in the country but merely outlines one important point which is the key to political restructuring and democratization: "We need a constantly operating mechanism for comparing views and for criticism and self-criticism in the party and society.... Under the one-party system...this question is vitally important." It is hard to put it more strongly. Such a mechanism is needed today, but as yet there are no prescriptions. One way, for instance, could be to turn party conferences into regular, maybe annual, events. We were silent for so long—it is now time to speak out fearlessly on all questions.

One of the ways of creating such a mechanism is an independent press. Alongside the party, state, and trade union press there must be newspapers that are at no one's beck and call, that no one can close, where no one can fire the editor or prohibit publication of an article. Especially at local level—in oblasts and rayons the local authorities now confidently suppress any criticism of them in the local press, and fighters for truth and justice invariably have to go to PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, or some other central paper in order to publish pieces about negligence, corruption, or lawlessness in Fergana, Odessa, Yerevan, or Astrakhan.

If we did not have to press ahead with our current discussion, the conference, and restructuring in general, it would be necessary to write volumes of analysis about the Theses—everything in them is new and untried. In the economy now it is not exactly the NEP, and in politics it is not the twenties either. However, now we must primarily touch on the topics that are least clearly outlined. For instance, that of the socialist legal state.

We have built socialism, but was it the socialism we wanted, and where do we want to go from here? The structure of political power must also be consonant with the type of society we want to build. How precisely, in detail, should people's power be organized? Do we want a presidential republic or a parliamentary republic at the top level of the state structure? People write in letters—and this proposal has now been put forward—that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, as the supreme state leader, should be elected by direct universal suffrage. What above all will be his functions, what will be the role of the general secretary, what will be the functions of the party? All this must be enshrined in the Constitution, and we cannot avoid a revision of it.

Even before the reform of the Constitution and the party rules, there are a number of steps that can be taken in the sphere of separating the functions of party and soviet organs, primarily eliminating all specialized, sectorial departments in party raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms, thereby focusing the party's activity on political, propaganda work, on the struggle for restructuring by political methods.

It has already been said here that the problem is not only that party organs are reluctant to share power, but also that the soviets are reluctant and often unable to assume full administrative and economic power. To a considerable extent this is because the soviets have little power, they have no rights to influence major enterprises within their territory—here too, constitutional reform is unavoidable.

Public organizations must play an important role in the process of the reform of our electoral system, to which the Theses devote just two paragraphs. They must nominate candidates together with the party, and the mass media, especially the independent media, must acquaint voters with the candidates and their political line within the context of the election campaign. This would be real socialist pluralism in action.

The principle of competition must be disseminated here, as it must in the economy and throughout our life. People often ask what should be done with the losers in elections. This is part of the political, economic struggle and we too must learn this—how to conduct polemics in a dignified fashion, without descending into insults and name-calling, and how to lose.

In general, the thing we can really be proud of in the last 3 years is that we speak the truth considerably more often, although not always the full truth and not always immediately. The upcoming conference must be another important lesson in openness and democracy in this respect.

I. Diskin: "In my view, the theses reflect a certain legal euphoria: You need only think up good laws, and things will go well. Is this really so?" [subhead]

The Theses are a mirror of the contemporary development of our society and of the ideas forming the basis of restructuring. Since they are a mirror, there's no point blaming them. It is necessary to study the political reality reflected in the Theses, in all their contradictoriness. The entire course of our political development—I would call it the priority principle—is as follows. First of all, as happened when the NEP was created, we form advanced political institutions and economic mechanisms, and then we pull our culture up to the same level. In my view, the Theses reflect a certain "legal euphoria," the idea that we need only think up good laws, and we will thereby resolve many questions.

The 12th All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Congress said that the party, which had taken power, was building the economy, carrying out colossal work, and was bound to make mistakes. Only the collective opinion of the party as a whole can prevent these mistakes. The collective opinion must be formulated in organizational forums. We have neither clubs nor other organizations where party members can exchange opinions and develop this collective experience. The creation of party debating clubs is extremely necessary today. This would help to revive the atmosphere of party comradeship in which all party members, regardless of rank, are on familiar terms with each other. Nowadays it seems strange to us even to recall this. This would make it possible to promote real, vigorous people who not only say "This is terrible, terrible," but are also prepared to say: How has this happened? So long as they do this at meetings of informal associations, I think no leader of party organs is going to accept what they say as relevant to himself. But when this is proposed in party clubs, a thing or two about real leadership will begin to emerge.

A second point. For the party to become democratic, it is necessary for the laws of its life to coincide with the laws of society's life. Guarantees for the minority are needed if we want to conduct serious political debates. Provided, of course, that this minority does not place the party in conditions of a split. The question of the limits to permissible disagreements within the party must be raised again most clearly and pointedly. It is necessary to revive tolerance, tactfulness, and respect for dissenters, which is something that, to be blunt, we lack among the party.

Today party control organs are entrusted with the functions simultaneously of Prosecutor's Office and investigation, and the Party Control Committee at the same time also performs the functions of party court.

My specific proposal is this: clear separation of functions. While party control organs can also perform the functions of party inquiry, the functions of party court must be performed by special party bodies in which rank-and-file Communists would take part.

The entire democratic mood of society will be determined by how far the party lives strictly according to the laws of democracy.

A. Shokhin: "It would be disastrous and immoral to create the illusion that restructuring is already bearing fruit and to implement merely short-term half-measures. Surely it is better to tackle the most difficult matters, even if you run into upheavals." [subhead]

It is clear that conservatism is the reason for the slow progress. What are its sources? We usually interpret it as an antirestructuring process and even identify it with an approach aiming to restore the past. But it is a more complex phenomenon: Conservatism is not so simple; it holds a substantial trump card against changes—suppose things get worse?

After all, there are also several trends within the restructuring movement itself. What is noticeably forging ahead is the pragmatic approach, which is proposing the most radical measures in economic life, in particular, developing the market in all its forms, including capital. But it is clear even to the naked eye that this will involve conflicts and that this may be fraught with inflation and temporary instability. Conservatism is on the alert here. What lies behind it is a wish to prevent negative collisions. Here it constitutes a factor for stability. There is yet another trend—that of political liberalization, which advocates the development of parliamentarianism and the ensuring of political freedoms. Here too conservatism is ever-watchful—lest we overstep the bounds of the socialist type of development.

So it seems to me that what is required of society is consistent steps along the road of democratization. Without hurry and haste. After all, we already have negative experience of democratization.

Events in the Transcaucasus show that a group of people can inspire the mass of the people and lead them in their footsteps. The fears are not without foundation. We must act without haste.

But also without delay. After all, the reform in the economy cannot be implemented without changes in the political system. Nevertheless, this is not a justification for delay. For a kind of respite in the economic sphere. There are few problems in the economic section [of the Theses]. They have fallen out of the document's sphere of attention. The main question is how to ensure the real priority of reform. To the surprise of most economists, the Theses raise this question in a different dimension: Priority is given to fulfilling the quantitative indicators of the 5-year plan. Yet the plan was drawn up in the prereform period and leaves no potential for maneuver to secure a new quality of economic mechanism.

What other questions need to be discussed? M.S. Gorbachev raised the task of making the transition to a legal state. How is this to be implemented in the economic

sphere? Very good laws have been adopted: on the cooperative system and the state enterprise. But they still do not form the framework of a legal state in the economy. What is missing? Complete separation of rights and duties and separation of economic power, in which the functions of ministries and departments would be fully defined. Without mechanisms for the legal defense of enterprises and the legal restriction of the activities of ministries and departments, we will not make headway. As yet there is just one prescription: If we cut staffs and are "rigorously exacting," bureaucracy will be overcome. But it won't be. For this it is necessary to radically change the functions of the upper echelons of management and to transform them from commanders of enterprises into equal partners.

It is also necessary to discuss the social aspects of economic reform. The Theses mention price reform. Specialists know that a draft reform exists, but nationwide discussion of it will take place only after all departments have rubber-stamped it. Surely this will be too late? Perhaps some possibilities could be discussed right now and alternative options could be outlined?

Both Sovietologists and our own economists are now saying that the social base for reform depends largely on the availability of goods in the stores. There is some truth in that. But I believe that the fate of restructuring depends not only on store windows but also on the political will to move toward democratization of society and radical reform. Surely it is better to tackle the most difficult matters, even if you run into upheavals? This will produce more results in the long term than half-measures will. Moreover, we will also be able to feed the country more swiftly.

M. Piskotin: "We must put into practice self-nomination for elected office. This is the only way in which more individuals can appear in the political arena." [subhead]

A note that has very often been struck in our discussions lately is that the conference is our last chance. If that were so, things would be bad in our country. Of course, the conference is a major landmark, possibly of comparable significance to the 20th or 27th CPSU Congresses, but profound qualitative changes in our sociopolitical life will require long-term efforts. Here too it is important to assess the prevailing situation correctly.

The theses contain a very precise assessment: "Positive results have been achieved, but they give no grounds for speaking of a fundamental breakthrough in the country's socioeconomic development." Why is this? Because two currents carrying different charges have collided. One is pulling forward, the other is pushing back. And the "old way" is based on the established system and the existing management apparatus. As yet no great changes have occurred in our political and economic system. We now feel more keenly than ever how closely they are linked in our country. After all, back at the start of restructuring it emerged that without changes in the political system we

would not be able to carry out serious economic reform. And now, on the eve of profound changes in the political system, we realize that these are impossible without shifts in the economic mechanism as a whole. In short, unless we smash the administrative edict system of party-state leadership of the country, we will be able to do nothing serious in either the economic or political spheres.

We often allude to resistance by managers and say that things have advanced greatly at the enterprise level but are at a standstill at the ministry level. But say a minister would like to work in the new way, but he gets a phone call saying that freight is stuck at some railroad station, and one plant is not getting its raw materials and another its subassemblies. He cannot help becoming a dispatcher, a fixer—in other words, returning to the old methods.

Development of the socialist market may change a great deal. But what are we really doing in this respect? Very little. This is the weakest point of our whole restructuring. What is the market? It is wholesale trade, price reform, the elimination of shortages, the organization of information, and the creation of instruments serving the market as a whole. Today the task is to make the economy a freer sphere. And this entails qualitative changes in the political system. The CPSU Central Committee Theses contain hints about this, but propose no cardinal measures. Yet such measures are necessary when it comes to the correlation between the efforts of party, state, and economic organs.

It has to be said that the general nature of all party work and leadership methods is determined by the Politburo. For several years now we have read the information reports and seen the range of questions that are examined. They include many that could have been resolved without the intervention of such a high party organ. The Theses rightly speak of focusing the efforts of party organs on formulating the political strategy and solving fundamental problems, and if we care about deepening restructuring, this proposition of the Theses must apply above all to our party's Central Committee. There is much to be considered, including the expediency of the existence of sectorial departments in its apparatus. But the main thing, in my view (and the Theses partially reflect this), is to change our notions of democratic centralism. For at present a great deal depends on the chance correlation of votes within the top echelon of political leadership. But can the country's development continue to depend on the disposition of forces within a narrow circle of individuals? I think there must be changes in the procedure for forming leading organs, electing the Politburo, electing the general secretary, and so forth.

Incidentally, this is a general question; it applies both to the party and to our soviets. How are candidates for election to plenipotentiary organs nominated? I think a great deal could change if we recognized the institution

of self-nomination. After all, the rejection of it makes the entire election procedure dependent on the apparatus. The apparatus decides whether an individual is to appear in the political arena or not.

Self-nomination and the nomination of several candidates, with guaranteed free discussion of each candidacy—that is the practice that must be developed. And nominations must also come from informal organizations. Since we acknowledge the positive role of a number of informal associations, why not grant them this right?

Now a few words about the size of the body of deputies. It is too big, I think. Just think: There are 1,500 people in the USSR Supreme Soviet.... Is everyone who possesses the lofty Supreme Soviet mandate an active politician? Relevant procedures in the activity of our representative organs must be developed from this viewpoint. We all remember how the draft Law on the Judicial Appeal of Illegal Actions by Officials was discussed. During the session certain deputies began to voice criticisms, but the Supreme Soviet was unaccustomed to hearing this, and anyhow just a few hours were set aside for discussing the draft law. As a result there was a hitch and an unprecedented decision: The law was adopted, but the standing commissions were instructed to improve the law which had already been ratified. What can we make of this? The point is that we have not seriously tackled the question of the legislative organization of the Supreme Soviet's activity. So there is no legislative procedure. The fact that bourgeois parliaments have two or three readings of bills is not just some kind of game to fool the ordinary people. It is a necessary condition for adopting carefully considered laws.

Take the discussion of the plan and budget. The USSR Supreme Soviet approves the union budget and the funds spent by union departments according to just two indicators—income and expenditure. More detailed study is required today, with the approval of targeted programs and prioritization.

Democracy is inconceivable without a developed system of political institutions. If we are seriously thinking of reforms, the closest attention must be paid to this system.

National Equality Problems Viewed

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[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences G. Litvinova, senior scientific worker at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, under the rubric "The 19th All-Union Party Conference: We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "On Equality and Equal Rights"]

[Text] Events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and even earlier in Alma-Ata perturbed millions of people. It has turned out that the sound

edifice of inter-nation [mezhnatsionalnyye] relations built during the years of Soviet power is full of hidden cracks. And any of them, as the tragedy in Sumgait showed, can lead to dangerous collapses. Let us not delude ourselves: It will be a long time before the Armenians and Azerbaijanis start smiling openly at each other in this city.

How could this have happened? Where and when were the errors permitted in national policy and what were these errors? What should be done to neutralize them? How to ensure that this cannot be repeated? I fear that there are still no exhaustive answers to these questions. It is clear only that a significant role in what happened was played by economic factors. In particular, shortcomings in developing the social sphere.

In a number of regions, people also attempted to use inter-nation problems as a smokescreen for blatant bribe-taking and extortion. To this day rumors are being spread in these regions that the central organs, mainly concerned with Russians' interests, are fleecing the republics. And in Uzbekistan they are even trying to justify Rashidov's acts with the fanciful notion that in extorting money from the state treasury he allegedly wanted to feed the Uzbek people. Of course, today the Uzbeks are well aware where this money went in the period of stagnation and lavish feasts. But this does not remove our obligation to examine thoroughly the economic aspects of nationalities policy.

For many years, in arguing this policy's advantages, we gave priority to the concept of equality for all peoples and nationalities. But then it turned out that in fact it is only a question of equal rights. As for the other components, among which equal obligations are one of the most important, they are not always remembered. Many examples testify that at some stage we virtually deviated from Lenin's principles of nationalities policy. Why?

Our country's peoples and ethnic groups came to the October Revolution at different levels of economic, social, and political development. In addition to regions of developed monopoly capitalism, there also existed in the country regions where tribal relations were still maintained. Whereas the natural population growth among the Russians and Ukrainians was quite high, extinction threatened the Kazakhs, Turkmens, Buryats, and a number of other peoples. Legal inequality among the peoples, which exacerbated inter-nation relations, aggravated the situation.

Without overcoming these differences, it was impossible to create a free socialist state. For this reason legal equality for all nations and ethnic groups was proclaimed immediately after the October Revolution victory and was enshrined in the first Soviet Constitution. But to achieve true equality in socioeconomic and political development, years of effort, colossal material expenditure, and huge organizational work were

required. Who was able to take this on? Primarily the numerically strongest peoples, relatively developed in industrial terms, who boldly set out to build the new society.

The resolution of the 12th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress on the nationalities question directly indicated: "A number of republics and peoples which bypassed or nearly bypassed capitalism, which lack or virtually lack their own proletariat, who for this reason have lagged behind economically and culturally, are incapable of fully utilizing the rights and opportunities granted them by national equality, are incapable of rising to the highest degree of development and so catching up with the nationalities which have overtaken them without real and prolonged assistance from outside.... Overcoming this inequality in a short time...is impossible.... But it should be overcome without fail. And it can be overcome only by means of real and prolonged assistance from the Russian proletariat to the backward peoples of the Union in the matter of their economic and cultural success."

Entire factories and plants were transferred to backward national regions from the RSFSR industrial oblasts and other republics in order to resolve this task. Qualified workers, specialists, teachers, doctors, and scientists were sent from Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Baku, and other industrial centers. The more backward the republic or region was, the more rapid the pace of development the Soviet state endeavored to ensure.

The preferential budgetary and tax policy played a particular role in the extensive system of measures enabling backward republics to develop at a preferential rate. In particular, Kazakhstan and the republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia obtained the right to divert into their budget at times up to 100 percent of turnover tax—the main source of financial revenue. Moreover, as a rule, they also receive for their budget the full 100 percent of the income tax from the population. The general picture, for example, in the thirties was this: More than 60 percent of the majority of the union republics' budgetary expenditure was covered by subsidies from centralized sources. Thus, the state carried out the redistribution of national income in the interests of individual peoples through budgetary channels.

Thanks to this policy, by the end of the forties we had achieved a virtual equality among nations on many questions. The necessity for privileges and advantages passed when this task was resolved. But for a number of different reasons this practice has been significantly maintained to this day. In particular, in the budget for 1988 it is planned to spend almost R5 billion to subsidize three republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia. In the second half of the eighties even such a republic as Lithuania started relying on subsidies.

As a result, the threat of the emergence of a new inequality appeared: Peoples who earlier assisted others now started to be classed as backward themselves. The distortion in the social, moral, and political spheres became increasingly tangible. Accordingly, inter-nation relations were also deformed.

Most of the economically backward republics were agrarian regions. Thus, preferential purchase prices for agricultural output played a special role in their accelerated development. These prices were the reasons for many "distortions."

Take potatoes and citrus fruit, for instance. According to specialist opinion, their cultivation involves approximately the same labor expenditure. For this reason the prices for them throughout the world are almost the same. If in some places citrus fruit are more expensive than potatoes, then this is mainly because of transport costs, and their cost is no more than 2-3 times higher. Only in our country are prices 20-35 times higher.

The differences in prices correspondingly determine the higher income of the producers. And not just of citrus fruit. High purchase prices for cotton, rice, fruit, and other output mean that, for example, in the fifties the average income for kolkhoz members in a number of regions was nine times higher than in the RSFSR. There is no need to be surprised at this: Our system of purchase prices is such that the prime cost of gross crop production per work day, for example, in the non-Chernozem zone was 10 times lower than in the Uzbek SSR and 15 times lower than in Georgia. True, the wages discrepancies have now been minimized. But there is still a big difference in incomes because of personal plots: High state prices have automatically legitimized high market prices too.

But it was not only purchase prices which stimulated or hindered agricultural development. In the non-Chernozem again transport costs "added" up to 40 percent to the cost of output. The reasons for this are well known—the sparse road network. By the beginning of the eighties the RSFSR was at the bottom of the ladder among the republics in terms of provision with blacktop roads per square kilometer of territory. As regards this indicator, even Turkmenia, where 85 percent of the territory is desert, and the Tajik SSR, where 93 percent of the territory is covered with mountains, outstripped it.

The situation is no better in other spheres. It is well known, for example, that the Siberian petroleum and gas workers are poorly provided for as regards accommodation, although it is precisely they who by their labor make an enormous contribution to the country's national income. The slow pace of socioeconomic development has led to the point where today far fewer children study in RSFSR general education schools than did in the prewar 1940-1941 academic year. Yet at that time only a 7-year education, and not a 10-year education was compulsory. In the 1970-1980 period alone, the

number of children studying in general education schools in the RSFSR fell by 20 percent. An ominous trend: The birthrate has declined more among the Russians than that of other nations. Nor does the "surge" in the past 2-3 years save the situation—it is still not enough to maintain even the existing population.

There is nothing negative in the actual practice of privileges. We deliberately embarked on them in an attempt to create an equitable economy. But then the privileges turned into the opposite, creating an atmosphere of parasitism and a consumerist attitude. In his recent speech to the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev noted, in particular, that large resources were put into this republic's agriculture, but its output volume remained at the level of the early eighties. Irrigated land, on which harvests even began to fall, are being poorly utilized.

Of course, it should not be thought that parasitism is characteristic only of former national outlying areas. Over the past year alone Novgorod Oblast—and oblasts don't come more Russian than this—has demanded subsidies from the state to the tune of R 500 million. It is another matter that in a number of republics economic distortions have been aggravated. In particular through errors in cadre policy.

At one time, in order to eliminate the gap more rapidly, people of indigenous nationality were given priority in receiving education and in getting promoted at work. But then the thesis of creating national cadres was replaced by "national preference," often based on kinship relations, local favoritism, and nepotism. People mainly from the indigenous population were nominated to key posts in the party and economic apparatus, in science, culture, and education. In any case, their proportion in the leadership was much higher than the proportion of this nation in the total numbers of the republic's population.

Education played a particular role in this issue. Lowering the requirements for "entrance" meant that certain VUZ's in the republic began to turn out specialists who were extremely poorly qualified. The example of the Azerbaijan Economics Institute, which simply had to be closed, is obvious confirmation of this. Such VUZ's not only trained cadres which were incapable of managing efficiently but also multiplied the number of people aspiring to a high public position.

A 1979 population census revealed alarming trends: Among the nations which were notable for their low (lower than the nationwide average) proportion of highly-qualified specialists were...Russians, Belorussians, and the peoples of the Baltic Republics. And, conversely, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia were among those with the highest indicators. As a result, such industrially developed regions as the West Siberian, East Siberian, Urals, Volga-Vyatka, Central Chernozem, and Volga regions, today have 2-3 times fewer highly qualified

specialists (per capita of those in work) than, for example, Georgia. The training of scientific cadres is also cause for concern. In 1973 Russians accounted for 9.7 percent of postgraduate scientific workers, Belorussians for 13.4 percent, Turkmen for 26.2 percent, and Kirghiz for 23.9 percent. This ratio has not changed significantly so far.

Statistics revealed another feature. It turned out that, for example, the percentage of people with higher education is twice as high among Tajiks living on the territory of their "own" republic than those Tajiks living in the neighboring Uzbek SSR. The situation is similar for a number of other nations. The wish to live on the territory of one's own republic is easily explained: Large privileges are given here to representatives of the indigenous population. And, conversely, talented people of a different nationality, losing hope of getting a prestigious position, frequently leave for other places. As a result, the prerequisites are created for national isolation.

None of these problems will go away of its own accord. They must be resolved. And resolved with extreme caution so as not to harm mutual understanding and friendship among our peoples. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that true friendship begins with mutual respect. So the platform for resolving the problems which have accumulated must be genuine equality based not only on equal rights but also on equal responsibility for the fate of our entire multinational country.

In economics the path toward this goal is clearly defined in the documents of the 27th party congress which raised the question of how "the contribution of all republics to the development of a unified national economic complex should accord with their growing economic and spiritual potential." A certain amount of time will be required to fulfill this task. And a fundamentally new strategy by planning organs aimed at eliminating the distortions which have emerged.

It is not a question of rushing to the opposite extreme. But one solution could, for example, be that preference will be given to creating in the "debtor" regions labor-intensive production facilities working for the entire country. It is not excluded that tried and tested methods of privileges would be utilized to boost the economy of some regions and republics to average union indicators. But as soon as their position is rectified, these privileges must be abolished. The main condition is that these measures must be implemented on the principles of broad discussion and glasnost. Every people should know what they owe and to whom. And who owes what to them.

Cadre policy is also in need of new approaches. The complex period of restructuring is making a rigorous demand: It is not nationality but only a person's businesslike and moral qualities which can serve as the basis for election or nomination to leading party, soviet, or

economic posts. There can be no "second class" specialists or scientists, and that also means no privileges for entry to VUZ's or leniency for defending dissertations. Take the structure of republican academies. In some of them there is not a single scientist with the title of full member of the union Academy of Sciences.

It is also time to deal seriously with a problem about which we have shamefully preferred to remain silent for many years. It is a case of the education of young people in the spirit of internationalism.

Nothing draws people together more than a common cause. But unfortunately, our labor collectives have still not become the main school of internationalism.

We have, for example, the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubno where representatives from a variety of countries work. There should also be more of these institutes. But we have no collectives at all which are international by virtue of their set task. There could be, for example, an Aral Institute where representatives of the Central Asian republics would work jointly on reviving the ancient sea. Or, for example, a Transcaucasian Economics Institute concerned with questions of the harmonious development of the three union republics.

The socialist system is creating opportunities for all peoples to flourish and for relations between them to develop harmoniously. These opportunities only need to be implemented. And implemented skillfully, in accordance with changing circumstances and the spirit of the times. In my view, talk at the 19th all-union party conference must be about precisely this. It is easier to implement restructuring with united ranks.

Sociologist Zaslavskaya Interviewed on Theses
PM0706135788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Academician T. Zaslavskaya, president of the Soviet Sociological Association, by Ye. Manucharova under the rubric "19th Party Conference. Considering the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Fundamental Question of Restructuring"; date, place not given]

[Text] [Manucharova] Tatyana Ivanovna! The CPSU Central Committee Theses offer us absolutely new conditions of life. They commit every person to a great deal. But the people who grew up in the era when social activeness was not encouraged and initiative was punished remain fettered. It is as though a "circle of prohibition," invisible to others but highly imperative, had been drawn around each of us, separating the "accepted" from the "unaccepted...."

[Zaslavskaya] This circle is a dangerous thing. It is widespread. And traditional. Much comes within it. For instance, the passiveness of the majority of Supreme Soviet deputies. As far as I know, in the past 25 years not

a single deputy has displayed any genuinely radical social initiative, although he ran no risk and no actions would have been taken against a single deputy, whatever he demanded. But, as we know, until the last session, when the draft Law on Cooperatives underwent stormy discussion, the Soviet essentially rubber-stamped decisions prepared by the apparatus.

You are right: After a long period of stagnation it is hard immediately to acquire different habits and to behave in a truly free manner—as you consider necessary. Our consciousness is overgrown with many erroneous ideas, illusions of prohibition, and skepticism. And that is characteristic of all strata of society. But it is on the level of public awareness that a very great deal in the fate of restructuring now depends.

[Manucharova] Forgive me for interrupting you but different people have different understandings of what restructuring is. Some people think it is a case only of the quality of work, others of the number of goods. And this correspondingly determines their position: Skepticism is manifested when goods disappear from the shelves. But few people think about the underlying meaning of the breakthrough period.

[Zaslavskaya] I believe that the key to an understanding of restructuring is given in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's words to the effect that restructuring is a social revolution. That is how I see it (or at any rate want to see it!) in the CPSU Central Committee Theses.

[Manucharova] It is the Theses that our talk is about today. But it would be a good thing to determine also what should be understood in this case by the word revolution. Precise terms are particularly important here.

[Zaslavskaya] There are no variant readings here. Revolution is a radical means of changing the socioeconomic formation. Marx called revolutions the "locomotive of history."

[Manucharova] The main question which any revolution must resolve for its victory?

[Zaslavskaya] Power. Without resolving the question of power there are no revolutions. Our present-day revolution is no exception. The transfer of a large part of incomes, rights, and social privileges from the top stories of the social pyramid to the lower is connected with the redistribution of power. This is a profoundly democratic action but it is understandable that it can only be carried out by encroaching on the interests of those groups which occupy a privileged position today and primarily the apparatus of party, soviet, and economic management. The principle of the radical redistribution of power is "built into" the very concept of restructuring—that is what makes it a social revolution. Fundamental transformations are required to lead our society onto a Leninist path of socialist development.

But from the fact that these changes are essential it would be premature to conclude that they are already taking place; in other words that the measures which are being implemented in society are of a revolutionary nature. To assert this would mean deceiving ourselves and others. From my viewpoint so far the system of measures which are being implemented can be assessed only as a rather uncomprehensive, contradictory reform based on many compromises, a reform whose pace and only slight efficiency are so far curbing society's development.

We still have to attain genuinely revolutionary transformations. Or, to be more precise, they must be won in a hard sociopolitical struggle, markedly changing today's balance of social forces.

It must be said that far from everyone has grasped the idea of restructuring as a revolution. The need for a fundamental change in social relations and the consistent surmounting of all elements of "equalizing socialism" has so far been realized by only a few people. That is why people often speak of restructuring not as an in-depth process but as a manifestation of its individual features—economic accountability (*khozraschet*), discipline, and so forth. Nonetheless, over the past 3 years social awareness has become more active and has become politicized—political events and the country's fate are important and interesting for people. This is explained by the fact that truly revolutionary qualitative changes have taken place in the sphere of ideology.

Yes, as the Theses state, a fundamentally new ideological-political situation has now been created in society. Glasnost, freedom to express positions, the pluralism of opinions are absolutely essential prerequisites for the further radicalization of social relations.

Naturally this is where the revolutionization of society should begin. Unless people's awareness is unfettered further social and economic changes would be impossible.

And the main thing is that we are unable even to understand exactly what is stopping us. After all, the organic link between the economy and the political sphere was understood far from immediately. Stereotypes had a firm hold on our awareness and we did not want to admit openly the restricting influence of our political system on economic development.

Yet this influence was displayed in the direct contradiction between the harsh diktat of the system of administration through commands and the ideas of the consistent development of commodity-money relations, the market, and a consideration for the consumer's interests.

After all, as long as the imperative power of telephone calls from directive organs to economic organizations remains, the economy cannot be normalized.

[Manucharova] Let's dwell on today's obstacles to reform. The situation is complex, after all.

[Zaslavskaya] Naturally. The restructuring of social relations is not being implemented in an empty space but where the vitally important interests of different classes, strata, and groups of our society intersect. Each of them is seeking to protect its own interests, to achieve their implementation, and to prevent a threat to them. The professional demands made on leaders under the new conditions are naturally growing. Labor is becoming more complex. The intellectual level required is increasing. This alone is enough for a proportion of leaders to occupy a conservative stance, to be in no hurry to make practical changes to production management methods.

To these factors we must add insufficient thought and the inconsistencies and confusion which inevitably arise in connection with the first attempts to switch enterprises to new conditions of economic management. This is expanding still further the circle of leaders who are displeased by the course of restructuring. While supporting the fundamental concept of restructuring they believe that it is not being implemented, that many of the innovations which are actually being introduced are in fact only consolidating a leadership based on administration through command.

Hence the skepticism and the reservation of their own old positions.

A very high concentration of power has always been characteristic of our society. The majority of representatives of the top group hold responsible places in several ruling organs simultaneously. CPSU Central Committee members have become Supreme Soviet deputies, republican leaders have become CPSU Central Committee members, and ministers have joined the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee. In brief, a powerful ruling nucleus subordinate to no one has always taken shape. The centralist principle always dominated drastically over the democratic principle.

During the time of stagnation the management apparatus wielded enormous power. A command-based style in managing the lower echelons, the unconditional execution of orders from higher ranking echelons, formalism and bureaucracy in resolving questions affecting people's interests, the minimizing of direct contacts with working people became characteristic features of behavior here.

That is why it is precisely in this group that we can now see the staunchest champions of the ideological views of the period of stagnation. Many of them are reluctant to concede their positions, to surrender even a small amount of power, and they allow themselves to ignore even keen criticism in the press.

The pseudo-supporters of restructuring working in the management apparatus also present a great danger. While creating a semblance of great activeness and

effective participation in the elaboration of directive documents and instructions, they are in fact imperceptibly reducing transformation efforts to nothing.

I think that this group will wield a large volume of rights for a long time. That is why as yet many "prohibited zones" are preserved which seem not to be affected by the transformations taking place in other regions. The changing of leading cadres at least improves the situation, but it is taking place relatively slowly and not always successfully.

Many unseen but tangible barriers are obviously dividing society into groups which are constantly seeking to consolidate their positions and which are aware of the opposing nature of their interests. On the one hand there are the initiators, champions, and allies of restructuring, on the other hand the opponents of restructuring. In this connection there arises the question of the "social price" which our society can, should, and is prepared to pay for overcoming its backwardness, for purging itself of the accumulated dirt, and for moral renewal.

[Manucharova] The question also arises of the selection of a path option. In selecting what is now the definitive symbol of our faith, our "temple," do we know the road to it?

[Zaslavskaya] You are talking of several paths for the country's development and society's improvement? Yes, indeed, until recently, it was unclear what restructuring would threaten. Whichever path we are able to travel, will we not slide into the simplest liberalization, into attempts to make a few repairs to the existing system without essentially changing anything. It would be to the advantage of many social groups to stop there, and they are by no means onlookers. They represent a real force.

The Theses, as I have already said, contain a fund of ideas for a social revolution. However, victory still has to be achieved—in a very hard struggle.

[Manucharova] Not a single social group, it seems to me, has proposed a more radical path than that now adopted by the political leadership. But a less radical path? I want to understand: Could we have backslidden? Was such a zigzag of history possible? Did it threaten us?

[Zaslavskaya] I think that this threat no longer exists, although the reaction (let us call this group thus) still has strength. Extraordinarily influential hotbeds of organized crime have been destroyed in the country. These clans united the demoralized section of trade workers, merchants in the shadow economy, and the corrupt section of the apparatus of power, including the law enforcement organs. These major clans of criminals established a regime of lawlessness on the territories under their "tutelage." Some mafias have been exposed and punished but I think there are still some in hiding.

They can scarcely allow themselves simply to passively bide their time—for them restructuring means losing everything. And they will stop at nothing.

The published CPSU Central Committee Theses reinforce the feeling that revolutionary restructuring is irreversible.

[Manucharova] Please name the points in the Theses which you consider to be truly momentous.

[Zaslavskaya] First of all, of course, the transformation of the soviets of people's deputies into fully empowered organs of power and the party organs' renunciation of interference in the solution of economic questions. In other words, spheres of power are being precisely differentiated: The management of the country and of socio-economic processes will be undertaken by the soviets while the party organs will fulfill actual political and ideological functions. This allocation will make it possible to overcome political organs' unnecessary and harmful tutelage over economic activity.

The slogan "All power to the soviets" put forward by October has acquired particular popularity among the people's masses in recent years. It seems to me that the Theses express precisely this truly Leninist revolutionary idea. The Theses suggest a system of specific measures for the life support and implementation of this idea. One of these measures is aimed against the "private unions" of which I was speaking—against the merging of executive and legislative power. For instance, it will no longer be possible to elect ispolkom members to the soviets, the soviet is the supreme legislative organ, while the ispolkom is the organization under the control of and subordinate to the soviet.

So far deputies have divided their time between their main work and representation at sessions. Here their main profession naturally dominated. That is why they readily agreed to vote for any decision prepared by the apparatus (the executive power). And they did not even think particularly about its content, frequently they did not even have time to understand it properly. To strengthen the soviets, for the period of their election a proportion of deputies will be relieved of their professional work.

The restriction of the terms in office in leading elected posts also seems to me important. This ensures the rotation of cadres.

One more fundamental position—the rejection of the nomenklatura system for forming cadres—is being submitted for discussion. This is very important, but I should like to see this Thesis formulated even more precisely.

The idea of the self-purging of the Communists' ranks is very important; this will help the party protect itself against those people who, without sharing its basic ideas,

have joined the CPSU for selfish reasons. There are undoubtedly such people in the party. We must free ourselves of them, but how? After all it is not clear who will undergo recertification, who will be able, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, to offer an objective decision on the alienation [chuzhdost'] of a particular party member. For instance, the example of Uzbekistan, with which everyone is familiar, shows that under certain conditions it is precisely the people for whom there is no place in the party who can seize the upper hand in the party apparatus.

[Manucharova] Perhaps you have already switched to a criticism of the Theses.

[Zaslavskaya] The Theses are the fruit of collective thinking; they reflect a compromise between people's different positions. (Hence the large number of streamlined formulations). In fact they have been put forward as a platform for subsequent discussion and undoubtedly need to be given practical concrete form.

Their text is concentrated more on what has to be done rather than on how to achieve it. In them you will find no answer as to how the most important demands can and will be implemented: intensifying the role of the USSR Supreme Soviet, altering the election system, and subordinating the apparatus to the elected organs. Only general words are uttered too about a drastic reduction of the party apparatus.

The discussion of the Theses has already developed and people are demanding more radical changes. In my view this is extraordinarily important. The raising of the level of public awareness is having an effect here. Some 3 years ago the very publication of such Theses would probably simply have caused a mass shock.

[Manucharova] The value of feedback....

[Zaslavskaya] It is important for society that feedback should travel upward through many channels, and not just one. It is a good thing that we have a large and powerful press and television and that social initiatives are growing.

[Manucharova] What do you think of informal associations? A march and meeting by the "Civic Dignity" group was held in front of our newspaper building recently. Their slogans are "All power to the soviets" and "Long live restructuring." Are they of any use?

[Zaslavskaya] For the time being they are still perhaps not mature enough on the social plane. But they should be supported. In my view organizational forms are needed into which the desire of many people to take an active part in transforming social relations could merge. People are now talking increasingly frequently about creating a "people's alliance for assisting restructuring" operating on a public basis. This has already been done

in Estonia. Why should the experience not be extended to the Union? If this initiative is supported, the organization could exist on the people's money, not state money.

There are funds protecting children, culture, and peace. There should also be a fund for assisting restructuring. Informal organizations could be of considerable benefit to society, becoming one more channel of feedback for the government.

[Manucharova] Many people do not accept the very idea of informal associations and have probably lived their whole lives without seeing such enterprising and uninvited organizations. That is why they consider the informal associations to be simply savages which some "evil forces" will be able to launch into any conflict—between nations and between groups.

[Zaslavskaya] Distrust scarcely extends only to young social initiatives. The development of society is never without conflicts. Denying the inevitability of the struggle of group interests in connection with restructuring means closing your eyes to reality. But our path will not be so hard if we consciously and promptly enlist science to our assistance. It is necessary for the elaboration of a strategy for the social management of restructuring. And it will make it possible to minimize and to "domesticate" intergroup conflicts, to reduce social tension in society so that it is possible to achieve the projected goals at the least social cost.

The least cost. I want to stress that. Here an understanding of the measure of things is extraordinarily important. Under the conditions of the antagonism of the interests of different social groups an attempt to absolutize the line toward easing conflict can in reality result in the emasculation of the main ideas of restructuring. And a one-sided orientation toward compromises, excessive fear of offending the interests of a particular group will delay development. Then the slow progress of restructuring will lead to acute dissatisfaction among working people, although it is being implemented precisely in their interests. The implementation of a thoughtful strategy of managing restructuring will make it possible to accelerate the progress of the revolution.

After all, it is only the convinced, self-sacrificing participation of the broadest masses which can ensure its victory. Social revolution implemented through the efforts of the apparatchiks, revolution "from above" cannot work. It should be the business of those who are vitally interested in it: the progressive section of workers, kolkhoz members, and the intelligentsia. It is essential to sharply intensify its influence on the progress of restructuring. The Theses show how much can be done if you alter the political power structure.

[Manucharova] You will repeat all your bold ideas at the party conference?

[Zaslavskaya] I will not be there. I was not elected. But you can consider that I have already delivered my speech here.

Control by Labor Collectives' Councils Urged
PM1306103588 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Jun 88
p 2

[Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor V. Pertamutrov article under the rubric "We Are Discussing CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Self-Management: Control From Below"—boldface as published]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference note: "The correct organization of relations between local soviets and labor collective councils is acquiring particular significance." The question, in my view, is a very important one.

The course of restructuring is the course of the democratization of all public life. The democratization of economic management is the key, determining factor in all the complexity and diversity of the ties between the different spheres of society's activity. **The socialist economy cannot fully reveal its potential outside democratic methods of economic management.** And the democratization of other aspects of public life cannot consistently be implemented without radical changes in the production sphere.

We recall that democratic institutions of the emerging bourgeois system came into existence precisely out of the economy's requirements. The inviolability of the merchant's capital and person and the worker's working hands and person, as Engels said, is essential for capitalism. In those places where this prerequisite had appeared earlier, as in Italy at the end of the Middle Ages, capitalism emerged and established itself earlier than in other countries. And, conversely, in the East, where pashas, caliphs and other rulers could not permit anybody to be inviolable, economic development, and therefore everything else, was suspended.

At the same time we should not forget that the capitalist organization of the economy also determines the limits of democratization beyond which this society cannot go without risking its very existence. **Only socialism, only public ownership of the means of production, offers scope to true democracy.** And whereas in the past all kinds of factors—objective and subjective—in the country's life and the world situation prevented the steady manifestation of this basic feature of the socialist economy, in the present conditions of socialist renewal it is precisely democracy that must determine the entire path of economic development.

I will permit myself to digress a little. For a long time we spoke a great deal and often about how it is essential to cultivate a sense of ownership in every worker. But here we forgot that education can only cultivate those things that have a material basis in life. But how can this be

cultivated if a worker in real life has not been put in the position of an owner, has never taken part in organizing work, and has not taken responsibility for its results? Only the utopians of the past (there were some great people among them) thought that people could be brought to fair, collective labor through appeals and lofty ideals alone. We are not utopians. This is why we are beginning from the basics. When we finally succeed in putting each worker in the position of the owner of production—then a sense of ownership will emerge.

What paths lead to this? The first step of the present economic reform is the Law on the State Enterprise (Association). Production collectives will not live off the state budget but will switch to a self-financing regime. This will constitute the material base of responsibility for economic results. But that is not all. The main point is that enterprises will also switch to self-management on the basis of self-financing. According to the law the entire running of the economy switches from the higher-ranking organization and the administration appointed by it to a general meeting (or a conference of representatives) of the working people, and to the labor collective council elected by it.

This is a natural change: If responsibility for the results of activity is transferred to the labor collective itself, then it is the collective that makes decisions on the economic and social questions of its own life. The administration becomes the collective's executive organ and is completely accountable to it. Then the leaders are not nominated but are chosen. Moreover, the workers are transformed from "hired hands" into **coordinated and responsible joint owners of their enterprise**. Of course, it is not easy to implement these changes. Teaching millions of workers to run their enterprises is a task without precedent. This means that attention should be given to it first and foremost.

The enterprise is a large and complex organism. It is essential also to organize genuine economic accountability (*khozraschet*) within the plant so that every worker is a joint owner of production not in words but in reality. The best form of economic accountability, as practice shows, is the contract—of the shop, sector, or team. Unless the worker feels that he is the owner in his primary collective, then he can easily slide into a position of parasitism as regards the enterprise as a whole and society. And it is true to say that the plant is large and the state is huge. Just try figuring out who is adding to the wealth and who is eroding it? It is another matter when the wage of each person will be determined by his labor contribution to the final results of his primary collective. Here parasitism is ruled out...

But let us move on. In conditions of collectives' self-capitalization and self-financing, the position of state management and planning organs is becoming exceptionally important. For many decades, as purely administrative organizations, they managed by "pressure" and command methods. Demanding that administrative

organs, as we often do, remove "petty tutelage" from enterprises, without changing ministries' rights and responsibilities, is demanding the impossible. It is now virtually impossible to administer absolutely everything from the center and to plan absolutely everything in detail as happened in the 1930's. What is more, the desire to do so can stifle any economic accountability—the economic relations of partners who manage independently and equally.

That is precisely why the democratization of the activity of the organs that manage the entire economy is being put forward as a priority task. Each worker must, not in words but in reality, be put in the position of joint owner, joint proprietor of the public means of production not only in his work place and at his enterprise, but also in the country's economy. This is the very essence of a genuinely socialist organization of society. This is also an internal reserve for rationally conducting affairs that does not and cannot exist in any other social structure.

Let us look at history. In the first years after the revolution, the provincial regional economic councils, subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy, were also directly connected with the organs of Soviet power—and acted as economic departments of the local soviets. Soviets of all levels were elected not at people's homes but at workers' meetings at enterprises. And the result was that the labor collective representatives controlled the industrial management organs through the soviets. Congresses of the republic's national economic soviets were also regularly convened and determined on a democratic basis both the current and the long-term tasks and methods of resolving basic question of managing the entire state industry. Even in the most difficult year of 1918 two such congresses were held.... The 1930-1932 reforms, which created the economic mechanism for forced industrialization, eliminated the influence exerted on industry by the organs of Soviet power.

Now that we are finally once again raising the problem of democratizing the national economy, the experience of the past can be utilized, on, of course, a new and modern basis. If the administration at the enterprise is accountable to the general assembly of workers or to a conference of their representatives, and also to the labor collective council, if cardinal socioeconomic decisions cannot be taken without their approval, then why does this system not work at the upper management levels? Perhaps it would be logical to regularly convene all-union, republican, and local congresses of labor collective council representatives? At their congresses they could discuss basic socioeconomic issues—drafts for national economic plans, guidelines for social, investment, financial, scientific and technical, and pricing policy for the next plan and for the longer term, and drafts of economic and social legislation.

We will try to imagine this more specifically. For example, the all-union conference of labor collective council representatives listens to reports by Gosplan and the

USSR Academy of Sciences on how the country is implementing the reform of the economic mechanism. If the Council of Ministers listened to this report it would be control "from above." But in this case it is the labor collective representatives who are well acquainted with the state of affairs locally and are not responsible for the work of the reporting organization. Indeed, this control "from below" can be very effective, in our view.

Or, for example, take construction. How many decisions have we had against the dissipation of capital investments in construction, on concentrating resources and efforts on facilities scheduled for completion. But so far there are no noticeable improvements. Officials from some departments refer to others, they are all ready to turn down numerous construction projects, not their own, but their neighbor's. Neither Gosplan nor Gosstroy, as long-standing practice shows, have been able to resolve the problem. But what if a thorough investigation into the matter is conducted not by those who look after departmental interests but by a congress of workers themselves—the representatives of the labor collectives? It couldn't do it? But why not? After all, these are the people who build, who prepare equipment for new plants, who transport, install, and repair it. It is they who know the real state of affairs.

But the most important factor is that the congress of labor collective council representatives should be not an information or discussion association, but a working one; that the decisions of the appropriate soviets of people's deputies right up the USSR Supreme Soviet should be made according to its recommendations; and the economic management organs—Gosplan, Gossnab and others—would change from administrative, bureaucratic organs into executive organs of democratically formed congresses of labor collective council representatives.

Editor Pledges To Defend Komsomol at Conference

PM0706115588 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 88 p 1

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA chief editor Gennadiy Seleznev under the general heading "Your Position? We Continue the Discussion on the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Delegates' Questionnaire: 1. What Will You Be Defending at the Conference? 2. What Will You Be Decisively Opposing? 3. What Do You Personally Want To Propose?"]

[Text] 1. The Komsomol. Yes, yes, the Komsomol as the only mass sociopolitical organization of young people in our country which aids and is a reserve of the CPSU.

The Komsomol took heart when the 27th CPSU Congress gave it back the status of a sociopolitical organization. But the Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference mention the role of our union in a package with other public organizations and

foundations. Why? Name just one party in the world which does not have its own reserve youth organization which enables it to replenish its own ranks with young people who have the same views. I think you would not be able to name one.

Now, in the period of revolutionary transformations, the Komsomol should be given more independence and even power. Young people are ready to work very hard, take responsibility for serious state work, and get the masses to gravitate toward them. I do not know the names of ispolkom chairmen, plant directors, leaders of scientific research institutes, or VUZ deans who are Komsomol members. You think they are not up to it? You are wrong. The Komsomol has been kept in short pants for too long, protected from bruises and bumps. Now it is paying for this, but it is also being cleansed of formalism, conformism, bureaucracy and is beginning to breathe freely.

2. I am against the viewpoint that exists in the public consciousness that specific problems do not exist among young people. Stagnation made young people the most unfairly treated section of society. But it is precisely they who will have to accomplish restructuring.

3. The conference must establish this fact and issue instructions for elaborating a multipurpose social and state "Youth" program.

Economist Responds to Party Conference Theses

LD0706083188 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 5 Jun 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th party conference is continuing throughout the country. Our correspondent Yevgeniy Sinitsyn has interviewed Yevgeniy Ashakovich Ambartsumov, head of department in the Economics of World Socialism Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in this regard.

[Begin Recording] [Sinitsyn] How do you perceive the Theses as a whole?

[Ambartsumov] I am very pleased. I consider it to be a profoundly democratic document, primarily because it reflects to a very high degree those positive suggestions which were expressed during preparations for the conference. Secondly, it provides sufficient freedom for corrections—it leaves some questions open; evidently they will be resolved in a more precise manner during the conference itself. The last thing I should like to say in this connection is that the very tone is profoundly democratic and in the restructuring vein. Only yesterday I was talking with a Spanish journalist from the major EL PAIS newspaper, who asked anxiously whether a compromise, a political compromise, had been reached between the champions and opponents of restructuring.

To judge from the Theses, this has not occurred. There is no political compromise; restructuring has gained the upper hand. The position of Nina Andreyeva can be said to have been conceptually rejected.

There are a few issues which seem to me to require further development. There is a very important clause whereby the party in fact places itself within specific bounds, in accordance with the Constitution, and obliges all party organizations to act within the framework of the Constitution and the laws. Furthermore, it says that the adoption by party committees of decisions containing direct instructions to state and economic bodies and public organizations should be ruled out. However, it is well known that interference by party leaders in everyday operational work occurs not by way of specific decisions, but simply, as the saying goes, by telephone law; instructions are given, you cannot yet away from them. I think this clause in the text of the Theses should be accompanied by directions on strict sanctions, right up to dismissal from one's post and party investigations, as far as expulsion from the party for interference by party organs in the operational work of economic and other organizations.

It is very important that the role of the soviets is being enhanced, and, properly speaking, Lenin's slogan, All power to the soviets, should be implemented. But I think that the opportunity for deputies to work properly, to devote all their energies to precisely this political work will be of very great significance. In connection with this, the question arises—and mention is made of this here, both of the duration of office [changes thought] of the duration of the sessions, inter alia of the Supreme Soviet, and that the discussion of these questions which will be posed at the session will take on a business-like and not a ceremonial character. [sentence as heard] The last session strengthened this business-like character, but even so, an element of the ceremonial in everything—unanimous voting and so forth, prevailed. But at the end of the day it is people on the move who cover the distance [dorogu osilyat idushchiye]. I think that what we have proposed, put forward, and have still not fully done—we have still done very little over these past years—is a very great deal. [end recording]

Conference Must Pave Way for Congress

PM1006115188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 9 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V. Trushkov, member of the CPSU since 1965, under the rubric "19th All-Union Conference: Perusing the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Nowhere To Retreat to, Stagnation Is Past"]

[Text] There was no official opening to the party debate this time, and it began long before the publication of the Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference.

The people and the party are expecting the conference to carry out a searching analysis of restructuring, make principled assessments of the role played in it by everyone who has been placed in charge of it (not only of leading collective bodies, but individual assessments as well), make mature decisions, and provide reliable guarantees of democracy and glasnost.

If I had to answer the question what do I expect from the 19th all-union party conference, I would reply: A congress.

In my reply I am not being disrespectful toward the party conference, nor do I doubt that it will be successful and significant. I am pinning enormous hopes on it for an acceleration of restructuring—just as much as any member of the party, as any incorrigible optimist. But it seems to me that in the past 2 years many questions have accumulated that lie outside the conference's jurisdiction, which it does not have the authority to tackle. Here are two hypotheses. First, the conference could elevate (constitute, to use legal language) its status to the level of a congress. It is true that it would then have to widen the range of questions for discussion to include the traditional congress matters—amendments to the CPSU Statutes and election of party central bodies. The party has had conferences of this kind. The celebrated Prague 6th and April 7th Conferences elected entirely new Central Committees and the 18th all-union party conference in 1941 considerably expanded the membership of central bodies. Questions relating to the Statutes were discussed at the 8th and 12th conferences.

The second option is to decide to convene the next, 28th party congress. No, not an extraordinary congress, convened to tackle some very important, specific issue, but a routine one—with a Central Committee accountability report, with a discussion of the shape of the next 5-year plan, with amendments to the Statutes and elections. And the Central Committee could, of course, broaden the range of questions if necessary.

But the principal question today is: Democratization is the political essence of the current restructuring. The party's task is to involve ever greater masses of the working population in the utilization of democratic rights and freedoms and to widen the material potential of this. There will not be more democracy in our society than there is in intraparty life.

We admit that there are exactly as many violations and restrictions of democracy in the party today as are perpetrated by us, Communists. Ilich told us: "All the members of the party, on an equal basis and without exception, conduct, directly or through representatives, all the affairs of the party."

The state of intraparty democracy depends to a crucial extent on the quality of party ranks.

And concerns about intraparty democracy and about protecting our ranks from careerists and rogues are closely interrelated. Democracy can do without people who try to worm their way into the party. They are after the ranks and offices that democracy prevents them from achieving. So the careerists and bureaucrats are constantly attacking democracy. Do we have a strong defense against them? Or are we surrendering position after position? In fact, there was Lenin's behest: "Communist parties in those countries where Communists are operating legally must carry out periodic purges (reregistration) of party organization personnel in order to systematically purge the party of the petty bourgeois elements who are bound to worm their way in."

The Central Committee Theses provide for pre-congress certification of Communists. But it must not be merely an isolated episode. Incidentally, a number of fraternal parties have accumulated a wealth of experience of annual reregistration. What is stopping us having a regular clearout, although we have renounced mass purges? One obstacle, perhaps, is the fact that the apparatus is not interested, if only because it will mean extra work.

The practice of electing leading party bodies is also defective. Remember how many candidates are nominated for party committees or bureaus—exactly as many as have to be elected. This is very convenient: Unanimity is almost assured. Not even the wildest imagination could picture a situation where one of the nominees was not elected. The thing is that Article 24 of the CPSU Statutes envisages what is ostensibly a very democratic norm: Anyone who obtains more than half of the vote is deemed elected. In fact, this means that there is no point in putting forward extra candidates so that Communists are able to choose: No one will be turned down, the elective body will merely be bigger.

The Theses propose that henceforth elections to all party bodies will be held on a competitive basis. While backing this proposal, I would note that it will become effective when the corresponding changes are made to the CPSU Statutes.

Echoes of Stalinist disregard for intraparty democracy and the desire to identify the party committee with the apparatus have lingered for too long, unfortunately. A hired body, the apparatus is inevitably a strictly hierarchical, administrative system, because the hired official always reports exclusively to the hirer, who is on the next step up on the official ladder.

Today's elective party committees are effectively collegiums of apparatchiks. It is not the most authoritative party people, but holders of authoritative posts who are nearly always elected. It is difficult to genuinely and accurately express the will and aspirations of workers and peasants if their representatives are in an absolute minority on party committees. For example, workers

and kolkhoz members constituted 5 percent of the Central Committee members elected at the congress before last, the 26th, and 10 percent of the Central Committee candidate members, and 20 percent of the Central Auditing Commission members. At the same time, nearly two-thirds of the Central Committee members and more than half of the candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Central Auditing Commission had never been either workers or kolkhoz members. To be frightened that workers may not be able to make competent social decisions is not to have faith in one's people.

Is it not time to completely carry out Lenin's historic behest? Increase the Central Committee membership by bringing in workers (remember that in 1922 there were only 18 Central Committee members). "Workers joining the Central Committee must be...predominantly not workers who have served for a long time in soviets (in this part of my letter I always include peasants among workers), because certain traditions and certain prejudices which it is desirable to combat have already developed in these workers."

As for the number of Central Committee members and candidate members, is it not excessive? Obviously, in any collegium of 300-400 people (candidate members on top of that) two unequal parts are bound to emerge: One that actually tackles issues, the other that votes. Incidentally it was in the years we now call the stagnation years that the Central Committee membership swelled to such proportions. Here too, one should probably get closer to what Lenin intended.

In fact it is to the congress rather than the conference that the numerous proposals are addressed relating to the revival of the Central Control Commission, which would be subordinate neither to the Central Committee nor to any other body, but would be elected by the congress on a par with them. This was Lenin's idea. And the Bolsheviks saw the Central Control Commission as the conscience of the party.

But the party's supreme arbiter was abolished. So is it not time to rectify this gross error! This task would scarcely be solved by combining the Central Auditing Commission and the Party Control Committee, as is suggested in the Theses. Indeed, the Central Control Committee would have control not only of the individual party members, but of all party instances, including the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the general secretary. That was Lenin's behest.

To develop democracy we need a sober and realistic assessment of what has been achieved. This relates in particular to the description of economic relations. However, Article 15 of the USSR Constitution says that "the supreme goal of social production under socialism is to satisfy as fully as possible people's growing material and spiritual needs." But the full satisfaction of needs is the same as distribution according to needs. So why, in the

Constitution, which enshrines victories won and real social ties, ascribe to socialism something that is inherent only in the highest phase of communist society? If we have achieved that level of distribution, why are we talking about democracy at all? V.I. Lenin convincingly demonstrated that under communism democracy, like political life in general, will simply fade away. And commodity relations, which we intend to develop, would be incompatible with our state's Basic Law, given constitutional formulas of that kind. I think the 19th party conference would have to initiate the process of overcoming such inconsistencies. This, in particular, is what the Central Committee Theses are geared to.

This document envisages enhancing the role of labor collective councils. But is it not time to answer the question whether they are uniform with soviets? The answer will certainly be in the affirmative if one recalls the history of the emergence and the very nature of the first worker soviets. But if so, then the labor collective councils will have to be incorporated in the system of organs of soviet power, their relationship with local soviets will have to be established, and the principle of the sovereignty of the soviets will have to be extended to them once and for all. And in this case the conference decisions could be decisive.

And can one really avoid the question of the machinery for recalling elected representatives? It is equally relevant for party bodies, for soviets, and for public organizations. Restructuring has added elected economic leaders and labor collective councils to this list. V.I. Lenin taught that no assembly or institution can consider itself democratic unless the masses can easily recall any elected representative or official. We must not forget this democratic demand today. But, apparently, we are forgetting it. Reserve deputies have appeared in multiseat okrugs. They say this is the virtue of experiment. In one way, maybe so. But under this system it is not feasible to replace a deputy since even when they have recalled an unsuitable deputy voters are not able to replace him with a new one: The vacant place is automatically occupied by a reserve deputy, who does not entirely lack their confidence, but has not been given their complete approval. This problem will also have to be unraveled by the 19th all-union conference.

But no matter how wide the range of democratization problems might be, the chief ones are associated with amendment of the CPSU Statutes and election of leading party bodies—the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee. But these are congress problems. Maybe it is good that they will be raised and discussed this summer, but no final decisions will be made. The main thing is not to brush them aside, put them on ice. For that reason a decision is needed on convening the 28th CPSU Congress.

An extra year of preconference preparation would be very useful for the party: The more we become accustomed to extensive democracy, the better the decisions on democracy will be. In the end, as Gorkiy's hero said, rights are

not given, rights are taken. At the moment we are only learning to take them. For instance, the election of delegates to the 19th all-union party conference is proceeding much more democratically than even at the 27th party congress. There the delegates were elected by oblast conferences, and by them alone. Today their candidates are also being discussed in labor collectives. But by no means all oblast and city party organizations saw fit to carry out the Central Committee recommendation put forward by General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev: Publish in the local press a list of candidate delegates and discuss it in primary organizations.

It is a difficult task mastering the science of democratization that was recently called socialist pluralism. It is time to clearly recognize that it is no sin and cannot be a sin to have a different opinion and the only crime for a Communist is apostasy from socialism. Lenin's advice is very relevant today: "In such fiendishly difficult conditions, one must not see people with different opinions or different approaches in terms of 'intrigue' and 'counterweight,' but value independent people." We are learning this Leninist science. By and large we are approving of the "dissidence" of N. Bukharin, A. Rykov, M. Tomskiy, N. Krestinskiy, and Kh. Rakovskiy.... We intend to revise former assessments of the dissident views of G. Zinovyev, L. Kamenev, L. Pyatakov, G. Sokolnikov, K. Radek, and dozens of others. At the same time, one does not always have the ability to separate a Communist's different views from political errors, and this is also part of the democratization "training program." Examinations in this subject are always difficult. The party believes that the party conference will show the way to pass these examinations. But it is already under way. Communists and all Soviet people are addressing it in brief notes in newspapers and in lengthy articles. The unstoppable wheel of socialist democracy is spinning faster and faster. It has nearly reached the "19th all-union" mark. The arrow pointing to the congress is clearly visible from there.

Theses Solve Main Problems in Party Mechanism
LD1206134088 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 0800 GMT 12 Jun 88

[“We Discuss the Theses of the 19th All-Union Party Conference” program, presented by unidentified announcer with Ivan Ivanovich Antonovich, pro-rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee and doctor of philosophy—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Antonovich] The democratic construction, which will be continued and strengthened by our conference, is not something that is coming into being upon a bare spot: It is continuing the best traditions of socialist democracy. Take the problem of electing the best people. In our discussions we sometimes forget to analyze these questions in an all-round way. What I would like to do now is express a thesis and provide foundation for it. In my view our problems lie not in the election of

people but in the regular replacement of people who are in power. During the whole tragedy of the personality cult and in the whole marasmus of stagnation, the issue was not the fact that the party had elected these particular people to these offices. The fact is that the mechanisms of democracy did not start to work in order to remove them from power when the incompatibility of Stalin's personal interests with the requirements of socialist development in the eighties became obvious. It is all very complicated.

We cannot say that the party did not try to deprive Stalin of power at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties. We know that such attempts were made. The party lost that fight. Defeat in struggle is not the party's fault, it is the party's misfortune. The mechanism for the regular transfer of power did not function. We cannot say that the party acted badly in 1964 when it removed a leader who at that time I would say was showing an inclination for indulging in empty talk, unrealistic plans, harebrained schemes, and even some adventurism. That's not the point. The point is that when Leonid Ilich Brezhnev became ill and ceased to perform his functions in a normal manner, the party turned out not to have any mechanism for removing him from the post of general secretary.

In my view the idea of two terms in power for any elected official which has been set down in the Theses solves the main problem. It brings into operation in our democratic institutions—be they party, local soviet, or public—the idea of a regular transfer of power from individual to individual, and so will put an end to a considerable extent the possibility of repeating the mistakes, the tragedies, and indeed the crimes of the past. I therefore take a very optimistic view of our conference. I am convinced that these specific measures to democratize internal party and state life will be the main valve through which the inexhaustible spring of people's initiative and talent will pass on its way to the management of public affairs. I should like straightaway to make the point that my optimism tries to cling to the soil of reality. I am convinced that the conference cannot be the generation of words for display purposes. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Ivan Ivanovich, don't you think that recently it's become almost a rule that in order to strike the right note, one should continuously criticize everything? I think that criticism is often being turned into fault-finding and carping.

[Antonovich] There is indeed a lot of criticism, but while there is a lot it's probably inadequate. As far as the public reading of the Theses is concerned, therein lies the strength of our new stage—in the fact that everyone has his own version of the Theses, rather than one version for all. I'm a little embarrassed, it's true, by criticism of the Theses when comrades of standing appear on your medium—television—saying that the theses are too general in character. As though Theses could be specific in character! That's the whole point: The overall political,

overall theoretical, and overall intellectual tendencies of democratism have now been marked out and the task is to develop them into specific systems.

Take the thesis dealing with the legal state. In the context of this conference this is revolutionary, but it is general. Indeed, for it to become specific, a completely new system of legislation is required; a reform of the law is required; enormous work in making it specific.

I am, in fact, worried by another aspect of criticism: People who complain about democracy have now made their appearance in the press, on radio and television, and in conversation. Quite honestly it isn't at all interesting to listen when someone, for example, who has turned out not to be elected to the conference says that there is no democracy. It turns out that they have only understood democracy as being democracy for themselves and not for everyone. And when they are not elected, then that is where democracy ends as far as they are concerned. Here we all have to learn about democracy; it takes a long time and it's hard work, because democracy is both the right to be elected and also the obligation to accept the results of the democratic election process. There's no shame in not being elected. It means one is not elected at that particular moment and one has to be able to accept the will of the majority.

This is a huge piece of learning and we all have to go through it. Quite frankly, those who are now complaining that there is no democratism, therefore, merely because they have not been elected, do not produce the best impression as far as I am concerned. [passage omitted]

Ways To Enhance Supreme Soviet Role Suggested
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13 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[M. Buzhkevich and A. Chernyak article under the rubric "Debating Tribune: Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Full Power. Reflections on Ways To Radically Enhance the USSR Supreme Soviet's Role"—boldface as published]

[Text] It was just a coincidence: The newspapers simultaneously published reports on the just concluded USSR Supreme Soviet session and the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th all-union party conference. Much space in them is devoted to strengthening the role of soviets of people's deputies at all levels, and they speak of the need to restore real power to the soviets. This also presupposes a radical enhancement of the role of the country's supreme organ of power. It was from this viewpoint that we decided to review the last USSR Supreme Soviet session and describe conversations with its deputies.

...On the day before the USSR Supreme Soviet session opened, Central Television conducted a poll in Moscow's streets to find out what people knew about the

forthcoming sittings of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Some of those polled showed no interest at all in the event and did not know what questions would be discussed by the country's parliament. Why such a lack of interest in it? One of those who were asked this question explained: "Had it been a party Central Committee plenum, everyone would have been interested—it is there that the most important decisions on the country's and society's life are made. But a USSR Supreme Soviet session? What decisions does it make?"

It is sad to admit, but far from all Soviet people recognize the USSR Supreme Soviet as the supreme organ of state power, as enshrined in our Constitution. To this day, the parliament's work contains much formalism and many "ossified" traditions. PRAVDA's readers write about this, the deputies themselves say it.

"Sessions," according to poet Rasul Gamzatov, "still 'roll along' the well-trodden path. We arrive in Moscow, we get to the Kremlin, and we examine questions that have been prepared by the apparatus and have been essentially decided in advance."

"And our vote is invariably unanimous," Dzhemma Skulme, chairman of the Latvian Artists Union, added. "It would be interesting to find out whether anyone has ever thought about the cost to the people of our trips to the capital for this totally unnecessary unanimity. Even comrades-in-arms who are united by a single goal may have differing views on the ways to attain this goal, there must be arguments about how to find the best possible way. It is well known that truth is born out of argument. As for us, every now and again you hear it said at the session's sittings: 'All those in favor? Anyone against? None. Any abstentions? None.' Everything is nice, smooth, and calm. We are so accustomed to all this that at the last session, when I abstained during the vote on one of the proposals, the chairman paid no attention to my raised hand and right away summed it up as usual: 'Carried unanimously.' A triviality, some people might say. But here we have a matter of principle—to express one's own opinion, one's own belief. And this is where we deputies must set an example, a model to those who have elected us. It is incumbent upon us to actively influence the state's life and people's social mood, and this cannot be done by mechanical voting and formal unanimity."

"I am amazed by the haste at sessions," Ye. Safonov, general director of the "Nizhnevolzhskgeologiya" Association, told us. "The Law on the Cooperative System was, for all intents and purposes, discussed for only a few hours at just one sitting of the chambers. Only 23 deputies spoke. And yet this is something new, there are many unclarities and ambiguities. Everything ought to be thought out, right down to the tiniest detail. Even 2-3 days would not have been begrudged. I think that sessions ought to be convened more often—even once every quarter...."

V.I. Lenin also expressed a similar idea in the past. In his report to the 11th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress he noted that the aim must be to ensure that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee functions more energetically and that it is properly convened in sessions that should last longer.

At this point it would be appropriate to say that the majority of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies no longer wish to work in the old fashion and are breaking down the entrenched canons. The last session saw what could be described as an unprecedented event: Despite the agenda, the approval of the Law on the Cooperative System was postponed until the following day. Why? Numerous amendments were introduced during the discussion of the draft, and there was not sufficient time to consider them.

There were especially heated debates between the authors of amendments and government spokesmen, especially USSR Minister of Finance B. Gostev. V. Kalashnikov, secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Obkom, and Kolkhoz Chairmen V. Popov and F. Shnayder insisted that the new law contains a paragraph raising the minimum pension of kolkhoz members to the level of workers' minimum pension. The argument between the deputies and the head of the finance department lasted more than 1 hour. The minister was as immovable as a rock and did not yield: At present, he said, there is no money for such a step. This proposal, which restores social justice, will be included in the draft of a new law on pensions that is due to be submitted for nationwide discussion toward the end of this year. Let us add our own remark: According to the session's decision, the USSR Law on the Cooperative System will come into force 1 July this year, while the new pension provisions will not come into force before 1990. Many kolkhoz members will receive meager pensions for at least 1 and ½ years.

The list of documents ratified by the session omits the decree dated 14 March this year on the taxation of the income of citizens working in cooperatives. The progressive taxation of cooperative members gave rise to numerous complaints because it essentially ties their hands. It was decided to study this problem further. A commission was set up, headed by the USSR minister of finance. Deputies suggested that B. Gostev should inform the public of the new edition of the decree prior to its adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Such debates during a session were virtually unheard of in the past. Let us hope that henceforth they will become the norm of our parliament's work. All this, of course, generates joy and hope. But there are also some distressing facts. The progress of restructuring in the supreme organ of power is far from easy. Judge for yourselves.

The session discussed the question of the work of soviet and economic organs to ensure fulfillment of the program for housing, cultural, and consumer services construction in light of the 27th CPSU Congress decisions.

A coreport on behalf of several commissions of both Supreme Soviet chambers was delivered by Deputy V. Zgurskiy, chairman of the Kiev Gorispolkom. No, he did not applaud the country's housing program, but spoke with alarm of its imperfections. First, because there is still no exhaustive and verified information on the technical condition of the existing housing stock. Second, there is no clear-cut definition of the family as a unit of account, and it is therefore impossible to define the quantity and type of apartments required. And finally, there is no clear idea of what an individual home ought to be like, of the standard of its comforts and amenities. And here is the "nail" which the deputy drove home: He said that in this case the government actions are based more on guesswork and instinct rather than on scientific calculations.

Could it have been a case of V. Zgurskiy confusing the session and misinforming his colleagues? A clear explanation could have been given primarily by the main speaker on this question—Deputy Yu. Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gosstroy. He failed to do so, he kept silent. So what is the truth?

It must be said that deputies' speeches, especially at sittings of permanent commissions and even at the sessions themselves, have recently become noticeably sharper. Some speakers, however, just like in the past, use the country's foremost forum for all sorts of obsequies to leaders of ministries and departments and for various supplications. This was the tone used, for example, in many speeches in the Soviet of the Union during the discussion on ways to improve the construction of housing and of social and consumer services projects. Suddenly Deputy Ye. Maryakhina, leader of an integrated team from Sverdlovsk, demanded on behalf of the voters that leaders of machine building sectors and numerous design organizations comprehensively and effectively tackle the mechanization of construction work. Construction industry workers today still perform a lot of manual labor and operate according to the principle of "Grab as much as you can, you can always throw it away later."

Let us turn to V.I. Lenin again. Back in November 1919, Vladimir Ilich wrote in a note on the composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the supreme organ of state power at the time: "Not all people's commissars (including the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) and deputy people's commissars should be included." He evidently feared that members of the Council of People's Commissars would start imposing their opinions and will on the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which would be contrary to the Soviet Constitution. Lenin's note provided the basis for the resolution on the composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which was later adopted by a Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee plenum.

This warning was subsequently discarded and forgotten. And now the office of union minister automatically gives the minister a mandate of a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy. The last elections to parliament, held in March 1984, saw the election of 12 deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, 78 ministers, 27 chairmen of union republic councils of ministers and their deputies.... And so it happens that those who are accountable to the Supreme Soviet and whose duty it is to implement the laws it adopts, often influence the union parliament's decisions at its sessions and impose their will on the supreme organ of state power. Paradoxical and unacceptable. The CPSU Central Committee Theses correctly say that the situation must be changed: It is time to assert the genuine supremacy of soviets over executive organs. The time has come to establish that officials from management organs subordinate to a soviet cannot be its deputies. This rule must extend, subject to rare exceptions, also to members of the union government.

Of course, this does not mean that "rank and file" parliamentarians carry no responsibility. So far, their activeness has been clearly lagging behind life which is fast changing and renewing itself. Some cannot—and at times do not even know how to—exercise the rights vested in them. Take for example the deputy's question—a powerful means in the struggle to fulfill voters' mandates, the struggle against major shortcomings in the economy and the social sphere. The total number of such questions asked during the nine sessions of the country's current Supreme Soviet is...two. Maybe this is why some of the laws approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet "operate" at half strength. Like the Law on the State Enterprise, for example.

"It is almost an insult, we fought for it, and today it is, to all intents and purposes, skidding," according to V. Piskunov, general director of the "Yakutalmaz" Association. "Collectives have simply not gained any independence—the ministries have no intention of relinquishing their power, functionaries are essentially uncontrolled. Much can be done by the USSR Supreme Soviet in this regard. A number of this law's provisions should have been amended, amplified, or replaced at this very session. Look at the U.S. Congress. Laws there soon become cluttered with amendments."

"And why not say this from the session rostrum?" we asked the deputy.

"It could have been said from the rostrum. Unfortunately, not everyone who wishes to speak can get the floor, owing to the short duration of the session's work. Last fall I did some solid preparatory work, wanted to speak about all the most pressing matters, but got no opportunity to speak."

"As a matter of fact, representatives of national republics—how shall I put it..." P. Gilashvili, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, paused for a

moment's reflection and went on: "...are not all in a position to play an active part in the discussion of questions. According to custom, only Russian is spoken at the sessions. Yes, this is our state language. But some people can express their ideas more accurately in their native tongue. The headphones plugged into the armrest of every seat enable you to hear the speaker's speech in English [Editor's note: an earlier edition of this article carried in Moscow PRAVDA on 12 June at this point has additional phrase "or German"] translation, but there are no translation facilities from Georgian or Kazakh into Russian."

Supreme Soviet deputies, just like deputies to all other soviets, perform their duties as public work. It is, of course, very good that they are not detached from the people.

They live among the masses and are aware of their concerns. There is, however, another side to the coin. But let us hear what Margarita Vasilyevna Yuferova, operator at Novopolotsk's "Polimir" Association, has to say.

"The ecological situation in Novopolotsk has deteriorated in the last few years. The population demands that urgent measures be taken, that the installation of gas traps and other apparatus be speeded up. I have to travel to the ministry in Moscow to solve these questions so that I might succeed in fulfilling the voters' mandates by the end of my term next spring—I'm thinking of retiring on pension. Seeing that women in the chemical industry are entitled to do so at the age of 45."

Margarita Vasilyevna added with a sigh that, had she been released from her work duties for the duration of her term as deputy she would have managed to do a great deal more for her electoral okrug.

There is a lot of sense in what she said. Quite a few of Yuferova's colleagues share her view. Some support her totally, others believe that deputies to the country's Supreme Soviet could be released from their work duties for several months every year.

Some deputies spoke with a sense of grievance about the fact that some leaders treat them in a downright consumerist fashion, instructing them to intercede with central organs to meet their requirements for the delivery of equipment, allocation of additional funds for industrial construction, and so on. For this purpose, deputies follow instructions from local bosses and use their personal notepaper to write letters to ministers or to the USSR Gosplan and Gosstab. Or they might travel to Moscow or the republic capitals as professional "pushers." [This last paragraph is entirely omitted in 12 June version]

Voters and those whom they send to the Supreme Soviet are also perturbed by the following problem. V. Karpov, first secretary of the USSR Writers Union Board, spoke

of it with utmost frankness at the session. He represents Rostov Oblast in the Soviet of Nationalities. He pays only flying visits to his voters, they do not find it easy to get to him, and there are about 250 such deputies who are permanent residents of Moscow in full-time employment there. They also visit their voters infrequently and are, to a considerable extent, detached from their daily concerns and needs. Deputies who are Soviet ambassadors to various countries are in an even more difficult position.

Letters received by PRAVDA also say that the time has come to radically restructure the election system itself. They must really become elections, in other words there must be an opportunity to elect the most deserving of several candidates. Moreover, each one of them must come out with his own work program. At the same time, there are proposals to reduce as much as possible the number of persons whose leadership positions predetermine their election to the USSR Supreme Soviet. This group now represents about 40 percent of deputies there.

There is an opinion that our parliament ought to be cut down in size—it is rather unwieldy. There is the question of a more clear-cut delineation of powers and the overcoming of the chambers' functional impersonality; of a proportion of deputies being elected directly from public organizations within our society's political system.

Restructuring is persistently knocking on the doors of our parliament. It is time for it to abandon the well-trodden path of decades-old traditions, rules, and regulations. And to take the broad highway of democratic transformations and maximum defense of the people's interests. Then the work of its deputies, permanent commissions, chambers, and sessions will provide tangible confirmation that full power has been restored to the soviets.

Zagladin Discusses Changes in Foreign Policy
PM1306145188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Jun 88 Second Edition p 6

[V. Zagladin article under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "Following a Course of Reason and Humanism"—boldface as published]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Theses, which have been submitted for discussion by the entire party and, essentially, by the whole people, contain two kinds of points. On the one hand, they sum up the past 3 years of restructuring, while on the other they outline ways to further develop and deepen it. It is a profoundly self-critical document that ruthlessly exposes those phenomena or processes that are hindering the renewal of society. At the same time, it formulates constructive proposals whose realization will make it possible to smash the braking mechanism wherever it operates. This revolutionary-critical methodology permeates all parts of the new document, which is essentially a program document, and each of its 10 sections

Understandably, the majority of the theses are devoted to internal political questions and to the chief tasks of further improving our society. At the same time, they also raise problems of foreign policy. Why? Above all, because restructuring itself has acquired outstanding international significance and had a powerful influence on the international atmosphere. This is now acknowledged by everyone. And, on the other hand, because restructuring, as the theses point out, "needed a foreign policy that would properly express its humanist nature." The renewal of the country's foreign policy activity has become an important part of the changes that are transforming our entire life.

1.

There is a question that Soviet people, as well as people throughout the world, have always asked themselves in alarm: Is the threat of war and nuclear conflict increasing or diminishing? The theses provide a clear, precise, and unambiguous answer to this question: "The direct threat of a war involving the major powers has diminished." This is probably the first time in a considerable number of years that our party has drawn this conclusion, which is understandably of an extremely crucial nature. It rests on the visible, tangible realities of the world situation, which is going through a process of improvement.

Yes, the restructuring of international relations has begun. How has this been achieved? Thanks to what? For not so long ago we were speaking of a shift to more lasting peace as something desirable and necessary but difficult to achieve and seemingly remote.

It cannot be said that our country was not striving to secure changes in the world arena also in the years prior to restructuring. We did strive. Good ideas were advanced to this end, and numerous initiatives were proposed. But they did not work. As M.S. Gorbachev put it in his book on restructuring, "Soviet foreign policy was skidding on the spot. The arms race was gathering new momentum. The threat of war was increasing."

Why did this skidding take place? What did we lack?

Above all—and this is clear enough now—we lacked a realistic view of the world. We looked at the reality surrounding us through the prism of customary formulas. At one time those formulas might have been right, and many of them remained correct. But, nonetheless, they did not accommodate the world in all its real complexity. And sometimes it so happened that we noticed some new phenomena but, since they did not fit within the framework of the old formulas, we endeavored not to see them, as though they simply did not exist.

We did, of course, speak of the diversity and the contradictory nature of the modern world. Nevertheless, we were far from fully aware of it. Thus, we frequently saw diversity just as a source of complexities and did not

notice that it provides broad scope for mutual enrichment with other peoples' experience. The evolution of the contradictions of world development characteristic of our time—old contradictions that have long been in existence but are constantly being renewed—also was not always correctly evaluated. And we noticed such a very important new contradiction affecting the very foundations of civilization's existence as the conflict between the interests of all of mankind and the increasing exacerbation of global problems only when the whole world was already speaking of it.

We essentially did not acknowledge the interdependence of the modern world, this very important feature of its contemporary state (although we encountered its consequences literally at every step, above all in our foreign economic ties). And sometimes we perceived the thoughts of particular authors on interdependence and its consequences almost as cunning intrigues by the class enemy. Yes, of course, imperialist forces tried, are trying, and will try to use the objective interdependence of countries and peoples to strengthen the neocolonialist web, for example, and to subordinate weaker states to stronger ones. However, this is just one aspect of the matter. The other is that interdependence opens up broad prospects for the development of relations of cooperation among all countries and creates new and unprecedented opportunities for this cooperation.

Ours was the first country to speak of the nuclear threat. We were the first to advance the demand for the elimination of this threat and the prohibition of atomic and then nuclear weapons. And we waged a dogged struggle over decades to achieve those noble ends. However, we were not always logical in this. On the one hand, we spoke of the deadly threat of nuclear catastrophe while, on the other, we proceeded for a long time, for too long, from the possibility of winning a nuclear war. The CPSU Central Committee Theses point out: "In seeking military-strategic parity, in the past we did not always use the opportunity to ensure the state's security by political means and, as a result, allowed ourselves to be drawn into an arms race—which could not fail to affect the country's socioeconomic development and international position."

I could speak of many other things—of our not always adequate response to imperialism's provocative actions, of a certain underestimation of Europe's role in world affairs, and of insufficient attention toward states on other continents—Asian and Latin American states, for example. I could also mention the imperfect methods of our policy, which did not always opportunely embody in specific diplomatic actions the initiatives advanced in high-level speeches and sometimes did not devote proper attention to the phenomenon of public opinion or to proper regard for the demands of public diplomacy.

"A critical analysis of the past," the CPSU Central Committee Theses point out, "has shown that dogmatism and the subjectivist approach have also left a mark

on our foreign policy. It was allowed to lag behind the fundamental changes in the world and new opportunities for reducing tension and for greater mutual understanding between peoples were not fully realized."

II.

In the foreign policy sphere, as in internal political affairs, the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum was a landmark turning point in our development. Speaking in Paris 5 months after the plenum, M.S. Gorbachev said: "Human thought does not at once adapt itself to everything new. This applies to everyone. We feel this, and we have begun reinterpreting and bringing fully into line with the new realities many ordinary things, including in the military and, of course, the political spheres." What form did this reinterpretation take?

First of all, the new political thinking was elaborated. For the first time in a long time our foreign policy embraced the entire contradictory novelty of the world situation on a scientific plane. Based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, on consistent realism, and on the truthful illumination of international processes, the new thinking ensured the clarity of our vision of the modern world and our understanding of the basic trends in its development. The new thinking enabled us to reach the very important conclusion that the modern world is a world of priority for values and interests common to all mankind, which, of course, are dialectically linked with all other values and interests, including the working people's class interests.

The new political thinking has made it possible to elaborate the new concept of Soviet foreign policy. This concept—consistent, logical, and according with the humanist principles of socialism and with the spirit of restructuring inside the country—is based on the conclusion that the modern world, despite its profound contradictoriness, represents a definite integrity. It is a world that combines a global threat to the very existence of the human race with tremendous potential for coexistence, cooperation, and the political resolution of acute problems.

A realistic action plan for our policy in the world arena was drawn up on the basis of this concept. It was founded on the idea of a nuclear-free world formulated in the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's statement of 15 January 1986 and on the plan to create an all-embracing system of international security approved by the 27th CPSU Congress. This program has absorbed numerous specific new ideas. Some of them were elaborated in our country, while others were advanced by various political and public forces both in the East and in the West. The party's creative thinking welded them into a unified political platform.

It is probably worth paying special attention to the last point. Our party has also renounced its monopoly on the truth in foreign policy. In a multifarious, complex world the truth can be learned only with due regard to all rational ideas, no matter who advances them. Such an approach, as we now see, produces profound, fruitful results.

Of course, the new concept and the new action plan of foreign policy have required improvements and corrections to the methods of its actions in the world arena. And this correction has been carried out. Above all, our foreign policy has fully adopted the principle of *glasnost*. In openly proclaiming its aims, it addresses both governments and peoples. A distinguishing feature of its style is the dialogue that enables our partners to better understand our ideas and us to better know and understand the world.

In the nuclear age state wisdom consists not in attaching paramount importance to the perfectly real differences and disagreements that undoubtedly exist when drawing up interstate relations but in seeking common, mutually acceptable, and mutually advantageous aspects when taking these differences and disagreements into account. And our diplomacy seeks to take this path, not allowing confrontational approaches and striving to eradicate them from international life. This is diplomacy of cooperation.

Our country has developed vigorous activity on the basis of the concept and the program, using methods consonant with their aims. Each point in the program was finalized in numerous and far-reaching proposals embracing all spheres of the world community's vital activity. We addressed our initiatives to the whole world, acted, above all, in conjunction with our friends, and expressed readiness to cooperate with all who are prepared to do so. "All" means states, international organizations, and public movements.

What has all this produced?

III.

The work of the entire mechanism of international relations has changed substantially in just 3 years. It probably still is not operating at full capacity nor imparting to the movement of world affairs the velocity that is needed now. But it is operating increasingly efficiently and, most importantly, producing a big return. The Soviet-U.S. summit meetings are a worthy example here. Four such meetings have already been held during the years of restructuring—just 3 years. And each of them has advanced both our relations with the United States and the cause of peace throughout the world. Broad contacts have been developed among countries and peoples—contacts in the course of which a joint search and the joint elaboration of decisions necessary to ensure peace are taking place.

Our country's initiatives have evoked a mighty wave of activity throughout the world community. Never before have our closest allies displayed such energetic creativity in the sphere of international relations. The ideas and initiatives advanced by them have appreciably enlivened the foreign policy debate and given it a new boost. At the same time, the Nonaligned Movement and the group of neutral and nonaligned countries on the European Continent have begun to play a far more active role.

We have all probably noticed how the role of international organizations—the United Nations above all—is also increasing. The ideas of the new thinking and the situation of the states' deepening interdependence are opening up new scope and new opportunities for them.

The new political thinking, which correctly reflects the increased requirements and imperatives of the modern world, has also opened up the way to a qualitative change in the awareness of the human race. Very broad masses of people inspired by the newborn hope of lasting peace have been set in motion. The people's masses are really becoming one of the most important forces in modern world politics.

All this has resulted, above all, in a change in the international atmosphere itself. The demons of confrontation are gradually retreating and yielding their positions in favor of constructive, mutually advantageous cooperation. The orientation toward a balance of power in international relations is gradually being replaced by the search for a balance of interests. Hence the successful conclusion of the work on the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, which has now come into force. Hence the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, which make it possible to eliminate a dangerous hotbed of tension and, at the same time, show the way to resolve other local problems too.

Of course, it must not be thought that we ascribe all these positive changes only to ourselves, only to the restructuring of our foreign policy. No, we pay tribute to all who have made their contribution to the cause of changing the international climate, as well, of course, as making our corresponding assessment of the realistic changes in U.S. policy too. However, while observing necessary modesty, there is no need to belittle our own role either. The Soviet Union's contribution to the constructive evolution of world politics is widely recognized in the world, and deservedly so. "The development of events in the Soviet Union has become the key factor that has raised the situation in the world to a qualitatively new level," a report by London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, points out.

The Soviet Union's international position has improved appreciably over the past 3 years. And it is very important that this has happened not as a result of increased strength but thanks to Moscow's increased peace-loving activeness and the growing trust in our country.

IV.

We must, of course, evaluate most soberly and objectively the changes that have occurred. Yes, the situation has improved significantly. "The situation in the world has become more stable and predictable," the CPSU Central Committee Theses point out. Real groundwork for the future has been created, which enables us to hope for further progress from confrontation to cooperation. But, of course, this path has only just begun. We have to do far more than has been done already in order to draw closer to the desired goal.

It is necessary, first of all, to further deepen and develop the ideas of new political thinking. On the one hand, the changes that have already occurred in the world have still been far from fully interpreted and thought out. And our leadership invites all who are ready to give this some thought to do so. On the other hand, the world is continuing to change, and each of the changes taking place requires not only thought but also theoretical and practical conclusions.

In just the same way our foreign policy concept and the action program corresponding to it also require further development. In the recent past we lost a great deal of time and missed many chances. And far from everything has yet been done to make up for lost time. And yet new tasks lie ahead.

For the time being we are striving to make the transition from confrontation to nonconfrontational cooperation. It is our aim, as defined in the CPSU Program, to create a new international order. One that will be dominated not by military force but by good-neighborliness and cooperation and will involve a broad exchange of achievements of world technology and cultural assets for the good of all peoples.

Here we have to act not less but, probably, more energetically than before. The reserves exist. In recent years we have considerably expanded the geography of our political contacts. But they now require deepening. While making progress in relations with major powers, we evidently have to develop cooperation more actively with small states, including European states, whose role in world politics is clearly growing. Latin American states and many Asian countries are displaying new facets of their potential. We are still far from being able to be satisfied with the state of our relations with Japan. Of course, we do not intend to impose our friendship on anyone, but it is clear that we cannot be permitted to miss an opportunity to improve relations. "During the years of restructuring," the CPSU Central Committee Theses state, "relations have improved or have been established for the first time with a large number of states—neighboring and very distant. And relations have not been spoiled with anyone." A portentous, weighty conclusion. But new and in many respects extraordinary efforts are needed to continue this effective course.

We also have to travel further on the path of using methods of public diplomacy. And what is needed for this—both on a global scale and within the framework of individual continents—is the increasingly dynamic explanation of our policy and our aims, which accord not only with our own interests but also with the interests of all countries and peoples.

The theses point out that restructuring demands the maximum mobilization of our society's intellectual forces. This applies, above all, to the sphere of domestic policy but also, to no less a degree, to foreign policy, particularly taking into account its boldness, its truly revolutionary nature, the innovative nature of its aims and methods, and its dynamism. This kind of foreign policy undoubtedly demands the firmest reliance on our party-minded, scientific, and, in a broad sense, public thought and presupposes the increasingly broad involvement of our aktiv in international work, in different areas and at different levels.

But the true, most reliable source of progress, including in foreign policy, is, of course, the success of restructuring itself. The 19th all-union party conference will give a new boost to our own country's development. But it will also be of tremendous significance for the whole world. In particular because it will once again demonstrate our party's loyalty to the course it has set in the international arena—a course of the humanization of international relations and the triumph of reason and humanism in world affairs.

Economic Institute Official Interviewed on Theses
LD1606092488 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1430 GMT 15 Jun 88

[Interview with Professor Boris Abramovich Rayzberg, doctor of technical and economic sciences and head of a department at the Economic Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Gosplan, by "our correspondent"; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Rayzberg] The Theses are the first document which brings together into one whole all the main points and aspects of restructuring—the ideological, political, economic, social, and governing. Now, part of the Theses deals with the introduction of new democratic forms of organizing the leadership of the party and the soviets. The fundamental novelty is obvious and is felt in an obvious way. But in those sections of the Theses which are devoted to economic restructuring and intensifying scientific and technological progress, the spirit of novelty and determination is not so strong and perhaps is not even felt at all. Against a background of a realistic analysis of the unfavorable state of affairs and the correct, though already familiar, appeals and declarations about restructuring, one cannot see specific program actions which need to be implemented in order to

ensure success in the cardinal reform of economic management and in order to overcome the obvious centers that are showing resistance, slowing things down, and which bring [word indistinct] out of the zone of uncertainty.

[Correspondent] Boris Abramovich, during your reading of the Theses, did you discover any controversial things? I would like you to tell me about precisely these, and about any proposals. You no doubt already have some proposals for the 19th party conference.

[Rayzberg] Well something that is in itself of indisputable and exceptional importance is the clause on the need to intensify political discussion on the keen questions of socialism. For some reason, it is immediately supplemented by a vague, in my view, phrase which runs thus: While supporting a diversity of views, the CPSU Central Committee stresses that discussions are only fruitful on the basis of socialism and in the name of socialism.

[Correspondent] We have so many opinions of what socialism is, therefore some will say that this is socialism, while others will say that it is not on the basis of socialism.

[Rayzberg] Yes, that is precisely it. We are ourselves setting the task, and not just this alone. It is not without reason that the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee himself calls for us to search for an answer to the question: What, strictly speaking, is socialism? How then, under such conditions, should one see the only-or-the-basis-of-socialism requirement, and who is to judge what is on the basis and what is not. The call for discussions to be conducted only in the name of socialism, despite its outward irreproachableness, seems even to be socially dangerous. After all, it gives the stronger the right to silence his opponent by saying: Now you are conducting the discussion not in the name of socialism; and he who is not with us, as we know, is against us.

Why, even during the period of restructuring can we not bring ourselves to overcome the fear of free discussions? Why are we afraid that someone will begin discussion in the name of capitalism? Of course, as the Theses correctly state, discussions should not lead to political confrontation, to the alienation of forces. After all, this does not depend on the subject of discussions but on the way in which they are conducted. It is precisely illogical restrictions that could lead to antagonism. I think that the propaganda of war, violence, national and racial strife, and exclusiveness, actions officially recognized by society as amoral, should undoubtedly be banned. Now it would be good for the Theses to have spoken about this, in order to once again firmly consolidate our constitutional tenets.

[Correspondent] Your main sphere is economics. Speaking to practical and theoretical economists, I increasingly come to the conclusion that the Law on State Enterprises is, on the whole, not functioning.

[Rayzberg] The second economic section of the Theses has turned out to be poorer than the rest. One can even see blank spaces in it. First and foremost is the problem of ownership, or rather developing the notion of forms of socialist ownership and effective means of implementing them. We are all witnesses to the sharp rise of cooperative ownership; this is essential. But where is personal ownership going? It is particularly unclear what will happen to ownership of the means of production. Should it be restricted as before, or, on the contrary, developed? I mean personal ownership here. Things are even more complicated with what has become known as state ownership. After all, it is not clear to whom it in actual fact belongs. I think that this main form of ownership should be brought closer to people, to the family, to social groups and collectives, so that it ceases to belong to no one and finally acquires an owner.

What also troubles me is that the Theses avoid the problem of a radical restructuring of planning. Meanwhile, it is precisely now that the problem of combining a centralized plan and financial autonomy has risen most acutely.

It is necessary to seek realistic ways to move away from directive state plans to partly binding, partly directing, and partly advisory state plans. No socially organized system, as Marx and Lenin taught, can exist without direction or without planning. Engels too spoke very vividly about this. That, after all, is not the point. The point is that it is necessary to find rational forms of combining planning and the economic independence of commodity-money, or even market relations. The capitalists have found their own form of combination. We must find our form. This does not mean removing planning from the agenda; it means reducing the level of centralized directive planning until it stops hindering the free planning of enterprises and the development of commodity-money relationships. We are unable to find that borderline. Therefore certain, as it were, ardent marketeers start, in general, to even declare—journalists in particular—that planning is virtually the main obstacle. But that is not actually the case.

There is also bureaucracy, which is slowing down the movement of economic reform. First, there must be a different system for promoting cadres to leadership positions, which would be liable to [word indistinct] that would not allow a potential bureaucrat to occupy that position.

[Correspondent] You mean national elections?

[Rayzberg] Yes, an electoral system. What is meant is a periodical renewal, a change of leaders. I think that a further weapon against bureaucracy is not only the

adoption of the Law on the Enterprise, but the adoption of a law on state bodies limiting the power of those bodies and their possibilities, and forbidding them categorically, in legislative bodies, to make decisions which impede the independent and democratic nature of the basic unit—the enterprise, the association, the collective. It would be nice if the conference somehow reflected questions and problems connected with a rational combination of centralized planning and decentralization, and the independence of commodity-money relationships. Giving our planning, to a greater degree, such an organizing, strategic, and normatively regulating (?function) rather than one relating to volume and, as it were, compulsory even as regards state orders, can be reduced to a minimum, and they can be transferred to a contractual basis.

Burlatskiy Views Parliamentary System

PM1606101188 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Fedor Burlatskiy, vice president of the Soviet Political Sciences Association: "On Soviet Parliamentarism"—boldface as published]

[Text] The fundamental platform for the country's democratization—the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference—directs Communists toward active participation in debate. In this context I would like to introduce into the scope of the discussion a few ideas which have been ripening in public opinion among scientists and practitioners for several decades. It is obvious to everyone that now, 70 years after the revolution, it is time to establish a firm constitutional order. This is the point of the idea of the law-based socialist state proclaimed in the theses. In fact, this happened in all previous revolutions: The time of storms and onslaughts was succeeded by a time for consolidating gains and ensuring the normal functioning of the political system.

1. On amendments to the USSR Constitution. For the first time in the whole post-Lenin period, the Theses implement a line of radically reforming our political system. This goal was proclaimed at least twice before. The "Sialin" Constitution of the USSR was adopted in 1936, but the repressions which followed in 1937 demonstrated the real price of the proclaimed democratization. In 1961 the party program formulated the principle of the transition to a state of the whole people, but, for well-known reasons, this did not lead to the emergence of new political institutions or substantial transformations in the political system. For example, implementation of the idea of the rotation of cadres, which was formulated back at that time, is only just beginning. The USSR Constitution adopted in 1977 included many good general declarations. But the gulf between word and deed had a pernicious effect once again: No marked positive changes occurred in the political system.

Now the party has set the task of restructuring the political system in order to: 1) create firm, immutable guarantees against a recurrence of an authoritarian regime of personal power and the attendant mass repression; 2) make the state an effective means for society's accelerated development, which means overcoming what Lenin called the bureaucratic perversion of Soviet power; 3) guarantee not only the socioeconomic but also the civic and political rights and freedoms of man.

There is a substantial difference in the approaches toward reconstructing the economic and political systems. While in the first instance a succession of many stages and a trial-and-error method, with errors which can be relatively swiftly rectified, are inevitable, the situation is different with regard to the political system. There is nothing more permanent than temporary solutions—that rule is particularly true when it comes to new laws. It is difficult, and even harmful, to change laws every 5 or 10 years because they will cease to be effective. And we rather abuse the multiplicity of laws. Four constitutions in 70 years is at least twice as many as is generally necessary. It would be sufficient to have just one constitution and to make additions and amendments to it.

Now, at the stage of institutionalizing the gains of restructuring, only radically new regulations and laws are entitled to come into being. If there is no readiness to adopt this approach, then it would be better to wait a while and then adopt laws which would operate not for just 15 years, as with previous constitutions, but for 50, 100, and even 200 years (of course, with whatever amendments are necessitated by life).

2. On the country's leader. This is one of the key questions of democratization. Although, as already noted, there has been no substantial change in the foundations of our political system, the political and ideological regime underwent fundamental changes—from Lenin to Stalin, from Stalin to Khrushchev, from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. Regardless of state posts, the Communist Party leader became the leader of the country. A pattern emerged in this process—each new party leader needed approximately 5 years to become, in one way or another, a leader towering above the other top party leaders: from 1924 to 1929 for Stalin, from 1953 to 1959 for Khrushchev, from 1964 to 1969 for Brezhnev. The struggle to gain real powers as leader of the country caused turmoil within the party and the state and resulted in either hasty one-sided decisions or a paralysis of power.

Experience has also demonstrated that the mechanism whereby the leader of the country is elected by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo has serious shortcomings. Otherwise it is impossible to explain how leaders like L.I. Brezhnev and K.U. Chernenko could have found themselves at the head of our great power in a most difficult period of world history.

Bearing in mind the special importance of the post of the country's leader, it would be expedient to discuss the question of switching to a presidential principle for electing him. In our view, this presupposes, first, the election of the general secretary of the CPSU directly at the party congress, and then his running for the post of president of the USSR in a direct secret nationwide ballot. Receiving two mandates—from the leading party and from the sovereign people—would give the country's leader the necessary powers to pursue the policy he had proclaimed in advance. On the other hand, this would boost demands regarding the selection of a worthy candidate known all over the country. The establishment, in line with the Theses, of (a maximum of) two 5-year terms, or three terms in exceptional cases, for holding these two posts would create guarantees against the formation of a personal power regime. It would be useful to establish a rule that this system is deemed immutable and cannot be revised under any circumstances. Furthermore, the USSR Supreme Soviet would be empowered to recall the president in exceptional circumstances—for example, manifest violation of the USSR Constitution or sickness.

I believe that the separation of the posts of party leader and state leader proposed by some participants in the current debate is wrong. In reality, it would lead to a struggle for personal power and total subordination of the state to the party. On the other hand, the unification of these two posts would lend a legitimate, legal nature to the practice which has existed for more than 70 years now and conforms with the political awareness of our people, who personify supreme power. The presidential principle has shown its superiority in the Western democracies by ensuring stability of government. It is also successfully applied in several East European socialist countries.

The country's president would be given powers to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet the composition of his cabinet, which would replace the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which has no government powers. The cabinet would include the main ministers and would decide the most important affairs of state. The president would submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet his nominee for the post of chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who, in turn, would submit the names of ministers dealing with problems of running the economy and with questions of culture and social life. The president's main functions, apart from the aforementioned, would be to implement foreign policy and overall leadership of the preparation of laws and other crucial legislative acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He would play the role of supreme commander in chief of all the USSR Armed Forces. In these conditions, labor collectives and public organizations would really turn into organs of economic, social, and cultural self-management.

The presidential principle was being discussed already at the time of the "thaw," and N.S. Khrushchev inclined toward it but did not have time to do anything. L.I.

Brezhnev borrowed elements that impressed him personally—the combination of the supreme party and state posts—and discarded the democratic essence of the matter.

Furthermore, it would probably be expedient to institute the post of vice president of the republic. It is well known that L.I. Brezhnev's lengthy illness after 1974 resulted in stagnation in state decision-making. Fortunately, there was no real threat of nuclear attack, otherwise it is impossible to imagine how this sick man could have made decisions in a matter of a few minutes. In the event of illness or other extraordinary circumstances there must be a deputy automatically vested with presidential powers for the short time until fresh elections.

3. On the development of party democracy. The 19th party conference brings us back to the traditions of Lenin's conferences, but at the same time it is unprecedented. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed, it must be an event of crucial importance for the entire cause of revolutionary restructuring. Consequently, its powers are also unprecedented.

The purpose of pluralism of opinions within the party is to take full account of two main traditions. The first is the Lenin tradition, which combines socialism and democracy, and [the second is] the Stalin tradition, which establishes an authoritarian regime. Whether we like it or not, the political awareness of Communists and of the whole people still reflects these two traditions, and the Stalin tradition is actually reinforced by the age-old experience of our peoples' authoritarian-patriarchal culture. It is important to ensure that the struggle between these traditions takes place in civilized forms, does not develop into a conflict, and leads to constructive solutions, thus helping the further consolidation of the Lenin tradition and consequently of the revolutionary restructuring.

In this context it would be expedient to make changes to the CPSU Statutes on the following points: On party organizations' right to discuss general problems of party policy; on the mechanism of subordination of the party's executive organs to its representative organs; on the election, replacement, and accountability of cadres; on party pluralism of opinions and freedom of criticism right up to [the stage of] decision-making; on guarantees for minorities after decisions have been made; on a Communist's right to defense in the event of a party accusation; and on the duty, honor, and dignity of party members. It is important to guarantee by appropriate measures the principle of glasnost and freedom to express opinions, the right to criticize, and the inadmissibility of persecution for criticism.

The reorientation of cadre policy with a view to extensively involving in party work genuine enthusiasts for revolutionary restructuring is also historically justified. It is time to overcome the prejudice against the party intelligentsia—the most educated and talented organizers and specialists in particular spheres. The struggle that

took place in the late twenties and the thirties did not only concern ideological differences. It was also a struggle between different cultural strata in the party. As theoreticians, orators, and specialists Bukharin, Rykov, Rudzutak, and Kirov were head and shoulders above those who replaced them. The same thing happened in other areas: One need only compare Tukhachevskiy and Blyukher with Timoshenko and Kulik.

Major figures with a high level of training and morality have now arrived and are arriving in the top echelon of leadership of the party. This new trend should be extended to all levels of party leadership. Under the conditions of glasnost, mass television, radio, and newspapers, leadership posts should be filled by figures of substance who can naturally grow in the eyes of the public.

The principle of the election, replaceability, and accountability of leaders is of particular importance. This principle of Lenin's should in practice replace the Stalinist practice of the "nomination and placement of cadres."

I think that the time has come to overcome the political illusion that leads to people being elected to party forums on the basis of their production successes. Such successes should be rewarded—morally and materially—in the production unit. Politics and management, as Lenin repeatedly stressed, require special qualities; namely, high social and political activeness, independence of judgment, boldness, and innovation—in short, the ability to make a personal contribution to the cause of revolutionary restructuring.

4. On the Soviet parliament. The principle of separation of functions proclaimed in the Theses ought perhaps to be extended by formulating the principle of the separation of power, functions, and decisionmaking rights among the different institutions of our political system.

Experience has shown that the concentration of power in the hands of a single organ (party or state) led ultimately to the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a single person noted by Lenin—which had tragic consequences under Stalin and revealed its complete inefficiency during the Brezhnev era. It was probably wrong to have rejected the ideas of the great revolutionary democrats of the past on the separation of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Therefore we must give each political institution—the USSR Supreme Soviet, the president and his cabinet, judicial organs, including the Constitutional Court—the right to make independent and final decisions within the bounds of their powers. Under such conditions, to use Lenin's expression, the party leads indirectly, but all the more correctly.

In order to fully implement the Theses' provisions on the subordination of executive organs to representative organs, it would be expedient, in accordance with Lenin's plan, to turn the USSR Supreme Soviet into a

permanent Soviet parliament. This presupposes that this organ would assemble for fall, spring, and winter sessions and sit every day. A country of 285 million can afford to pay for 700-800 permanent deputies. Then they would be able to really express the pluralism of opinions existing in society, to prepare laws carefully, and to control the activity of executive organs—above all, by means of the real right to distribute finances and resources.

There is an urgent need for a new approach to nominations for the soviets. They should include only people who are known to the electorate as serious figures aware of socially significant problems and able to resolve them in practice. The number of personnel of executive organs elected to the soviets should be reduced to a minimum. Even under Stalin most ministers were not members of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5. The reform of the state apparatus is no less important. A great deal is currently being written against bureaucratism. But this problem will be solved not by noisy tricks, but by scientifically organized management, since management will long need professionals and, consequently, "bureaucrats." Furthermore, we should not lose sight of practical experience. The terrible tirades against bureaucratism in the twenties did not prevent the emergence of the personality cult, and this cult itself exploited antibureaucratic slogans during the "great purge" [otstrel] of the thirties. The "Cultural Revolution" in China was also accompanied by these slogans. As a result the only thing to change was the "bureaucratic" cadres: Some left, others came in—but in what way were they better than their predecessors?...

So the problem should be put on a scientific footing. This presupposes: 1) the subordination of the apparatus to representative organs, to the party and nonparty masses; 2) the rational organization of management through the skillful distribution of functions; 3) the nomination or election (it is impossible to elect everyone) of really capable organizers and professionals; 4) replaceability—the replacement of incapable people automatically at a certain age or in accordance with a democratic procedure. There is yet another problem—alternative public activity for representatives of the apparatus. Then nobody would cling to their office chair and people themselves would resign when they were not impressed by a new leadership and its policies, for instance.

6. A central problem is to guarantee civic and political human rights. If there are no active citizens there will be no active modern workers equal to the demands of the age. The criticism of liberalization voiced in the press takes no account of our past experience. Russia had

certain elements of democratic traditions (communes, the Zemstvos, the Duma, and others) but it never had any liberal tradition—namely, of individual independence from state interference, or any concept of inalienable human rights. It was thought—and still is—that we are all servants of the state. But the state has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the people, otherwise they would only be the interests of the bureaucracy. The state is the servant of society and the citizens who maintain its apparatus. With this approach the importance of the human rights problem becomes clear.

As is stressed in the Theses, the judicial system, which is called upon to be an independent form of power, needs fundamental reform. Next, the number of workers in the judiciary should be increased several times over, their wages and social status should be raised, and independent relations with local party and state organs should be established. The courts' main role is to rapidly and effectively defend individuals' violated social, economic, civic, and political rights.

In developing the Theses' provision it would be worth discussing questions such as the creation of a panel of people's assessors (jury) for the most important criminal cases; the abolition of capital punishment (as was done by Lenin in the early twenties); the abolition of imprisonment for so-called anti-Soviet agitation (other forms of influence would suffice); and the sharp restriction of criminal sanctions for all crimes in accordance with the principle that the law is effective when it is irreversible, rather than when it is harsh.

It is necessary to provide a clear legal definition of the guarantees and unavoidable limits for the implementation of socialist pluralism of opinions, glasnost, freedom of convictions and conscience, the right to assembly, and the right to demonstrate and hold rallies, so as to rule out both administrative arbitrariness and crowd disturbances.

Perhaps it would be worth thinking about including in the USSR Constitution a special amendment on real guarantees for Soviet citizens' civic and political rights and freedoms which would simultaneously define people's obligations with regard to others, society, and the state.

The introduction of additions and amendments to the CPSU Statutes and the USSR Constitution and the ratification of new laws is only the beginning.

As party documents stress, it will require enormous effort to turn laws and other norms into political practice and particularly to foster a socialist and democratic political culture among the people.

'Backstage Games' Over Delegates Deplored

PM2505100188 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 May 88 p 2

[Article by "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA'S Sociopolitical Life Department" under the rubric "Toward the 19th All-Union Party Conference": "Once Again About the Election of Conference Delegates. Has Anything Changed?"—boldface italics as published]

[Text] *The principles would appear to be clear: No appointment by order. The main political directive is to elect active champions of restructuring for the conference. The CPSU Central Committee said that the selection of nominees must without fail involve the participation of party organizations and labor collectives; in other words it must be on a nationwide basis. Meanwhile, reports are coming in that nominations are taking place, more often than not, according to the canons of the stagnation times.*

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's own correspondent in Latvia G. Tselms reports: "Following conversations with the secretaries of Riga's four largest enterprises—the State Electrical Equipment Plant, "Radiotekhnika," the Riga Electrical Machine Building Plant, and "Kommunator"—one could draw this conclusion: The candidates were not elected but selected. True enough, raykoms did not appear to exert any formal 'pressure,' but they did indicate without undue persistence that a collective ought to be represented by, say, a young Latvian woman worker. And someone was sought to fit the mold."

Our correspondent in the Ukraine S. Kiselev reports: "One-third of delegates from the Kiev Oblast party organization were not nominated by anyone; they were appointed in advance.... According to the representation norms, the oblast organization should send 32 Communists to Moscow, and there were 42 nominated candidates. It would appear that, in this situation, the competition for election as delegates was well and truly in line with the principles of democratization of the country's social and political life. But the Kiev Obkom Bureau decided otherwise. At its session held 3 days before the plenum, 10 of the 42 nominees were simply 'weeded out.' It is obvious that the election of 32 delegates out of 32 candidates was most reminiscent of a lottery with no losing tickets.... What is the reason for this replacement of genuine democracy by a semblance of democracy? It is simple: 11 delegate mandates were allocated in advance to senior party obkom officials, the chairmen of the oblispolkom and the oblast trade union council, the first secretary of the Komsomol Obkom, and others."

Rather sharp conclusions drawn from similar reports can be frequently seen in the press. But...is anything changing? LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has written twice about the curtain of secrecy that has dropped over the nomination process in Rostov Oblast. But the backstage nomination games continued.

Reflecting on all this, one automatically asks: Will all the genuine leaders of restructuring gather at the conference? Maybe V. Tretyakov, foreman at the Taganrog metallurgical plant, was correct when he wrote to us: "I am profoundly convinced that restructuring now needs monitoring! Party, nationwide monitoring! And definitely independent of local authorities. Bureaucracy is pretty deep-rooted, and an apparatchik will not voluntarily restructure himself. I am against repressions, but I am in favor of monitoring."

We would like, of course, to end on a fact from the public life of literary figures. The nomination of a candidate from the Moscow Writers' Organization was quite a stormy and democratic process. There were nine nominees, and the secret ballot lists contained only the names of G. Baklanov, V. Korotich, Al. Mikhaylov, and Yu. Chernichenko. The discussion lasted 6 hours! According to the ballot results, Yuriy Chernichenko was elected candidate delegate to the conference.

Outdated Election Procedures Criticized

AU0106193288 [Editorial Report] Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian on 25 May carries on page 1 a 1,100-word report, "Everyone Was 'In Favor,' But Logic Was 'Against It,'" by V. Mishchenko, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent in Dnepropetrovsk, on the recent Dnepropetrovsk Obkom plenum which elected delegates to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in Moscow. In its 26 May issue the newspaper carries on page 1 a 1,200-word report entitled "...But the Secretary Kept Silent," by N. Ladanovskiy, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent in Donetsk, on the equivalent Donetsk Obkom plenum. Both reports censure the outdated ways the conference delegates in the two oblasts were nominated at party meetings in labor collectives as candidates, and then elected at obkom plenums.

"What was the role of the plenum?" Dnepropetrovsk correspondent asks and then answers his own question: "It seemed to be obvious: to elect the most deserving ones. But.... The number of proposed candidates coincided exactly with the number of deputies who had to be elected. They were elected unanimously."

"On the one hand," V. Mishchenko writes, "everything seemed to be correct. Since the candidates proposed were deserving, what was the point in breaking lances over them in vain? But on the other hand, it was deplorable that the plenum participants were again assigned the role of unthinking onlookers. The only thing they were expected to do was to 'stamp' the decision made by the obkom bureau which settled everything in advance."

N. Ladanovskiy, who attended the Donetsk Obkom plenum, describes at length the way woman wire drawer V.F. Krivenchenko was nominated as a candidate delegate at the Khartsizsk steel wire drawing plant. "Some 20 basic party organizations in the oblast," Ladanovskiy

explains, "elected candidate delegates from among two or more persons." But the aforesaid plant collective was told "in an imperative tone" by the gorkom to nominate "without fail a woman from among rank and file laborers." When the correspondent asked V.A. Zubanov, party committee secretary at the plant, why he kept silent and did not object to the gorkom's order, the latter answered: "What for? I would not have changed anything in this respect. You can see yourself that the discussion on the candidates is following the usual rut. Not one of the plenum participants objects to the candidates, and no one proposes his own candidates."

Delegate Nomination Directives Being Ignored
PM3105131588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 26 May 88 p 3

[A. Kameney article under the "19th All-Union Conference: Election of Delegates" rubric: "Nomination? Appointment?"—boldface as published]

[Text] In 5 weeks time 5,000 delegates to the 19th all-union conference will assemble in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses—genuine enthusiasts, leaders, and champions of restructuring. Or at least they should be. Plenums of CPSU obkoms and kraykoms and of union republic communist party central committees, which are resolving the question of who is to be entrusted with the fate of restructuring, the fate of the country, will end in a week's time! It is not on the basis of production indicators, the kind of job they do, or even less their age or sex that prospective delegates to the party conference should be selected and nominated. We were reminded of this 2 weeks ago by M.S. Gorbachev: "The main political goal is to elect to the conference active champions of restructuring."

We have already written (SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 14 May 1988) that the party Central Committee has banned the use of the notorious quota system (*raznaryadki*) which determined the proportional representation, and stressed that the composition of the 19th all-union party conference will depend on the scrupulousness of party committees at local level and the degree of activeness and commitment of primary organizations, which can, incidentally, include their own candidate on the list. Numerous telephone calls and letters received from readers and urgent dispatches filed by our own correspondents from various oblasts confirm—alas!—the bitter truth that, "they can include candidates of their own, only who will let them!..." Primary party organization nominees do not figure on the lists of candidates concocted in the innermost depths of the party apparatuses.

...A call from Moscow's M.V. Lomonosov State University: The university party committee instructed faculty party bureaus to urgently discuss the candidates—the rector and the party secretary—in their organizations. In most faculties everything was "discussed and approved" quickly and in the usual way. Some faculties expressed

dismay at such a foreshortened discussion schedule and nominated their own candidates, notably the economist G. Popov. True, no heed was paid this: The party committee pushed home its line: The candidates have already been nominated, all you have to do is vote.

It is the old, familiar "game of preference," demonstrating unpartylike disregard of the opinion of Communists in the economics faculty, who condemned the actual electoral procedure, and the fact that the biological and mechanomathematics faculties refused to hold a "discussion" according to the customary and repeatedly condemned pattern.

Our correspondent Tamara Abakumovskaya reports from Minsk: A. Sorokin, secretary of Frunzenskiy Belorussian Communist Party Raykom, urged the following at a meeting of Communists of the "Belgosproyekt" Institute: "It is necessary to trust the obkom (the secretary has in the customary way confused the members of the oblast party committee with the officials of the obkom apparatus—Editor). And the obkom laid down that as a "construction" region, one candidate must be a construction worker, the other a representative of engineering and technical workers, and that they should be nominated by an industrial housing construction association and a refrigerator plant. This is the party obkom's quota system. "Belgosproyekt" Communists had nothing against these candidates—they simply did not know them and were exasperated not so much by who is nominated as how it is done.

Officials of the Minsk Belorussian Communist Party Obkom apparatus ignored the very strict CPSU Central Committee instruction issued by M.S. Gorbachev at the meeting held 7 May at the CPSU Central Committee: "No quotas, as occurred in the past..." Terse and clear. But, as you can see, not to everyone. Quota systems—which are alive and kicking—continue to be imposed, and the pressure continues.

The editorial office telex received a report from Yelena Matveyeva, our correspondent in Khabarovsk Kray: Academician Yu. Kosygin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Department's institute of Tectonics and Geophysics, received a telephone call from Tsentralnyy CPSU Raykom and was asked to name a woman scientist aged about 45 as a possible delegate. The academician refused to pander to such a notion of "democracy" and asked whether the institute collective might not nominate a worthy candidate regardless of this directive. The raykom officials promised to consider it, but entered into no further telephone communication with the institute—they found the "woman scientist of about 45" at the Rail Transport Engineers Institute. So now the "image" of the kray party organization will not be distorted—the party kraykom is keeping a close eye on this.

...The "Snezhnyy" timber procurement establishment in Khabarovsk Kray's Komsomolskiy Rayon was tasked with providing a timber procurement team leader as a delegate. This kray—they said—is a timber region and cannot do without a representative of the "taiga" profession. Age and nationality were also specified. So they found, discussed, and nominated someone (who is, incidentally, a fine person and a principled Communist), and a feature was prepared for the rayon newspaper—everything as required. Then literally the day before the newspaper was to appear a call came from the party kraykom: The feature is not to be printed, the "Snezhnyy" team leader's candidacy is being withdrawn. It turns out that, clearly for extra insurance, another rayon, Solnechny Rayon, had also been instructed to select a forestry candidate. And the latter's curriculum vitae tipped the scales....

That is "democracy" in action. You could go no farther, you might think. But you would be wrong, as it happens.

Riga Latvian Communist Party Gorkom, our correspondent Eduard Govorushko reports, did go farther. Without putting the Communists of the capital's Moskovskiy Rayon to the trouble of having to look for themselves, it was simply suggested they vote for the nomination of the president of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, the chief of the Baltic Railroad, and a well-known sewing machine operator.

But what about the party Central Committee directives? Surely they must serve as guidance and be carried out by local party organs? Who gives them the right to ignore them and stifle democracy at birth? These are not idle questions, since the topic "On Measures to Further Democratize the Life of the Party and Society" is on the 19th all-union party conference agenda. And preparations for discussion of this question have already graphically exposed people who dislike the genuine democratization of the life of party and society.

The fate of restructuring concerns us all. And for that reason we are bound to be concerned by who is elected, the manner of the election, and in whose hands the fate of decisionmaking on vitally important, crucial problems of our society and socialism will rest.

...Neither in the Bashkir nor Tatar ASSR's, reports Valentin Leksin, our correspondent for those autonomous republics, have the candidate lists been published in the local press or discussed. Voting papers containing 60 names—exactly the number required—were quietly and calmly dropped into the ballot box at the Bashkir CPSU Obkom plenum held in Ufa. And this procedure has scarcely augmented the authority of local Communists and party officials. It seems that no one paid any special attention to it, particularly as the delegate elections were item three on the plenum agenda, by which time all the participants had been openly looking at their watches.

The infamous lists are also actually ready at Tatar CPSU Obkom. True, there has been a hitch. The autonomous republic's Union of Writers had the candidacy of union chairman Tufan Minullinn "handed down" to it by the relevant department of the party obkom. This did not suit the writers, however, and they included Renat Kharis, the well-known poet, on the list as well. Now everyone is waiting to see whether this candidate will satisfy the obkom and whether the poet will remain on the voting lists. But in the Kamal Theater a candidate who is getting on in years, USSR People's Artist Sh. Biktemirov, who was nominated in the same manner, has been...rejected. Marcel Salimzhanov, the theater's chief producer, has been selected as a candidate instead. Where will the artistes' "license" lead? To find out we will have to wait until Saturday, when the CPSU obkom plenum will be held.

What principle guides the officials of party organs when they decide on the labor collectives whose Communists are entrusted with nominating their representative to the delegation of an oblast, kray, or republic party organization? Whichever apparatus member I had occasion to talk with on this subject, the answer was always the same: Their concern is to ensure that the oblast or kray is represented at the party conference by Communists from the main sectors most typical of the republic's economy. They also pointed out that too little time was set aside for the election campaign and that if they were to begin to nominate candidates from below, from all the primary party organizations, they certainly would not meet the deadline set by the CPSU Central Committee. But this hardly justifies the hasty nomination and election procedure. If the party apparatuses had not wasted time on drawing up the infamous quotas and if they had shown greater faith in Communists' ability to decide for themselves who should represent them at the forum in Moscow, everything could have turned out differently. But it did not, and much of the business is following the same much criticized paths....

...At the Khabarovsk party kraykom plenum A. Chernyy, first secretary of the kraykom, read out a telegram sent to the plenum by Khabarovsk Communist Bessonov, who asked if the discussion of the issue could be moved to the end of the month so that Communists would have the opportunity to discuss the candidates, meet some of them, and give them their mandate. At this point, however, several raykom secretaries got up one after the other and quickly reported that the nomination and discussion of candidates in primary organizations had been perfectly democratic and open (how, I mentioned just above) and that there was therefore no point in accepting Bessonov's proposal: The comrade does not really understand, they said.... And the next day the sender of the telegram was summoned to his enterprise's party committee and, in the presence of E. Slipchenko, chief of the CPSU kraykom organizational department, and A. Bodin, first secretary of Tsentralnyy CPSU Raykom, was reprimanded and pulled to pieces on the basis

of all the laws from the period of stagnation that we have condemned: Don't poke your nose in where it's not wanted.

Incidentally, at this plenum no one discussed the candidacies of the kraykom's first and second secretaries, the first secretary of Yevreyskiy Obkom, or the first secretaries of Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk-na-Amure party gorkoms. All that was said about the other candidates was that they are "good production workers" and "have government awards".... They did not even say this about the first group, including them as delegates automatically.

The situation was a strange one: Our correspondents had to look for examples of the procedure defined by M.S. Gorbachev for nominating candidates and electing delegates to the 19th all-union party conference—without quota systems and on the basis of their own real contribution to restructuring. And they didn't find anyone. Just think: They actually had to look for examples of a normal approach founded on party principle. But they came across plenty of examples of an anomalous approach repeatedly condemned—without having to specially seek them out.

The most encouraging information came from our correspondent Anatoliy Prazdnikov in Kuybyshev: Kuybyshev CPSU Obkom had not given the raykoms and gorkoms rigid rules about the number of candidates or set quota requirements concerning their age, sex, education, and official position. So they seemed to be able to act independently and in fact nominated more than the set number of candidates. This is true. It is also true that the primary organizations simply...rubber-stamped the candidates nominated from above. It is also true that the participants in the 17 May Kuybyshev CPSU Obkom Plenum were presented with a voting list containing exactly the right number of names—66. Again no choice. This was explained as follows: If the list included more candidates and each one who picked up more than 50 percent of the vote was considered elected, the need for a second vote could arise. But elections based on an outright majority of votes are not so desirable because—they say—people with a delegate's mandate "accorded" ex officio, so to speak, could find themselves "on the wrong side of the line." There's your "democracy" for you.

Over the long years we now call the period of stagnation, we all somehow forgot that any party resolution is only a condition of the task in hand and that the real decision must be made on the spot. Practice has shown that virtually everything is still the same. And if party committee apparatuses—if only those mentioned in this article—have indeed looked for "solutions," then it seems that in so doing they have had only one aim in mind: to maintain the status quo and prevent the nomination and election of delegates from being conducted in line with current requirements, thereby virtually blocking the CPSU Central Committee directives.

So these are the lessons taught us all by the campaign to assemble the delegates to the 19th all-union party conference.

P.S. When we were working on this issue of the newspaper we were told that an extraordinary session of the Khabarovsk CPSU Kraykom Bureau had discussed the topic "On Cases of a Formal, Bureaucratic Attitude Toward the Nomination and Discussion of Candidate Delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference." Some raykom secretaries who spoke admitted that they had "committed errors" and explained this by a lack of experience of working in the conditions of democracy and glasnost. The kraykom bureau strictly reprimanded them and singled out E. Slipchenko, chief of the CPSU kraykom organizational party work department.

But, as they say, "The horse has already bolted"—the delegation from the Khabarovsk Oblast party organization has been put together on the basis of the old criteria....

SOVETSKAYA KULTURA Readers Voice Concerns on Delegates

18000397b Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in
Russian 26 May 88 p 3

[Article consisting of fragments from readers' letters under the "19th All-Union Party Conference: Election of the Delegates" rubric: "Lines From Letters"]

[Text] Yu. Shmannikov, Chelyabinsk

I am quite worried that the 19th party conference may convene with a majority consisting of party officials for whom the cause of restructuring is not a real vital problem. They are unconditionally "for" in what they say (especially), and even in what they do, and they do do something for restructuring. But at the same time many of them have no intention of relinquishing their powers, which for them are something natural. They are afraid that their personal life will not be as comfortable as it is now. Do not get me wrong, my generalization was not made out of a desire to cast aspersions on these people; I am only concerned lest Marx's principle of the primacy of people's interests in their actions should operate if a majority at the conference is made up of people who have not experienced on an everyday basis all the "charms and delights" of ordinary life which each of us experiences.

P. Bakst, CPSU Member Since 1947, Veteran of Labor,
Moscow

Today we are extricating ourselves from many stereotypes of the past. In my view, the column on the questionnaire requesting "nationality" is a recrudescence of the past.

In the first years of Soviet power this question was in order, since the degree of social activity and participation of the various nationalities in building the new life was vividly demonstrated.

The ethnic minorities oppressed under tsarism aroused particular interest in this regard.

But now that 70 years have passed since the Great October Revolution, in a period of universal restructuring and moral renewal of society, is it in order for a questionnaire to ask the respondent's nationality?

In answer concerning my own nationality, I would like to make an exhaustive response: citizen of the Soviet Union!

V. Kolesnikov, Leningrad

There are no opponents of restructuring now. Everyone is in favor. And more than that. One gets the impression that everyone understood all of this long ago and has done everything in their power. That makes it difficult to understand who is to blame for the crisis of the economy and the preponderance of bureaucratic methods of operation and many other things.

A. Yakubenko, Party Member Since 1941, War Veteran and Veteran of Labor, Ulyanovsk

I have been involved in collecting party dues for many years and have called attention to how unfair it is. Party members who receive wages from 100 to 300 rubles pay dues at a progressively increasing rate. At 100 rubles the party dues are 1 percent and at 250 it is already 2.5 percent. But after 300 rubles the percentage of income payable as dues does not increase for some reason; that is, a man who receives 300 rubles and a man who receives 800 pay dues in the proportion of 3 percent. Why?

When we talk about the equality of all members in the party regardless of official position and position in the party, then there must be equality and fairness in the payment of party dues. That is why I propose that a single rate of party dues be established regardless of the level of income. Or increase the percentage of income paid as dues on earnings above 300 rubles. Let a wage increase of 50 rubles result in an increase of half a percentage to be paid as party dues.

M. Tanicheva, Leningrad

I propose to submit for consideration of the party conference the question of ABOLISHING MILITARY PARADES. It does not square with restructuring. On the one hand we are fighting for peace, we have done a great deal to eliminate lethal weapons, while on the other hand we make a public display of weapons and our military might.

07045

Election of Sakhalin Conference Delegates Denounced as Fraud

*18000397a Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in
Russian 26 May 88 p 3*

[Article by B. Sukhinin, shop chief in the Sakhalin Radio-Television Broadcasting Center, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, under the "19th All-Union Party Conference: Election of the Delegates" rubric: "The Right To Be Elected"]

[Text] Although mature in age, I enrolled in the party recently. Earlier, to tell the truth, I did not want to. I saw no point in just paying membership dues when a sizable portion of them went to pay for the numerous officials. But even though I was not in the party, I always considered myself a Bolshevik, a Communist more than many of those who carried party cards in their pocket. But I did not sit on the fence, I waged frequent battles, often I raised problems all by myself which are today talked about everywhere. I argued, I disputed, I ended up in the minority. I gave the bigwigs some lumps, at times I was discouraged, but I also believed that my time would come....

I understood after the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that significant events were brewing, and I could no longer be outside the ranks of the party. And I submitted my application to the party of Communists. A really magnificent time has come. The press has aroused the masses! But at present, matters are hardly moving at all beyond discussions. And I took a practical step: I proposed to my primary organization that we send a delegate to the 19th party conference. I also wrote to SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN setting forth what you might call a political platform: reviving Lenin's slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" and carrying out a strict certification in the party, during which it would free itself of all the idle-talking leeches; the party's Central Committee must reassess the structure and size of party staffs so as to relieve them of functions improper to them. And if the all-union conference is to really become a turning point in the development of restructuring, if the people are to regain confidence, a responsible attitude must first be taken toward making up the delegates to the conference, and here the mechanical principle of nominating candidates should be renounced, as M.S. Gorbachev said at the meeting held in the headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee on 7 May.

I feel that the largest possible number of candidates should be taken into consideration in plenums of party obkoms and kraykoms. Let each of them make a speech setting forth the program with which he would go to Moscow. Personal past service in production has nothing to do with this. And all the party members in the oblast or kray must know what kind of people will be deciding the fate of restructuring, the country's destiny....

I wrote to the newspaper a few days before the plenum, but the editors rejected my letter, referring to a lack of space. I received the support of my party organization. To be sure, our party organizer N. Simo inquired whether a distribution order had come down? No, it didn't, I said, nor should it!

I have attended various meetings in my time, but I do not recall any like the one we had in the radio-television broadcasting center. Dignity, self-respect, and participation in a great cause were awakened before our eyes. We unanimously chose our candidate for delegate—A. Brusokas. We also unanimously adopted an appeal to participants in the plenum of the party obkom: that they call an extraordinary oblast party conference, that they study all the candidates thoroughly and choose a delegation from Sakhalin consisting of authentic fighters for restructuring. This time the oblast newspaper had room—an article on our meeting was published, but the party obkom simply ignored it.

On the eve of the plenum the "unplanned candidates" were done away with: they were simply removed in a meeting of the bureau of the party obkom, they did not fit into the scheme for promotion and election that had been polished until it shined.

I did not, of course, attend the plenum of the Sakhalin Oblast Party Committee. But I have in front of me the speech given by P. Tretyakov, first secretary of the party obkom: the delegates must be active advocates of and participants in restructuring, "prestigious people who take an active position in life and can properly represent the oblast party organization at the 19th All-Union Party Conference." And what is it they will be setting off with, what kind of program do they have? And who in the oblast aside from the collectives where they have worked knows these "active and authoritative individuals"? There are four workers, a teacher, a manager from the economy, an official of the soviet and three party officials, two employees and one from the "central list."... Probably, there is nothing wrong with any of them, but we do not know them even from articles in the newspaper. And what does this "representative from the center"—I. Dudenkov, RSFSR minister of consumer services to the public, have to do with our party organization? What has he done to deserve that kind of confidence? Or are consumer services on Sakhalin the best in Russia? By no means!—I take full responsibility for this statement. Or local people here are impressed with the ideas which the comrade minister would like to advocate in the meeting of party members? No one is aware of any such....

And another delicate point, which probably does not seem delicate to any of the participants in the plenum. "After a thorough study of the candidates," the first secretary of the obkom put himself forth as one of the worthiest. He in fact proposed that "all the candidates

named be placed on the list for a closed (secret) ballot." Everything according to the laws of the notorious "farce-vote for one slate of candidates."

What is the point of this game? What is the point of a secret ballot when there is no alternative to any of the 13 candidates: they all will automatically become delegates? After all, it is clear to everyone that elections become worth something only when there are people to choose between. This was not the case.

I am convinced that if the delegates were really elected, some of the oblast party leaders would simply fail to be among them. They have proclaimed too loudly from every platform that things are getting better and better for us, for the people, and they violate that principle too manifestly. It is not for the people of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, after all, that they put up the best building in the city, surrounded it with a high fence, and set up guard posts. And it is not to protect mothers and infants that they have built in the center of the city the House of Soviets at a cost of 10 million rubles, at a time when the oblast maternity hospital is taking shelter in a former dormitory, and the physicians in the children's polyclinic are receiving patients on three shifts....

To be a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference is not some honorific title, it is not an award, nor is it a privilege. Being a delegate means being free to accomplish a most difficult mission, one of which not everybody is capable, even if he is a respected person who has given past services.

...The Sakhalin delegation has been formed (not elected!). And there is no confidence that its members are real fighters for restructuring capable of waging a struggle for it.

07045

Chelyabinsk Obkom Election Procedures Scored
PM0306134788 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 1 Jun 88 p 2

[Own correspondent L. Pertsevaya report "From the Chelyabinsk CPSU Obkom Plenum. If We Do Not Give It to Them Straight From the Shoulder"—boldface as published]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—The ax with the famous silver-tongued engraving in steel was enormous. One side of the head was decorated with the inscription: "Chop down left-wing deviation!" and the other—"Chop down right-wing deviation!" On the back nestled the appeal: "Strike against reconciliationism!" This "ideological" weapon was presented to the okrug party conference in 1928. Exactly 60 years have passed since then. The hatchet-type ideological methods which maimed many souls and took the lives of many dissidents [inakomyslyashchiye] have been rejected by the party and strongly condemned by the

people. This particular ax is kept in a museum, while beyond its walls another search is under way—the search for humane ideological instruments and new methods of party work.

On the eve of the scheduled plenum, all candidates and members of Chelyabinsk party obkom were asked to submit proposals for ideological backup for the restructuring process. They came up with a lot of interesting ideas. Party workers concluded on the basis of real-life situations that the obkom needs a center to coordinate the activity of informal associations, a permanent sociological service to study public opinion, and a subdepartment or section responsible for nationality issues. It is very important to teach agitation and propaganda workers the art of polemics, more frequently to practice debate and discussion in collectives, and ensure that party workers of all ranks move away from office activity in favor of direct contact with people. People recommended ways to transform the apparatus of party committees at all levels and restructure the work of the "Znaniye" Society, libraries, red corners, and so forth.... Maybes not all the proposals were suitable for immediate implementation, but they provided a wealth of material for discussion, debate, and formulation of the optimum solution.

At the plenum, however, this material was put to minimal use in the report given by N. Shvyrev, first secretary of the party obkom. As in the old days in reports "on the current situation," the first secretary informed the plenum participants about literally everything: About the state of schools in cities and villages throughout the oblast, the crime level, industrial performance in the conditions of economic accountability (*khozraschet*) and the introduction of contract work in rural areas, housing construction, and the development of cooperatives. The enumeration of problems lasted more than an hour and the proposed solutions were not distinguished by any novel approach: Increase attention, make more demands, organize monitoring.... In his speech N. Shvyrev did not polemicize with the obkom members, and he did not propose new forms of ideological work. The resolution, drawn up with no regard for the opinions of the speakers, was merely an echo of the report.

But the other speeches contained a lot of accurate observations, assessments, and proposals. Many people talked about the inertia of members of the obkom apparatus, the gulf between ideological work methods and real life, and about how even obkom members find it hard to get through with their problems and concerns to the bosses of some offices in the party house. S. Lazarenko, a worker from Kopeysk, voiced a thought that is troubling many people in the oblast:

"New work forms and methods have already appeared in every party raykom and gorkom. But the procedure for holding obkom plenums and auditing commission sessions has not changed. The entire column can see that the headquarters are at the front but moving in the wrong direction."

So how has this happened? Take this plenum as an example. Formally speaking, everything was done with a view ensuring that any decisions were the result of collective effort. An opinion poll was carried out and the floor given to anyone who wished to speak. Even the report was given a preliminary discussion by members of the obkom bureau, when everyone could make their own observations and did indeed take the opportunity to do so. But then all these judgments and opinions were put aside. Nikolay Dmitriyevich made all the changes to his report himself, forgetting the advice of his comrades.

It cannot be denied that the search for new ways is difficult insofar as it is so tempting to slip back into the well-worn rut, resort to tried and tested systems, and hide behind the customary time-polished phrases. It must be very difficult for someone in the grip of stereotyped thinking to act with initiative and with an eye to producing an educational effect. Here is another telling example from the same plenum:

This year the chairman of Chelyabinsk Oblispolkom retired. As has always been the case, the candidate for his replacement was sent from the center. All the protests and outcries from ordinary oblast soviet deputies and their demand that there be more than one candidate to vote for were ignored. The oblast leaders obediently complied with the recommendation from above.

That is why obkom member A. Borisov wrote in criticism of the plenum: "The report should assess the actions of the CPSU obkom bureau at the oblast soviet session when appointing the acting chairman of the oblispolkom." The report gave no such assessment, and now the situation has been repeated. This time they elected a party obkom secretary sent from Moscow. No, members of the party obkom bureau and plenum participants had nothing against the character of A. Kostin. But in line with democratic principles many insisted on demanding a choice between at least two candidates and so nominated another candidate from among their own ranks. A long, stubborn argument at a session of the obkom bureau ended in victory for First Secretary N. Shvyrev, who wanted no alternative and probably feared an undesirable outcome. At the plenum this stand was presented as the collective opinion of the bureau members. But in fact they had elected no one—they had merely approved and confirmed the candidate sent from above.

A mistake twice repeated is no longer a mistake but a policy. A lesson had been taught to A. Borisov and all the other plenum participants. We will make the decision the leadership wants, they said.

The rest of that day followed a well-worn path. No one now had the heart to dispute the proposed procedure for electing delegates to the 19th all-union party conference, although it would be very difficult to describe this procedure as democratic.

In fact, primary organizations (albeit not all of them, which is vexing, of course, for those who stayed on the sidelines) nominated candidates, discussed them, elected the best, and gave them their mandates. But afterward, in a closed discussion in the obkom bureau, half of the names were struck off the list and other candidates from central bodies appeared. Essentially the plenum was offered a ready-made list to which no changes were intended. But why were obkom members not trusted to themselves elect 61 delegates from the 139 candidates? Why did none of the candidates present their own political platform and their own ideas on ideological work?

After the list of elected or, to be more precise, approved delegates was published in the local press, the SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent center received letters criticizing the unsophisticated, undemocratic election procedure. Doctors from the first oblast teaching hospital and designers from "Chelyabimpromet" wrote in and there were phone calls from ordinary Communists from the primary organizations which had not been given the right to vote. It is difficult to do anything about it now—the deed is done. But it is important to realize that the awakened activeness of Communists and all working people commits party leaders to a great deal. The most fundamental changes must be made—not only to the slogans, phrases, and patterns on which reports are based but also to the actual approach to party work.

Course of Conference Delegate Elections Viewed
PM106131788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Mandates of Restructuring Will Be Observed by Delegates in the Work of the 19th All-Union Party Conference"]

[Text] The day when the 19th all-union party conference will open in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow draws ever nearer. Communists and society as a whole place great hopes in it. Hence the sincere and active interest of millions of Soviet people in ensuring that it is more thoroughly prepared and successfully held beneath the banner of deepening restructuring and democratization in all spheres. This is especially vividly demonstrated in the process of forming its complement of delegates, which is now nearing its conclusion.

It is noteworthy that, immediately following the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum, which adopted the resolution to convene the conference, PRAVDA started receiving letters from our readers on the subject of who ought to be elected for it and how. What if, some readers worried, supporters of stagnation and party members with wavering or shaky positions are elected as delegates? What is the point, others asked reasonably, of having the old familiar "extras" whose participation in formulating crucial decisions will be limited to just

raising their hands en bloc?... It was thus, in an atmosphere of sharp polemics which still continue at local level today, in the course of discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the conference, that the overall picture of the conference delegates emerged and more and more details were added to it.

But who are these people who enjoy the confidence of party organizations and labor collectives? What are the distinguishing qualities of these Communists? Now that the names of many of them are already known, one can conclude: They will observe the mandates of restructuring during the conference's work! The attitude toward restructuring—this is the touchstone which today unerringly defines who is who. And people perceive the delegates as genuine and active champions of restructuring. Fighters for restructuring. Foremen of restructuring.

Among the delegates there are quite a few Communists famous throughout the country. This fame was gained not through high official status or ringing speeches, but through selfless work for the common benefit and implacability toward routine, conservatism, and empty talk. Take construction worker N. Travkin for example. The tribulations that befell this enthusiast for full economic accountability in the construction industry in his struggle against overt and covert adherents of the old forms of work! Attempts were made to settle scores with this "troublemaker" and if not to discredit then at least to "slow down" the innovator by means of controllers' bureaucratic tricks and demagogical criticism. They failed.... Having started work "at the bottom," in a matter of a few years Nikolay Travkin built up a career in the best sense of the word—just 1 year ago, when he took part in the memorable conference at the CPSU Central Committee on questions of fundamentally restructuring economic management, he was a trust manager, but now he is deputy chief of the Moscow Oblast Main Administration for Housing and Civil Construction. A deserved recognition!

The reliable mainstay of restructuring are Communists who persistently march along the path of introducing modern methods of economic management, the path of renewal of our entire life. Primary party organizations and labor collectives are on their side. For example, conference delegate Ya. Kukoba has worked for 25 years at the Kirov Machine Tool Building Plant in Mukachevo, which is in Transcarpathian Oblast. People used to say about him: Quite a good and capable engineer. And that was all. And yet—surely not by accident?—he was entrusted with the post of director at the very start of restructuring. And suddenly an exceptional organizational talent emerged before the collective's very eyes. A talent that includes economic enterprise, a specialist's perspicacity, and the ability to find a common language with partners abroad.

A principled, enterprising, and restless Communist capable of thinking and acting in a non-routine fashion—such testimonials were and still are being heard during

the discussion of nominations for the conference. These are gratifying signs. After all, it is a question of people who were usually called, and are even now still called by people who evidently fear their pressure, "disturbers of the peace."

Striving to implement the line of the selection by the whole people of candidates for election as delegates to the all-union party conference with the participation of party organizations, labor collectives, raykoms, and gorkoms, many obkoms, kraykoms, and union republic Communist Party central committees have taken a clear-cut and open stance. But it seems that this work has not been treated with due responsibility everywhere. Some committees, as shown by alarming reports from local level, continue to act in the old fashion: They pay lipservice to full democratization in forming the delegations, but are really in favor of halfhearted or altogether sham democratization. They say "No quotas!" from the rostrum, but in reality make titanic efforts to "railroad through" the candidates agreed upon in advance by the apparatus quietly behind closed office doors.

"Ivan Kudinov was the candidate for delegate to the 19th party conference nominated by Altay writers," a group of Communist writers writes from Barnaul, for example. "But the raykom produced its own nominee. Many efforts were made by bureau members and by the raykom first secretary personally, but nevertheless the rayon aktiv voted for I. Kudinov rather than for their nominee. Then we saw the newspaper with the list of those elected to attend the conference. Our candidate's name was nowhere to be seen. Never mind, presumably he hadn't 'made it.' But suddenly we saw the name of the man against whose nomination the rayon aktiv had voted so unambiguously. We thought that Gorkom First Secretary Yu. Zhiltsov would explain everything. We understood nothing from his 'explanations.' Apart from just one point: There is, he said, a 'quota.'" Indignant telegrams and telephone calls are pouring in from the Kama Truck Plant. Its 130,000-strong collective nominated Party Committee Secretary N. Galiullin as candidate delegate. But the plant workers saw the name of the party gorkom first secretary in the list of delegates.

Against the background of people's growing political and civic activeness, the attempts to get open party meetings over and done with as swiftly as possible and then to stage manage obkom plenums looked strange, to say the least. Why, PRAVDA readers ask in perplexity, is the apparatus playing these games? Indeed, "games with democracy" serve no purpose. Indeed, they are harmful and opposed to restructuring in nature and spirit.

Reflecting on the peculiarity of today's situation in society, M.S. Gorbachev remarked: "It is as if the gates to a new and unusual living space have opened before us." The accuracy of the guidelines to the still unexplored paths of restructuring will depend largely on the delegates to the 19th all-union conference.

Selection of Yaroslavl Area Delegate Criticized

PM0030610398 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Jun 88 Second Edition p 5

[Letter from A. Malygina, librarian at the I.A. Krylov Yaroslavl Oblast Children's Library, under the rubric "Discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses": "People Are Angry"]

[Text] Yaroslavl—I read the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference and, you know, I started breathing easier.

But what worries me and made me write this letter is: Who will discuss the Theses at the conference? There are grounds for my doubts. Our Yaroslavl is buzzing like a beehive: Discussions are under way about the delegates to the 19th all-union party conference who were recently elected at a party obkom plenum. Some are mentioned approvingly: We know that they are good people. There is nothing that can be said about others.... But when the conversation comes round to F. Loshchenkov, former first secretary of the party obkom and currently chairman of the USSR State Commission for Useful Mineral Reserves, the reaction is the same: "It can't be happening!"

There are too many bitter pages in the life of the Yaroslavl area associated with this man's name. During the 25 years of his leadership the oblast fell behind in terms of many indicators. Agriculture collapsed, and to all intents and purposes social problems are only starting to be resolved now. It is shameful to hear what residents of neighboring oblasts call our Yaroslavl: "long-suffering," "starving." And this despite our immense potential....

However, F. Loshchenkov did not notice anything of the sort during his stint as first secretary. Any criticism was brushed aside at the outset. Yet words veritably flowed from his lips: successes, achievements, labor enthusiasm....

We tried to find out from the party obkom just which party organization had nominated F. Loshchenkov as a delegate. We called the chief of the propaganda and agitation department. The comrade immediately referred us to the first secretary's office. There was a long silence and we were finally referred to the instructor of the general department. He advised approaching the organizational party work department. From there we were redirected to the first secretary's office. Full circle.

A. Malygina, librarian at the I.A. Krylov Yaroslavl Oblast Children's Library

'View' Examines Elections to Party Conference

LD0506174688 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1930 GMT on 3 June broadcasts a 13-minute report during the "View" program on elections to the 19th all-union party conference.

The announcer says a survey was recently conducted at Moscow's Belorusskiy Station. The video shows interviews with 10 passers-by, all members of the CPSU. None of those interviewed had voted or knew the names of their candidates.

Next, in a video report from Vilnius, A. Chekuolis, chief editor of the weekly RODNOY KRAY, is interviewed. A caption says the interview took place on 22 May. The interviewer asks Chekuolis what he expects from the coming party conference. He says: "I think that it will consolidate the process of restructuring and glasnost and give a legal basis for what is being done and I hope that it will speed up restructuring because I think that it is high time to move on to specific actions."

Then Yu. Pozhela, president of the Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR and delegate to the 19th party conference, is interviewed. He says: "In the various strata of our society restructuring is proceeding at different speeds just as throughout the country. Restructuring has two characteristic features, the first is the economy and the second is restructuring of society, the new thinking in society and in international relations. These are two layers and the second layer, which does not require powerful economic transformations, glasnost and democratization, has strongly affected our republic."

In a video interview, V. Mitskyavichyus, lecturer at the Vilnius Mitskyavichus-Kapsukas State University, says: "Restructuring has hardly touched our republic. There has been more talk than actuality. Public organizations should undoubtedly have restructured themselves properly long ago. This has not yet happened. They are probably waiting for instructions from above. Up above they are probably waiting to see what happens in Moscow."

The program then presents a video report from a mass open-air meeting in a stadium. The caption says, "29 May, Omsk." Two officials are shown addressing the meeting. The video shows a banner being held by two members of the crowd which says "Give Us Restructuring." The first official says: "We are now at a crucial point at which each of our votes can be decisive. We are now at a crucial point at which it would be unforgivable to trust the fate of the country to chance and mistakes, to an unforeseeable run of events."

The second official says: "We have unanimously decided to make use of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the party rules and to fulfil our duties as Communists. At a meeting of the party group [words indistinct]

which took place on 25 May this year, we made the decision to work out the orders to be given to the delegates, and to present these orders for discussion by the party organizations of (?building and assembly directorate) No 1 and (?Trust No 4), to act as an initiatory group with the following tasks:

"1. To arrange meetings by all candidates without exception with as many Communists as possible to present their delegates, their businesslike qualities and positions, their plans for work at the conference; to make it incumbent on the delegates to struggle to implement their orders from the electorate, and

"2. After the conclusion of the conference to listen to the delegates in the same organizations where they have been given their orders; to assess their actions; to inform the public about the results by all possible means. In conclusion, I express the hope that today we are observing not just a brief flash of activity but evidence of the awakening feeling of the worthiness of the Soviet person, understanding of the personal responsibility of each person for the fate of the country and the people."

The announcer then says: "The election of delegates to the 19th party conference has virtually ended throughout the country. The procedure for these was determined by the June 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Today we want to point attention to the mechanism of putting forward candidates for delegates to the 19th party conference. The appeal by party leader Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that the discussion of the candidates should be conducted by the whole people was, unfortunately, not heeded in certain places. The candidacies were in practice not discussed in the labor collectives that should have put them forward, but the party apparatus went along the well-worn path. The candidacies were put forward in camera. As happened, for example, in Omsk—and we have just shown a report from there—the candidates were put forward literally in one day, then the following day they were voted for at the gorkom plenum. There was virtually no discussion. What sort of discussion can there be in one day when 37 delegates were put forward and they voted for 37?

"Where the mechanism of putting forward candidates was conducted in camera, this naturally aroused a certain reaction. Making use of their right, guaranteed by the Constitution, to freedom of speech, people joined in demonstrations, held meetings, and even spontaneously organized petitions for those people they would like to have seen as their delegates to the party conference, as happened, for example, in Moscow."

The video, with the caption "28 May, Moscow," shows a young man holding a poster that says: "Signatures are being collected here to a letter to the Moscow Gorkom proposing that mandates of delegates to the 19th party conference be given to Communists Yu. Afanasyev, Yu. Karyakin and V. Korotich."

"Working as rector of the Historical Archives Institute, Yu. Afanasyev has consistently and successfully conducted a program of revealing and studying 'blank spots' in our history from the thirties to the fifties.

"With articles in OGONEK, ZNAMYA, and other publications, writer Yu. Karyakin consistently conducts a line of making public facts about actions damaging to socialism committed by former leaders of the state whose names are still surrounded by false respect and an unjustified halo.

"The chief editor of OGONEK, V. Korotich, has boldly brought the magazine into the position of all-round and consistent defense of the de-Stalinization and democratization of our life.

"Comrade Communists and nonparty people your signatures are essential."

The poster is signed by "The initiatory group to promote the election to the 19th party conference of active supporters of restructuring.

"Leaders of the initiative: Communists V. Kardailskiy, G. Lozovoy, V. Lysenko, nonparty member Yu. Samodurov."

Two other people are holding sheets of paper for people to sign. The man holding the poster says: "You know, right now every person must take an active position to ensure that it is not members of the party but real supporters of restructuring who get into the conference and that this conference should really become a turning point in the history of our country, a turning point toward real democracy and glasnost, and that it should be a guarantee of the irreversibility of restructuring."

Another man says: "For the first time in my life I am engaged in some action together with Communists and we are united precisely by the fact that we now have no other way of bringing influence to bear or try to ensure that really active supporters of restructuring, and not people who wore one mask yesterday and will wear a different one tomorrow, become delegates of the conference. These people mentioned here have proved their program by their articles. They are fighters. We hope that if they get there they will come out in favor of de-Stalinization. There is no alternative to de-Stalinization."

The video then shows an interview with writer Yu.F. Karyakin. Karyakin says: "It is only now that we are beginning Lenin's tragic testament. There are too few, there are very few people with the four qualities: do not take a single word on trust, do not say a single word against your conscience, do not fear any struggle, and speak the truth regardless of any difficulty. The Stalinist stamp which still lies upon us consisted of selecting people with directly contrary qualities and the extermination, hunting, and shooting of the former. We do not

have enough such people. They are appearing now as never before. I am sure that never before in the history of Russia have there been so many qualified people, in science, in knowledge, (in suffering, as we are now finding out). I dare say there has never been so great a lack of will and even lack of character among very qualified people. We are lacking in—we are for the most part spectators—we are lacking in direct participation in all of these things. Dostoyevskiy wrote some wonderful words, the sense of which scorch us again. Where are our best people, he asked, where? He replies: They rise to the surface during times of danger. Such a time has come now and many are rising up as never before. If we lose, it will be a universal Chernobyl and the only ones to blame will be ourselves. No one but ourselves."

Then the video shows an interview with Yu.N. Afanasyev, rector of the Moscow Historical Archives Institute. Afanasyev says: "It seems to me that today not only official history but many representatives of that administrative and bureaucratic system that people have been talking of recently still have no interest in very clearly and precisely formulating the question: What is our historical knowledge, exactly? I think that if we thought along these lines, we would conclude that there is no people and no country with so falsified a history as ours. Of course, it is terrible, of course it is not easy to admit, but if we wish to ensure the success of restructuring, we cannot get away from this. A society cannot live normally or develop normally not knowing what exactly it is. I think that the 19th party conference—I am talking of the Theses and it says this—should also concentrate on this question. In this sense my efforts could also be useful."

The video then returns to the men with the poster and petition. The first one says that it is not enough to support restructuring, but one must know how to achieve it. A second man says that this is their last hope and if they lose here, they lose altogether. A third man says that the 19th party conference will have a great influence on their lives and he would like to be represented by people he trusts.

The video then shows an interview with V.A. Korotich, chief editor of OGONEK. Korotich says: "You know, it is very important to me not to be ashamed before the city or the community. Today when we say that we must defend restructuring, I understand very clearly that I have many times in my life been elected to all sorts of things, but for the first time I feel myself to be a genuine elected representative of the people, and therefore, I feel my duty as never before. It is very important for me to do everything to ensure that restructuring is successful. If they manage to stop it, it will be a tragedy, not for Gorbachev or any one of us, but a tragedy for the system, for socialism.

"The word democracy comes from the demos, the people. Let us give the people the opportunity to give their orders to their delegates and let us give them the opportunity to implement these orders."

While he is speaking a caption reads "He has been elected a delegate to the 19th party conference from Kherson Oblast."

The video then shows the announcer, who is seen holding teleprinter material. A second man is in the studio with him, who says: "A plenum of the Moscow Gorkom was held today. Here is the report TASS put out. We shall give a brief account of it. All the 319 candidacies that were discussed received the sufficient, necessary number of votes for election. They include party leaders and in particular Gorbachev, Ligachev, Ryzhkov, Gromyko."

The announcer says: "As far as concerns Yuriy Nikolaevich Afanasyev, rector of the Moscow Historical Archives Institute, his candidacy was also discussed at the Moscow Gorkom plenum and by a majority of votes he was first of all entered on the list for secret voting and then elected delegate to the 19th party conference, with which our program is very pleased."

"Here is another report. I am quoting directly from TASS. In the several organizations of the city of Moscow where there was discussion of the candidacy of Vitaliy Alekseyevich Korotich, chief editor of OGONEK, he did not receive the necessary number of votes. OGONEK is an all-union magazine. The candidacy of its editor was put forward in other regions of the country. Vitaliy Alekseyevich Korotich was elected to the conference from the Kherson Oblast party organization."

"As far as concerns the third person who spoke on our program, the well-known writer and publicist Yuriy Karyakin, at the meeting of the writers organization withdrew his candidacy to become delegate to the 19th party conference and transferred all the votes to Grigoriy Baklanov who is also a well-known Soviet writer who was elected to the 19th party conference."

Moscow Gorkom Plenum Elects Conference Delegates

PM0406144688 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Jun 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report: "Resolutely Implementing Restructuring: Moscow CPSU Gorkom Plenum"]

[Excerpt] Just over 3 weeks remain before an event destined to play an enormous role in the life of the party and all our society—the opening of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. An important stage in the preparations has been completed in the country—the elections of the delegates who will represent the 20-million-strong detachment of Soviet Communists at the conference.

The honor and the right to speak on their behalf are granted to those whom the people rightly call the pioneers of the revolutionary transformations that have been in progress in literally every sphere of our life since

spring 1985. In order resolutely to advance the restructuring and ensure that its concrete results are felt more rapidly by every Soviet person, we need enterprising, restless people who think and act in a new way.

The party is approaching the conference with the people's full support and with a clear and constructive concept of renewal. Communists and nonparty people are discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the conference with profound interest and a sense of personal involvement and responsibility for the future of restructuring.

Elections of delegates to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference took place at a Moscow party gorkom plenum on 3 June. M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in its work.

Those to whom Moscow's Communists have proposed entrusting their mandates of confidence were invited to the plenum. The working atmosphere was itself unusual—as open, democratic, and businesslike as could be. Microphones were installed in various parts of the hall so that people could ask the candidates questions and take part in the discussion. There were secret ballot booths in the foyer.

The plenum was opened by L.N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom.

Today, he said, we are concluding the great organizational and political work done by party organizations and CPSU raykoms in the capital in nominating conference delegates. In preparing for the conference the party and the entire country are actively discussing the Central Committee theses.

This document of great political, ideological, and moral significance constitutes a collective opinion concerning the platform for the forthcoming conference and the prospects for restructuring. It gives a profound, realistic assessment of the initial results of the fulfillment of the 27th CPSU Congress decisions. The positive results, problems, and difficulties of radical economic reform are analyzed. The Central Committee theses put forward principled approaches to the further development of intraparty democracy, the renewal of all spheres of our society's life, and the establishment of the principles of the new political thinking in the world arena.

The ratification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was a concrete result of restructuring in foreign policy, a truly revolutionary breakthrough in the cause of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet-U.S. summit talks ended successfully and another step was taken along the path of achieving lasting peace.

The party's innovative transformations in domestic and foreign policy are becoming irreversible. They have received the people's full support. The whole of society is in motion.

The Central Committee Theses gave new impetus to the open, businesslike discussion of a wide range of questions of restructuring.

L.N. Zaykov then dwelt in detail on how the nomination of candidate delegates was carried out in Moscow.

This was a complex stage. In essence the party committees underwent a test of political maturity, the ability to operate in conditions of democracy and glasnost. The discussion and nomination of candidacies was based on the opinion of primary party organizations and labor collectives. Party gorkom members took an active part in nominating candidates.

At various stages of the discussion more than 3,000 candidacies were examined. As a rule the discussion and nomination of candidates took place at open party meetings. There were more than 900 of these meetings in primary organizations and 4,000 in grass-roots party components. The collective opinion was also elaborated at extended sessions of party committees and group [kustovoy] and rayon aktiv conferences. There was a searching analysis of the practical and moral qualities of those recommended, and above all their personal contribution to restructuring.

The keen interest of Communists and nonparty people in the forthcoming conference and the composition of its delegates sometimes took unusual forms. Candidacies were put forward not only at party meetings, but also in press publications, television and radio programs, and numerous letters and appeals to party committees. Signatures were even collected in the streets in support of individual candidates.

Really worthy people were named. It is gratifying that in the majority of cases the opinion of the broad public coincided with the opinion of the party organizations. And there were no instructions or hints "from above."

Certain difficulties arose in a number of party organizations. This applies mainly to the rayons in which scientific, academic, and creative collectives are concentrated.

In Sverdlovskiy Rayon, for instance, where there are five major VUZ's and several technical colleges and vocational and technical institutes and schools, a conference of secretaries of party organizations of educational institutions decided to grant the right to nominate a candidate to the collective of one of the country's most prestigious VUZ's—the D.I. Mendeleyev Chemical Technology Institute.

The Communists and nonparty people of the Mendeleyev Chemical Technology Institute, after a thorough discussion, named as candidate Vitalina Trifonenko, a 4th-year student, recognized youth leader, and commissar of a construction detachment.

The alternative candidacy was that of Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev, rector of the History and Archives Institute. In the primary organization more votes were cast for V. Trifonenko than for Yu.N. Afanasyev. At rayon level, the student's candidacy was unanimously supported.

Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev has been given a truly unionwide platform. He is known throughout the country for his scholarly works and trenchant journalistic articles. In the light of all the circumstances the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Bureau deemed it possible, by a majority of votes, to submit his candidacy for the plenum's consideration.

In several of the city's organizations where the candidacy of Vitaliy Alekseyevich Korotich, chief editor of the magazine OGONEK, was discussed, he failed to receive the necessary number of votes. OGONEK is an all-union magazine and its editor's candidacy was put forward in other regions of the country too. V.A. Korotich was elected to the conference from the Kherson Oblast party organization.

There were similar situations in Frunzenskiy, Sevastopolskiy, Leninskiy, Oktyabrskiy, and a number of other rayons, where they simultaneously discussed the candidacies of many well known figures in science and culture who have shown themselves to be ardent champions of restructuring. Among them are L.I. Abalkin, T.I. Zaslavskaya, A.A. Nuykin, G.Ya. Baklanov, E.G. Klimov, N.P. Shmelev, Yu.F. Karyakin, Ye.V. Yakovlev, G.Kh. Popov, O.N. Yefremov, A.I. Gelman, M.F. Shatrov, and other comrades. And even if they are not all elected delegates, that will in no sense belittle the assessment of their contribution to restructuring. [I dazhe yesli ne vse oni budut izbrany delegatami, eto ni v koyey mere ne priumenshayet otsendu ikh vkladu v perestroiku.]

We have also received dozens of letters and telegrams in which labor collectives and party organizations insist that their representatives should be elected delegates. But the gorkom bureau worked on the basis that the capital's delegation should represent the interests of the city as a whole, all its population groups and various categories of party organizations.

There were also objections to proposed candidacies. In particular, there were a number of criticisms of certain party raykom secretaries, economic leaders, and writers.

The gorkom bureau carefully analyzed all these appeals. And a clear opinion was formulated on every one of them: The comrades can be included on the list for secret ballot.

Some people tried to use their official position to get onto the list and defended group interests. But the struggle for restructuring has nothing in common with personal ambitions.

By way of confirming that the elections of delegates took place in an atmosphere of democracy and glasnost, let me cite the following example. In view of the wide public reaction over the name of Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov, we proposed to Leninskiy party raykom and the university party committee that they reconsider the question of Moscow State University's candidates. Yesterday, at a session of the party committee with the participation of the secretaries of all the faculties' party organizations, the decision was unanimously confirmed to nominate two candidates—A.A. Logunov and E.D. Yershov. Naturally, we must heed the opinion of one of the city's biggest party organizations.

The results of the nominations, L.N. Zaykov went on, were summed up at an extended session of the party gorkom bureau with the participation of CPSU raykom first secretaries. In a principled, exacting atmosphere, and at the same time an atmosphere of frankness and good will, each of the candidacies submitted by the raykoms was discussed.

The plenum participants were then familiarized with the list of proposed candidates for the secret ballot. The personal discussion of candidacies was principled and sometimes heated, but entirely amicable and comradely.

Thus Yu.N. Afanasyev had to give detailed answers to questions and criticisms from V.A. Protopopov, professor of Moscow State University; Z.N. Korshunova, director of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom and Obkom Institute of Party History; and A.G. Bortsov, secretary of Sverdlovskiy party raykom. It was emphasized that a Communist's contribution to restructuring should be judged not only by speeches in support of it, but first and foremost by concrete action in his sector of work. After heated debates Yu.N. Afanasyev's candidacy was included on the secret ballot list by a majority of votes.

A number of searching questions on the role of cultural personalities in the renewal of society were put to E.G. Klimov, first secretary of the USSR Cinematographers' Union Board.

In particular, A.I. Zemskov, first secretary of Voroshilovskiy party raykom, spoke of the need for a high standard of debate, the impermissibility of pinning labels on people in the course of disputes, and the personal example of representatives of the artistic intelligentsia in the development of democracy. He noted that masters of the arts have a duty to the people. People expect from them works that are in harmony with our revolutionary times. People's Artist of the USSR M.A. Ulyanov and other participants in the plenum joined in the discussion of this interesting topic.

S.N. Fedorov, general director of the "Microsurgery of the Eye" intersector science and technology complex, A.A. Logunov, rector of Moscow State University, Academician V.S. Semenikhin, and others asked L.I. Abalkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, to speak about the course of the economic reform, the factors delaying it, and the role of academic science in the intensification of the national economy.

Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, responded to criticisms from S.M. Lotsmanov, drill operator at the Moscow Machine Tool Building Plant, and S.P. Skoromyslov, director of Agricultural Vocational and Technical School No 40, on shortcomings in political education work among personnel and in the preparation of young people for military service.

The discussion of the other candidate delegates to the conference was also animated.

The secret ballot then took place. All the 319 candidates discussed received the necessary number of votes for election.

Comrades M.S. Gorbachev, A.A. Gromyko, L.N. Zaykov, Ye.K. Ligachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, V.M. Chebrikov, and D.T. Yazov were elected delegates to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference from Moscow Gorkom. Among the delegates are representatives of the working class and intelligentsia and party, soviet, and economic workers.

L.N. Zaykov cordially congratulated the Communists entrusted with representing the capital's party organization at the 19th all-union party conference. Muscovites expect the conference delegates, he said, to show great activeness, principle, competence, and efficiency and to uphold consistently and firmly the Leninist principles of party life and the CPSU's line of expanding democracy and glasnost, of restructuring. That is the Muscovites' mandate to their delegates.

Readers View Delegate Election Procedure
PM1406154388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jun 88 Morning Edition p3

[Review by Yuriy Orlik, IZVESTIYA deputy editor responsible for letters section under rubric "Reading the Mail": "Lessons for the Future"]

[Text] Be honest: Were you really very interested a couple of years ago as to who would be delegate to a party congress or some other political forum? But suddenly the whole nation is interested to see who will be going to the 19th all-union party conference. Lists of delegates are currently the most read items in the press. Discussion of

the electoral procedure is the main topic of the editorial mail. We are waking from our social apathy—this is a sign of the new times. But the mail also reveals something else: It shows how difficult this awakening is and the strength of the resistance to the process of democratizing our society—a resistance that we have still to overcome. However, we could not have expected otherwise, as our country has so long been lacking in a full-blooded political life—a life replaced by ritual.

That is why we will not ignore the "delegate mail," although the conference participants have now been decided. We will take another close look at these letters and try to learn some lessons from the recent campaign.

Many of these letters clearly convey a sense of alarm: The procedure adopted for forming the delegations was not properly thought through and sometimes, according to readers, revealed its obviously undemocratic nature. Basically, it created a system of candidate selection that most favored people working in party bodies. "We have seen the old, extremely familiar picture," Ye. Mudresh from Kharkov wrote, "of elections without choice, elections based on a quota system, elections in which the apparatus of paid functionaries elects itself. This is so strikingly different from the general mood of the public, the substance of virtually every publication in the press, and the spirit of recent top-level party documents that you cannot help but think that word and deed travel in opposite directions in our country." "Despite direct instructions from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee," S. Semenov from Smolensk observed, "the formation of delegations to the conference followed the same pattern it always did in the stagnation period—behind closed doors, without a broad discussion of the candidates, and without preliminary information on them in the oblast newspaper."

Many envelopes contain cuttings from local newspapers with lists of delegates. Here are some of the comments with which readers accompanied them. "Huh! The same old faces.... The same comrades at all Moscow forums" (V. Severgin, Prokopyevsk). "First secretary.... First secretary.... First secretary.... Does being elected delegate depend on your position?" (A. Konova, Sverdlovsk). "Of the 70 candidates to the plenum the obkom bureau selected 48. Forty eight is the number needed—so we have to vote for 48. What kind of election is this?" (P. Pyanov, chief engineer, Odessa). "I had expected there to be people among the delegates who would be distinguished from us mere mortals not only by the brilliance of their orders and medals—but by the brilliance of their ideas" (Yu. Morkovkin, Simferopol). "The system that gives preference to party committees is unfortunately often at variance with public opinion" (N. Ioffe-Goncharuk, Moscow). "We have here the whole party apparatus plus other bigwigs. But 'for the sake of democracy' they have diluted this list with tractor drivers (women included), dairymaids, and metalworkers" (K. Ilyushina, teacher, Ashkhabad). And, particularly alarming: "If delegates were unaware of any violation of democratic

principles in the election procedure, will they be able to defend these principles in the future—at the conference itself?" (A. Kirillov, P. Chichagov, and a total of 25 signatures from associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences Applied Physics Institute, Gorkiy).

Readers plainly associate the system of selecting (not electing!) delegates with the interests of definite social groups. "The nomenklatura has no need of democracy and glasnost," G. Petrova, an engineer from Penza, is convinced. "The apparatus proved the best prepared for the elections," Ye. Parshina from Moscow wrote. "It set about drawing up lists of candidates and holding the traditional consultations (also within the apparatuses). The majority of ordinary Communists were isolated from this work."

Readers point out that it is impossible not to interpret attempts to confine the right to nominate candidates to a narrow circle of elite people as a lack of faith in the political maturity of ordinary Communists who will supposedly stray in the wrong direction if deprived of a guiding hand.

These letters confirm that the old approaches are rejected by the majority. They do not work now. Tomorrow they will be quite impossible.

The broad public interest in who is to be given the mandate of conference delegate has also become apparent in other ways that are unexpected and unusual to our way of thinking and in the context of our political practice. We have witnessed the formation of various organizational committees and initiative groups, the holding of thousands of rallies and spontaneous meetings, the collection of signatures supporting and opposing individual candidates, and also real election demonstrations. Streets, squares, and even stadiums have become the focus of discussions on what had seemed to be internal party matters.

The mailbag and reports by our correspondents tell the following story. Some 8,000 residents of Omsk gathered at the "Dynamo" stadium to express their opinions on the procedure for nominating delegates. Participants in the meeting held in front of the IZVESTIYA building, of which you had a good view from the office windows, demanded that prominent publicists and scientists be additionally elected to the conference. People are also discussing this idea in their letters. Muscovites Yu. Samodurov, A. Sukhov, and S. Mitrokhin (the letter was signed by 100 people in all) suggest that additional mandates be given to people "whom the public would definitely like to see among the conference delegates." "I think the Palace of Congresses would be able to accommodate another 50, if not another 100 people who have done (and will still do, if not deprived of the opportunity) far more for restructuring than many others," A. Bugayev, a student at Moscow University, supported this idea.

It must be said that public interference in the course of the election has not been without its results. For example, the people of Sakhalin were invited by a live broadcast to go to the square by the drama theater to discuss the results of the elections to the party conference in the context of the general situation on the island. A party obkom plenum held several days later released P. Tretyakov from his duties as first secretary of the CPSU Obkom. The decision was made to hand over the "obkom" hotel, hospital, and boarding house to the gorispolkom.

Evidently, uncontrolled forms of influence on the formation of the delegations, like these rallies, for example, have displeased many. Attempts have been made to disclose "troublemakers" and accuse members of initiative groups of the intention to create a "parallel power." Usually without any foundation whatsoever. Does this mean that group interests and personal ambitions did not make themselves felt during the struggle? No, it does not mean that. We were once again able to satisfy ourselves that not only party workers but also ordinary participants in rallies and meetings are incapable of democratic debate and democratically defending their positions. Loudmouths sometimes gained the upper hand. While noting these cases, we must bear in mind that these shortcomings are not the result of too much democracy but too little.

Both the party and society have now gained valuable political experience. It is important not to lose or forget this experience. We must gather and carefully analyze everything proposed by popular initiative and incorporate it, if you like, in the work of the forthcoming forum.

All the necessary lessons must be learned from the campaign in preparation for the conference. For the future. The first is that elections to any representative body and any forum can no longer remain a purely ritual procedure with the result known in advance. They are becoming an arena for social struggle and an expression of pluralist opinion. From now on we cannot count on any decision "from above" being automatically guaranteed unanimous support and approval. The people's political faith in the party is not automatically conferred on individual party workers. This faith has to be earned by each party worker for himself—through his own personal example, work for restructuring, and service to the people.

The elections have very clearly shown that we still have to perfect a democratic procedure for forming delegations to conferences and congresses. The quota system has not disappeared. It has merely changed its name. Because the perhaps understandable concern to ensure that the "oblast is worthily represented by its delegation" has in practice meant that the lists of candidates were compiled in offices as before.

Another lesson from the recent campaign is that participation by broad strata of society in politics is now a fait accompli. As our society becomes more democratic there will be an increase in the influence exerted by nonparty people on the situation within the party and in the extent to which the people control its activity. This is connected with the actual position of the CPSU in the present sociopolitical structure as the sole ruling party on whose policies and political and moral state the fate of society depends. And we must not reject or cut ourselves off from this influence but develop effective ways to take public opinion into consideration.

New figures—people with political acumen, whose words and ideas carry authority and influence—have recently appeared on the social stage. We must all take an interest in ensuring that these people become active assistants of the party.

And the last point. Considering that the forthcoming conference is arousing enormous interest and the public is having some doubts about the delegates, it would certainly be right to ensure that the conference is conducted openly, with both television and radio relaying direct broadcasts from the Palace of Congresses.

Official Sums Up Delegate Elections

PM1406084188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Jun 88 Second Edition pp 1, 2

["Our Interview" with Ye.Z. Razumov, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department, by V.S. Kozhemyako, editor of PRAVDA's Party Life Desk: "An Important Stage in Preparations for the Conference"; date and place not given—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The elections of delegates for the 19th all-union party conference have ended in party organizations. This crucial political campaign was the focus of public attention and was widely covered by the news media. Its course and results remain the topic of lively discussion. In this context, V.S. Kozhemyako, editor of PRAVDA's Party Life Desk, asked Ye.Z. Razumov, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department, to answer several questions.

[Kozhemyako] Yevgeniy Zotovich, the elections of party conference delegates have aroused tremendous interest among Communists and all working people. What could you say about the course of the elections, what are their specific features?

[Razumov] This interest in the elections was no accident. It is well known that party conferences assemble between CPSU congresses to discuss topical questions of party policy. On this occasion, delegates were being elected for a party forum which will have to make some exceptionally important decisions, decisions that M.S. Gorbachev

has described as fateful, decisions that are meant to give a new and mighty boost to the processes of Soviet society's revolutionary renewal.

No party conferences have been held since 1941. The current CPSU Statutes do not regulate the procedure for holding party conferences, saying only that the procedure is determined by the CPSU Central Committee.

In connection with the convening of the 19th all-union party conference, the Central Committee had to solve afresh numerous political and organizational questions. They had to be solved in the atmosphere prevailing in the country and the party since the Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th CPSU Congress, in the conditions of strengthening restructuring and of democratization of social and internal party life.

One such question was the procedure for electing conference delegates. It differs substantially from the procedure for determining the composition of party congress delegates. It is well known that congress delegates are elected by oblast and kray party conferences and republic communist party congresses, which are preceded by report and election meetings in primary party organizations and by rayon and city party conferences. As regards delegates for the 19th all-union party conference, the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum decided that they should be elected by closed (secret) ballots at obkom, kraykom, and union republic communist party central committee plenums (except in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, where delegates were elected at party obkom plenums). The Central Committee plenum also established the norm for representation: 1 conference delegate per 3,780 party members. A total of approximately 5,000 delegates had to be elected.

The Central Committee did not give local party organs any quotas regarding the composition of delegates (in terms of occupation, social status, sex, age, and so on). The main political guideline boiled down to the requirement that the most authoritative party members who had proved themselves through their active stance and specific deeds in the process of restructuring should be elected as conference delegates.

The right to submit proposals for delegate nominations to party committee plenums was granted to collective organs—the bureaus of obkoms, kraykoms, and union republic communist party central committees. Moreover, the CPSU Central Committee recommended that, prior to the submission of proposals, party committees should consult primary party organizations, labor collectives, and party gorkoms and raykoms about the possible candidates.

This, in principle, was how these questions were solved at local level. As a rule, the discussion of nominations took place at open party meetings, where the most deserving candidates were selected from among what

was usually a large number of nominations. Subsequently, some party committees discussed the nominations at cluster [kustovyye] meetings of Communists, others at rayon aktiv meetings, and in some places at raykom and gorkom plenums. As a result of the discussions, the range of possible candidates was naturally narrowed. Nominations were often put forward in press, television, and radio material or in letters and appeals to party committees.

This procedure for selecting delegates made it possible to better consider the opinion of a wide range of Communists and working people's opinion and to discuss the proposed candidates in a collegial fashion.

[Kozhemyako] There were press reports that there were violations in holding the elections in a number of instances and that nominees were imposed "from above" in places. How correct are these claims?

[Razumov] It must be said with the utmost clarity that the Central Committee has no information at all indicating that the procedure it laid down for election of delegates was violated in any substantial way. True, not all party committees proved sufficiently prepared for solving these questions in an atmosphere of openness, broad glasnost, and genuine consultation with the party and nonparty masses. Unfortunately, there were some irregularities and instances of formalism.

In Kaliningrad, for example, comrades nominated by party organizations as possible candidates were initially invited to attend a party obkom plenum, but the invitations were hastily withdrawn later on. Of course, this tactlessness did not pass unnoticed. The discussion of candidates for election as delegates was needlessly rushed in places, which aroused censure.

Some articles voice complaints that comrades who, in the authors' opinion, deserved to be conference delegates were not elected. What can you say? You can only express joy that so many active and authoritative champions of restructuring emerged in the course of the nomination and discussion of candidates. We were spoiled for choice, as it were. It is obvious that not every deserving person could have been elected—after all, the number of delegates is limited. Be that as it may, however, the election or nonelection of a given comrade must not give rise to grievances or ambitions.

Lamenting the supposedly insufficiently democratic procedure for elections, and voicing regrets that representatives of some specific party organization did not end up among the delegates, the authors of some articles essentially overlook the procedure of discussing proposed candidates at party committee plenums. And yet this procedure was quite democratic. Party committee members had a real chance to examine any number of

possible candidates. There were no restrictions as regards the number of candidates they could reject or of other candidates they could nominate and add to the lists as they saw fit.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, the discussion of candidates was active, at times sharp, but amicable. For example, the Krasnodar party kraykom plenum was addressed by 57 speakers, the Irkutsk Obkom plenum by 72, and the Lvov Obkom plenum by 115.

The decision on the actual number and identity of nominees to be included on the secret ballot lists was made collectively by party committee members. And by them alone. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, for example, nominated and included on the ballot list more candidates than the actual number of delegates due to be elected. In other cases they limited themselves to the number that party committees were entitled to elect according to the set norm of representation. This procedure may or may not be to everyone's liking, but there were no deviations from the procedure established by the CPSU Central Committee or from the party statutes.

During the process of electing delegates, Communists and nonparty people advised or criticized individual leaders of party and other organs and formulated mandates. Sometimes criticisms were also voiced after elections had taken place. These remarks were not ignored. For example, when it became clear the P.I. Tretyakov, first secretary of the Sakhalin CPSU Obkom, did not enjoy due support from the oblast's Communists and population, the question was submitted for examination by a party obkom plenum. P.I. Tretyakov resigned as conference delegate and asked to be relieved of his post. The plenum decided to elect a new delegate and to replace the obkom first secretary.

One more point. A number of personnel of central party and state organs, foreign policy departments, news media, and creative unions were elected as conference delegates. In this process, personnel of central organs were recommended for election by party committee plenums on general grounds. Each nomination could be discussed without any restrictions or reservations. It is appropriate to mention that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the proposals to elect these comrades met with approval. There were also instances when questions were raised and critical remarks were made. Serious complaints were made against Comrade V.G. Arkhipov, RSFSR minister of the fuel industry, at the Kemerovo party obkom plenum; against Comrade A.I. Iyevlev, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosagroprom, at the Stavropol Kraykom plenum; and against USSR Minister of Geology Comrade Ye.A. Kozlovskiy at the Yakutsk Obkom plenum. But they were elected as conference delegates in secret ballots. Let me reiterate that no

deviations at all from the delegate election procedure established by the CPSU Central Committee or violations of the prerogatives of local party committees were allowed to occur.

[Kozhemyako] What is our opinion about the overall composition of delegates for the all-union party conference?

[Razumov] So far, the information on the composition of delegates has not been summed up. This information will be submitted to the party conference by its credentials commission. Nonetheless, I would like to say that deserving Communists have been elected for the conference. Any attempts to make out that "candidates were imposed" or that the election results "are disappointing" are groundless. I would also say this: Such generalizations reflect their originators' desire to cast doubts on the delegates' ability to successfully resolve the questions on the conference agenda.

In actual fact, we have the impression that the main political guideline of the CPSU Central Committee has been observed—the delegates come from among the active supporters of restructuring. You need only mention the names of just some delegates. Among them are famous miners Ye.I. Drozdetskiy and A.Ya. Kolesnikov; steel maker K.E. Romazanov; construction industry worker N.I. Travkin; production association leaders A.I. Chabanov and V.P. Kabaidze; agricultural production innovators V.A. Starodubtsev and I.P. Senko; machine operator N.V. Gellert; scientists B.Ye. Paton, G.I. Marchuk, A.A. Nikonov, and L.I. Abalkin; literary figures and artists V.V. Karpov, K.Yu. Lavrov, M.A. Ulyanov, T.Ye. Abuladze, A.V. Vasnetsov, Ch. Aytmatov, Ya.Ya. Peters, and T.N. Khrennikov; journalist I.A. Vasilyev; children's home director A.P. Khlebushkina, and many, many others.

As regards the social composition of delegates, let me give just some individual examples. The Moscow city party organization elected 319 delegates. One in four of them is a worker, while one-fourth of the total are representatives of science, culture, public education, and health care. The total number of delegates from the Donetsk party organization includes 44 workers, the majority of whom are members of labor collective councils and 6 of whom head the councils.

In short, these are people who will bring sensible experience of practical work to the all-union forum of Communists, people who will actively support the course of society's revolutionary renewal, will elaborate a program for the deepening of restructuring, and will live up to the great hopes of the party and the people.

Official Discusses Improving Soviet Electoral System

LD1306091688 Moscow TASS in English 0855 GMT
13 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 13 TASS—"There are no doubts that the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which convenes in Moscow late this month, will discuss among

other problems the problem of perfecting the election system in the USSR, which is also mentioned in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee. This system is the most criticized democratic institution of the country today. And it is, probably, only fair that a lack of democratism, characteristic of the administrative command system, manifested itself most graphically in our election practice. Therefore the question is raised of renewing the mechanism of forming the elective bodies of power," said Yuriy Korolev, head of a department of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He answered question from TASS news agency on ways of democratization in the country's election system.

To begin with, Korolev said, democratization has already started. "Let us remember, for example, the election experiment, new principles in nominating candidates to deputies, the practice of wide-scale pre-election discussion of candidates. All this has been already tested in the course of last year's elections to local soviets. But this is only a beginning."

"Speaking about ways of perfecting the system, let us recall what it is being mainly criticised for. First, the very possibility of electing is actually missing at the elections, because ballots as a rule carry one name. Second, the false results of voting: The 1000 per cent of yes votes, of course, does not reflect the actual situation. Third, excessive overorganisation during elections when the voter is often denied the chance to express his will. And, finally, voters practically do not know their candidates to deputies or know them little, and vice versa.

"The reform of election system will proceed along these main directions, prompted by the just criticism. Relevant documents are being currently drafted at the supreme bodies of state power with the participation of academics and specialists. Its contents will, of course, reflect the results of debates at the forthcoming 19th all-union party conference.

"It is too early to speak about specific provisions of the future system. However, it will be hard to imagine it without a new approach to nominating candidates to deputies being included. It will, probably, exclude nomination according to 'the post one holds' or to the principle of 'proportional representation', because elected are not simply representatives of people but exponents of their views, opinions and will. This is not one and the same thing. I think election ballots will carry two and maybe more candidates. Organisation of the work of deputies, Soviets on the whole, must become different. They will receive the opportunity to give more time to state affairs by extending sessions and improving the work of deputy commissions.

"We will soon learn about it," Yuriy Korolev concluded. By spring next year, when the term of office of the current Supreme Soviet of the USSR expires and new elections will be announced, cardinal changes, probably, will take place in the Soviet election system."

Moscow TV Views Delegate Elections, Conference Tasks

LD1506192188 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1750 GMT 14 Jun 88

[From the "May I Have the Floor" program; report by Aleksandr Mikhailovich Adamovich, identified by caption as a writer]

[Text] [Begin Adamovich recording] I do not think that a single congress or a single plenum has been awaited with such tension and with such hope as the upcoming all-union party conference. Of course, there are serious reasons for this. Among numerous reasons for the anxiety I can see the following:

We are all witnesses of how the ministerial bureaucracy has not very skillfully buried economic reform, but has managed to paralyze and castrate it. By doing this it managed not simply to put brakes on our economy but, to a certain degree, to discredit the restructuring itself, because the bureaucracy has made it impossible for the restructuring to give our population the fruits that should already have been reaped. Thus, it has made it impossible to activate support for restructuring.

I think that there is also concern that the most conservative part of the party bureaucracy and the party apparatus will try to do the same thing to those decisions and hopes pinned on the all-union party conference. In any case, the symptomatic fear that the party conference will go far in transforming society's political structures is clearly perceptible, and work against such success is clearly already being carried out.

For example, with regard to what we are seeing virtually every day now—well, we see something strange. After all, the whole country is a country of readers; it is now a country of ardent readers—I'm thinking about newspapers and magazines. This country knows who are the leaders of glasnost and, in the end, of democracy along with the creative and journalistic intelligentsia, which together with the party provides ideological support for restructuring. There are very few of these people. Everybody knows them and everybody reads them. Almost none of them have been elected to the party conference, although they were unanimously elected by the collective.

Let us say Gavril Popov, our economist who is amazingly talented, bold, and principled, was elected. Let us say there were 49 people (?at the chemistry faculty) and 48 voted for him, yet he did not pass. A usual higher education establishment official got through but Gavril Popov was, at the party raykom level (?removed) from this chance to participate, speak, and respond in as a conference delegate at the conference itself. They did this to Popov, and literally yesterday they also did this to Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev. He was nominated by the collective of the (?Archive Institute). This is a man without whom it is difficult to imagine the conference.

Nevertheless, it was done in a very simple and crude way. The right was given to the chemical technology institute that nominated a female student, who will sit and listen, but will probably not be very useful to the conference.

The same thing was done to Korotich and Koryakin, two publicists who participate very actively especially in the ideological aspect of restructuring. And so, I can go on and name Fedorov, an eye operations expert, world-famous scientist, and mainly a philosopher—a philosopher of restructuring. We listen to him and we read him. He got through by one vote. The three people who were speaking at the raykom were actively speaking against him. I would like to hear them. I would like to understand their logic, the logic of their speeches. But there is clearly only one logic: the desire to send to the conference people who will not actively support radical changes in the political structure for the benefit of the soviets, for the benefit of those organizations which stood at the head of the revolution and which were created by the revolution in order to lead the country.

Well, you do know what our local soviets are like now. We know it extremely well. You see, the most graphic evidence of complete paralysis of this organization of soviets over our long history is provided by the history of our Supreme Soviet.

After all, it is remarkable for its ludicrousness—it is a joke and a laughing stock! Since 1937 when the first Supreme Soviet was elected, not a single delegate and not a single participant of the Supreme Soviet has not abstained, not to mention voted against any decision. What does this mean, then? That starting from 1937 all proposals announced from the rostrum were "ideal", were they not? We know that they were not, otherwise we would not have ended up in the deadlock we have. And this in the first place certainly—I say—is evidence of the fact that the Supreme Soviet was not set up by accident in 1937. This fear of 1937 has been hanging over and continues to this day to hang over all of the Soviet activities. But the most evident is simply solving nothing.

So the ideas pronounced by Mikhail Sergeyvich, the ideas that will clearly be the main ones at the party conference, can only be implemented if genuine clerks of works [porab] of the restructuring get to the conference and not the conservative section of the apparatus, which is now clearly opposing the view of the Communists. In this lies a huge hope. After all, we now observe how actively the Communists oppose this, how they no longer consent to the role of puppets of the apparatus. And so, in all these cases I have mentioned of active, creative intelligentsia who were not admitted to the conference, the party organizations and the party grassroots levels have now appealed these cases.

After all, in our cinematography arts institute, a party meeting was held the day before yesterday, where the Communists from the institute stated clearly that they do not agree with the discrimination against small party organizations which simply are not given the opportunity to nominate their own delegates. Our institute nominated Andrey Noykin, who again is a man who is well known in restructuring. He forecast that the conservative forces would assemble, that they would be ready for an offensive, and that they would attack soon. And an article by Nina Andreyeva [author of a SOVETSKAYA RUSSIYA article questioning restructuring] appeared literally 2 weeks later. So, this is how sensitive he is to what is happening in our society and in restructuring. Our party organization nominated him as a delegate. However, it is clear, and I am absolutely convinced, that if the mechanism of pushing through people from a list of delegates works then of course he will not get through, just as all those others I spoke about did not.

Well, how does our population regard the situation that has come about in expectation of the party conference? It seems to me that too many people unfortunately use very mundane yardsticks to measure the successes or failures of restructuring—there is sugar, there is no sugar; there is vodka, vodka has disappeared; there is a threat of price increases. This is all very important, very important indeed, and it is important that restructuring really should show some economic results right away. But we know the reasons it has not shown any yet; I have talked about those reasons. It is all sabotage by our ministerial bureaucracy. But I think it very important for people to understand that if restructuring does not take place, then we will not simply return to stagnation. We will roll back very far indeed, perhaps to that comrade, the gravedigger of socialism, the gravedigger of democracy, and, in the literal sense the gravedigger of millions of people's lives.

And what is also particularly dangerous is that if restructuring really does not take place—and far too much depends upon the party conference—then the situation in the whole world will change abruptly in the direction of the cold war. How could there be any talk of some sort of disarmament then, of any sort of peace? I think mankind will once again feel itself on the edge of an abyss. The feelings of hope about our country and even affection for our country, which one notices meeting people abroad, will abruptly be replaced by a feeling of resentment, of being deceived again, or by a feeling of confrontation. To say nothing of what will happen in our country.

We will return to the Rashidov syndrome [Rashidovshchina] but reinforced, I think, by the Beriia syndrome [Beriyaovshchina] because during the Brezhnev era the Rashidov syndrome was pretty liberal. The clans at the top—Rashidov's, Kunayev's, and Brezhnev's clans—plundered the country, but sort of allowed it to be plundered at the grass-roots level as well. Everything will change abruptly: alongside the Rashidov syndrome, I

think, the Beriia syndrome will emerge again if restructuring collapses, because the frightened bureaucratic apparatus will feel mercy for no one. And the fact that our country will slip into the abyss, that it will turn into a poorly developed country encircled with missiles—and that is nothing more than some sort of political monster—will be the most dangerous situation for the entire world.

I think people must understand this, and they must therefore react to the forthcoming party conference as an event concerning everyone, not just Communists. Our slogan—the people and the party are united—should take on some sort of graphic form at this time. The party should really see the people on the streets now, see the people supporting the line mapped out by the 27th congress, for which the most active and most progressive part of our party is fighting. They must support it actively, because, as I read in the newspaper, if there is an attempt to go backward and, what is more, to foist who knows whom on us as leaders of the whole country, then the people will not stand by in silence I think, this would be a mistake, because it will be too late then.

One of the major events of recent days, I cannot but mention this as we see it on television every day, is the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. The old way of thinking put the troops there; the new thinking is withdrawing them. The way we regard this and the conclusions we draw about the impermissibility of small wars today, and all the more so tomorrow, are very important. Even the way we receive our returning boys is important.

And another thing I would like to say, the final thing—it flashed through my mind that 300 of our prisoners of war are still there. I think we must talk about this, we must talk about our attitude to those boys, which should show whether we have changed or not. Or have we remained in the same positions as those about whom I was reading in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA—some Colonel Pilatov, no, Filatov, who suspected that there were 5 million POW's in World War II declared traitors. I think we must expiate our inhuman, Stalinist attitude to the victims of that war, our prisoners of war, with our attitude to these 300 boys who are being held in terrible torment, in terrible conditions of captivity.

I think that the energies of our public and state must go in that direction now, this is of fundamental importance. It concerns not just the lives, the rescuing of these boys, but it will also show whether we have really changed in some of the most important, moral qualities. [end recording]

[Unidentified announcer] And now, dear comrades, an epilogue to the broadcast. Certain changes have occurred since the program was recorded. A most important stage in preparations for the 19th all-union party conference, the election of delegates, has been completed in the country. A number of active participants in restructuring

to whom Aleksandr Adamovich refers have been elected as delegates. In particular, Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev was elected as a delegate at the plenum of the Moscow Gorkom. Vitaliy Alekseyevich Korotich, editor-in-chief of OGONEK magazine, has been elected a delegate to the conference from Kherson Obkom. As far as Gavril Kharitonovich Popov is concerned, the Moscow Gorkom bureau asked the Leninskiy Party Raykom and the Moscow University Gorkom to return to the issue of candidates, and the decision to forward two candidates—Anatoliy Alekseyevich Logunov and Eduard Dmitriyevich Yershov—was endorsed unanimously at a session of the gorkom with the secretaries of party organizations of all participating faculties. The Moscow Gorkom Plenum chose them as delegates.

As PRAVDA has noted, we have not gotten by smoothly and without formalism. But it is gratifying that during the nomination and discussion of candidacies, so many active and authoritative champions of restructuring have emerged. One thing is clear—that not all those who are worthy of it could be elected. the number of delegates is limited, after all. Be that as it may, the election or nonelection of one or another comrade must not be turned into a subject of resentment and wounded pride. By and large, the majority of those who have been elected for the 19th all-union party conference are those who actively support the course of revolutionary renewal of society, and who will, at the conference itself, draft the program for the deepening of restructuring.

Moscow Delegates to Party Conference Viewed
LD1706083788 Moscow TASS in English 0646 GMT
17 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 17 TASS—TASS news analyst Boris Prokhorov writes:

Here are some initial data, at first. There are about 10,000 primary organizations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow. The primary organizations of the city nominated 3,000 people at the first stage of the selection of candidates for attending the 19th all-union party conference. Three hundred and nineteen delegates were chosen from among them. Who are the people in whom the Communists of Moscow have placed great trust?

When one studies the list of the delegations, it becomes clear that it represents the Moscow Communists in a sufficiently full and proportional way: The delegates are workers, engineers, scientists, servicemen, party workers, and creative intellectuals. This is not an artificial proportionality, I was told at the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. The selection of delegates was held for the first time without any instructions whatsoever from the party's city committee. Each district of the city independently chose a principle for the selection of candidates and the proportionality of representation took shape naturally, although some changes took place in this field, too. As compared with the composition of the Moscow delegation attending the 27th congress of the CPSU, the share of party workers on the delegation

to the 19th party conference has diminished while that of creative intellectuals has almost doubled.

And one more detail: More than 90 percent of delegates are Communists who were nominated by primary organizations and whose candidacies were publicly discussed and voted upon in work collectives.

Of course, one cannot rule out an error in forming a Moscow delegation: It is for the first time that the election of delegates to a major party forum was held without any regulating instructions. The city committee of the CPSU regard this, I was told, as a sort of experiment, as valuable experience and school. The city committee staff also learn democracy.

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